A-Infos (en) France, OCL CA #359 - SAINT SOLINE - The organization of emergency services, a tool of repression (ca, de, fr, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]

When discussing the repression in Sainte-Soline on March 25, 2023, 
police violence generally comes to mind, especially since body camera 
footage worn by gendarmes during the anti-reservoir demonstration 
recently brought it to the forefront. However, the government's ban on 
evacuating the injured actually exacerbated the effects of police 
violence. Thus, it can be said that the repression employed two tools: 
military organization and medical organization. And the latter was based 
on "doctrines of maintaining order" currently in vogue, as Françoise, 
Serge's mother, explains here.

- Following your complaint of police brutality and obstruction of 
emergency services [1], the IGGN (General Inspectorate of the National 
Gendarmerie) investigated and issued a report on these matters. What 
information did you glean from this report regarding the organization of 
emergency services?

During its investigation, the IGGN interviewed healthcare workers, 
firefighters, and military personnel. It collected body camera footage 
and seized clothing from hospitalized protesters. However, it only used 
a portion of this material (there are several gaps that our new 
complaint may uncover), and it was only this portion that experts in 
ballistics, medicine, and other specialties examined to provide their 
opinion. The IGGN then submitted a report to the prosecutor based on 
their findings-and the prosecutor dismissed our complaint.

To determine whether there had been any obstruction to the arrival of 
emergency services on March 25, 2023, experts studied the hearings 
conducted by the IGGN (General Inspectorate of the National 
Gendarmerie), as well as certain telephone communications between 
healthcare workers, military personnel, and firefighters. They quickly 
established that the emergency response had been organized based on two 
doctrines - the Orsec plan[organization of civil security response]in 
its "numerous victims" version (therefore Orsec-Novi) and the 
"operational doctrine for mass shootings" - and on the basis of 
"recommendations and organizational plans in the event of an exceptional 
health situation" (SSE).

According to hearings with officials from Samu 79 (the emergency medical 
service for the Deux-Sèvres department) and the SDIS (Departmental Fire 
and Rescue Service), meetings were held before the demonstration under 
the auspices of the prefect, with representatives from the ARS (Regional 
Health Agency), the departmental directorate of territories, the 
gendarmerie, the SDIS, and Samu 79 in attendance, to organize the 
emergency response. As the experts wrote, "within the framework of an 
ORSEC plan (emergency response plan), a departmental operations center 
(COD) was established at the prefecture, and interaction and 
coordination were implemented between a COS (commander of emergency 
operations) and a COPG (commander of police or gendarmerie operations)." 
An advanced medical post (PMA) was also set up "for emergency first aid 
and stabilization before extraction," and the intervention zones for 
operational emergency resources followed the "three-zone concept." In 
other words, zones have been delimited (by a COS) "according to the type 
of danger": a red "exclusion zone", an orange "controlled access zone" 
and a green "support zone" - with control of their access by law 
enforcement.

But the head of the fire and rescue service also referred, during his 
hearing, to a "mass shooting operational doctrine" which includes these 
same three zones (but defined by the Incident Commander and the 
Operational Command Post). The red zone, designated "immediate danger," 
is "an area in which the adversary is firing and using violence"; access 
to it is restricted to the police and gendarmerie, who "transport 
victims to the victim extraction point located at the boundary between 
the controlled zone and the exclusion zone." The orange zone is 
"partially secured by the police and gendarmerie": emergency services 
can access it under their protection and command." The green zone, 
"located on the periphery of the event site," is "secured by law 
enforcement," and it is there that "emergency services regroup and 
organize themselves, under the authority of the Incident Commander."

Finally, the IGGN experts consider that Sainte-Soline fell under the 
category of "an exceptional health situation (EHS)" since, according to 
the Ministry of Social Affairs, an EHS encompasses "all situations 
likely to generate a significant increase in the demand for care or to 
substantially disrupt the organization of healthcare provision." "In an 
EHS context," the experts stated, "medical care lies at the intersection 
of emergency medicine and disaster medicine." Police and fire department 
medical teams are responsible for extracting victims from red and orange 
zones and providing necessary first aid on site. As "in the case of an 
ORSEC plan, especially Novi," the collection of victims is carried out 
"by firefighters and rescue workers to a designated victim assembly 
point (VIP) where the medical teams are located."

- Did the IGGN experts make any comments regarding this organization of 
the rescue services?

- Some, yes. They raised concerns about several aspects of it, but 
generally without taking a position, always saying that it was not their 
mission to do so...
For example, they noted that, in the "operational directive" written by 
the SDIS the day before the demonstration, there is "no specific mention 
of the organization planned for the extraction and care of victims in a 
controlled area WITH a life-threatening emergency, while other 
situations are specified therein".

They also noted that the healthcare workers and firefighters in 
Sainte-Soline acted in accordance with public order protocols: they were 
aware of the designated zones and the procedures to follow. Numerous 
phone calls showed that they knew they were operating within an ORSEC 
(Emergency Response Plan), a "Novi" (Nighttime Emergency Response Plan), 
or a "catastrophe" (disaster response plan), and that
they were not authorized to intervene in the "exclusion zone." However, 
the experts observed that the medics were unaware of "the organizational 
principles of the deployed emergency response," such as the existence of 
a PRV (Public Response Plan) or its location; and they were also unaware 
that an ORSEC or ORSEC-Novi-type organization with the establishment of 
exclusion zones had been decided upon. The same was true for the 
demonstrators. Consequently, the experts concluded that, in the absence 
of a public announcement of the ORSEC plan before the demonstration, 
"the question arises as to the impact of the public's lack of awareness 
of the plan implemented for organizing emergency response."
They also noted that "given the gendarmerie deployment[in 
Sainte-Soline], the exceptional health situation was coupled with a 
defensive public order operation[sic!]." However, this is a scenario 
that the doctrines and/or recommendations used as a reference for 
organizing emergency services do not foresee: they do not consider 
"specific organization during a defensive public order operation 
combined with a rescue operation." These arrangements were therefore 
inadequate, even in the eyes of the experts.

Finally, these experts highlighted some gaps in the investigation. For 
example, the documents in their possession did not specify the access 
that fire trucks, protected by law enforcement, "could have had between 
1:50 p.m. and 3:34 p.m."

Similarly, they noted the lack of information "on the responsiveness of 
the gendarmerie escorts in providing emergency services following 
requests from the fire department command post[the SDIS]," or "on the 
number of gendarmerie escorts planned to provide emergency services." 
Regarding Serge, they only noted the "incomprehensible" delay of the 
motorcyclists who were supposed to escort the ambulance from Ruffec for 
evacuation and their "disengagement" at the entrance to Sainte-Soline.

Their conclusion is that the potential "problem" may have arisen because 
the emergency response plan (ORSEC) had not been publicly declared, or 
because potential life-threatening emergencies had not been taken into 
account. However, they argue that "strictly speaking, there cannot be 
any obstacle to the implementation of emergency services by the SAMU 
(Emergency Medical Service) since the organization[of the emergency 
response]anticipated the intervention of firefighter-paramedics on the 
ground (...) to transport the injured to the SAMU and firefighter 
medical teams located at the Clussais la Pommeraie command post." 
Regarding the firefighter-led response, they do not comment on "the 
presence or absence of obstacles to[its]implementation." Admittedly, 
members of the SAMU stated "on numerous occasions" that they were unable 
to reach the firefighter command post, but the experts refuse to offer 
an opinion on this... because the recordings from the firefighter 
command post were not reviewed by the IGGN (National Gendarmerie 
Inspectorate).

- Can you tell us a little more about this "Orsec-Novi plan" which even 
the experts of the IGGN seem to find somewhat unsuitable for the 
Sainte-Soline demonstration?

- The Orsec plan is officially designed to combat the direct or indirect 
effects of a disaster and to provide support for its victims. It can, it 
seems, be implemented without being officially activated - for example, 
if the government wants to downplay the extent of a disaster for one 
reason or another.

Its "Novi" version is intended to define the organization of emergency 
services in an emergency situation that requires more medical resources 
than usual. It is a medical response to natural disasters such as 
floods, major road accidents, explosions (like the one at the AZF 
factory in Toulouse in 2001), etc., but also to "crises with a 
predominant security and public order focus": terrorist attacks, hostage 
takings, suicide bombings, or riots.

However, the instructions given there seem more intended to help... law 
enforcement than protesters. A journal published by a first aid 
association demonstrates this [2]. It states that, in the "exclusion 
zone whose access is reserved exclusively for law enforcement," there is 
a section "similar to a war zone in which medical treatment is 
impossible except for rescue by a fellow soldier"; and also that, in 
this section, only "the operational doctor of the unit in operation 
(RAID, GIGN)" can intervene.

The Orsec-Novi plan was implemented in Sainte-Soline even though there 
was neither a natural disaster nor a terrorist attack. And it was the 
government that turned this anti-reservoir demonstration into a war-like 
situation, because the police were supposed to be accompanying medical 
workers to evacuate the injured, thus helping to save lives, but instead 
they were the ones "manufacturing" injuries. This wasn't "defensive 
crowd control," as the IGGN experts claim, but "offensive crowd 
control": the instructions were clearly to inflict numerous injuries on 
the demonstrators - notably through the direct fire shown in the body 
camera videos.

Furthermore, no provisions had been made for evacuating the serious 
injuries that were inevitable; and the need for hospital beds had been 
underestimated from the outset. These needs had to be reassessed very 
quickly, as experts acknowledge, because the initial plan was based on 
previous demonstrations; there was a "recall of medical and paramedical 
personnel in response to the surge in calls and reported victims." In 
short, while Darmanin had announced a "very violent" event, emergency 
services were not prepared accordingly - the objective was clearly not 
to provide rapid care for the injured. "Sainte-Soline" was a chaotic 
scene orchestrated and maintained by the State to teach the protesters a 
lesson and to crush the anti-reservoir movement - as well as other 
movements.

- Not only were the arrangements put in place to organize the rescue 
efforts inappropriate for the context of an anti-reservoir 
demonstration, but there were unofficial instructions, particularly 
those concerning direct fire...

"Of course, and what happened in Sainte-Soline perfectly illustrates 
that there's the procedure, or the regulations, and then there's how 
they're applied.
Even legal texts are always open to interpretation. For example, the 
experts from the IGGN (General Inspectorate of the National Gendarmerie) 
pointed out that, according to the Penal Code, 'dispersing a gathering 
is part of what is called "maintaining public order"'; and that a 
gathering is defined as 'an assembly of people, on a public road or in a 
public place, likely to disturb public order.' And they added: 'The word 
"likely" actually indicates that it's possible to use these measures 
against people who aren't causing any disturbance, the gathering itself 
becoming a disturbance that can be suppressed.' In other words, the 
intervention of law enforcement is left to the discretion of the 
government or the prefecture."

Furthermore, a failure by law enforcement to comply with a protocol or 
prohibition can be "justified" by the context-see the frequent debates 
surrounding the use of grenades based on their type. The experts 
reiterated what constitutes authorized grenades. They specified: "These 
grenades may only be used by personnel duly trained in their use"; 
according to the Internal Security Code, their use must "be part of a 
response or action proportionate to the objective to be achieved and be 
carried out with discernment"; and "in addition to all these conditions 
that define the legality of the use of force, there is also the 
requirement to respect technical rules on how to use the equipment." But 
the experts added: "Everything said here applies to 'classic' crowd 
control[because]in the event of gunfire directed at law enforcement, 
snipers will use their lethal weapons to stop the opposing fire." And 
they gave two examples to illustrate their point: the repression of 
demonstrations by the French army in the Balkans during the 1990s, and 
in Abidjan in 2004. So we are in a context of war, or 
colonialist/imperialist, when we demonstrate against mega-reservoirs (or 
against pension reform...)?

In reality, the debates about "good" and "bad" grenades muddy the 
waters, given that a "defensive" grenade can kill just as easily as an 
"offensive" one if fired directly - and law enforcement always finds 
arguments to justify this type of firing. But so do the experts, who 
write: "A deliberately direct and non-compliant firing of a tear gas 
grenade from a Cougar[grenade launcher]can be justified in certain cases 
of self-defense where the officer is doing what they can, for example, 
against an individual who rushes at them with a lethal bladed weapon, or 
if they cannot otherwise defend their position." But was the gendarme 
who fired directly at Serge from an armored vehicle located between 50 
and 60 meters away, using a grenade launcher designed for a range of 200 
meters, acting in "self-defense"? Was he threatened as if someone had 
rushed at him with a lethal bladed weapon?
The experts concluded their "demonstration" by saying: "The debate on 
the exceptionally dangerous nature of this or that weapon intended for 
maintaining order is not a technical debate, but a political one" - and 
on this point, we'll agree with them!

Finally, law enforcement has various ways of circumventing protocol. For 
example, the two warnings required to disperse a crowd: they can simply 
be made inaudible. According to Le Monde, the IGGN (General Inspectorate 
of the National Gendarmerie) confirmed that these warnings were indeed 
given in Sainte-Soline, but had to admit that the demonstrators did not 
hear them. Observers from the LDH (Human Rights League), however, heard 
one, but it was given after the grenades had already been fired - and 
was therefore deemed "non-compliant."

Three years after "Sainte-Soline", a call for mobilizations around March 
25th throughout France.
- We see law enforcement proceeding in the same way on many other 
occasions. Isn't police violence the common thread between 
"Sainte-Soline" and other social or environmental mobilizations (like 
the Yellow Vests), or the riots in Nahel and Nouméa?

- That's certain, but for these other "events" there was no obstruction 
to the arrival of help like on March 25, 2023, where the health 
organization was a tool of repression, the other being of course the 
military organization.

A second distinctive feature of "Sainte-Soline 2" is the trap the 
government set for the protesters. Before the "Sainte-Soline 1" 
demonstration on October 29, 2022 (or during the "water village" in 
Melle from July 16-21, 2024), law enforcement officers checked people 
heading to the gathering place, issued them EUR135 fines, and searched 
their vehicles. However, for "Sainte-Soline 2," they "escorted" the 
protesters, allowed them to approach the reservoir, and then suddenly 
bombarded them with grenades.

The yellow vests or the rioters[after the death of Nahel, or in 
Nouméa]have, as a second point in common, having suffered a judicial 
repression on all fronts; concerning Sainte-Soline, there have of course 
been and still are prosecutions and trials, but the judicial repression 
has primarily targeted the "organizers" of the demonstration (including 
trade unionists, no doubt to encourage the unions to return to the field 
of "social partners" participating in the maintenance of order).

Repression is the response of those in power to any challenge to the 
existing system: young people from the housing projects, formerly 
colonized peoples, and protesters are enemies to be subdued. Faced with 
all these realities, we must strive to counter the propaganda of the 
state and the capitalist system. We must try to make another voice 
heard, to convince people that the police are not "guardians of the 
peace," but defenders of an order that is more than ever in need of 
overthrow.

Interview by L.

Notes
[1] Françoise is part of the group made up of four seriously injured 
people and their relatives who filed this complaint shortly after the 
demonstration, and who filed another one in January to reopen the 
investigation. See CA no. 356 (January 2026)

[2] Article by Patrick Chavada and René Noto published in Secourisme 
revue in 2016

http://oclibertaire.lautre.net/spip.php?article4683
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