A-Infos (en) France, OCL CA #354 - What future for post-Assad Syria? (ca, de, fr, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]

On December 8, 2024, the regime of Bashar al-Assad, riddled with 
internal disrepute, collapsed like a house of cards after several days 
of a lightning offensive coordinated by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) 
group, supported by Turkey. This historic turning point ended more than 
fifty years of tyranny by the Assads, father and son, but it did not 
usher in a very promising period for Syrian workers and the working 
class. The new government, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, wavered between 
religious sectarianism and economic liberalism, while seeking 
international support to finance the reconstruction of a Syria left in 
ruins after thirteen years of civil war. This weak and divided territory 
is now witnessing the contradictions of global capitalism playing out on 
its own soil, while the ethno-religious and authoritarian dead ends in 
which the new power seems mired only serve to reinforce the territorial 
and social fault lines.

It did not take long for the Syrian uprising, which erupted in March 
2011 in the context of the "Arab Spring," to become militarized in the 
face of the Assad regime's relentless repression. As early as the summer 
of 2011, the creation of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) initiated this 
movement, which quickly fragmented, as the civil war spread, into 
numerous armed groups soon affiliated with regional or international 
powers (Turkey, Russia, Iran, the United States, etc.). The fall of the 
Assad regime almost a year ago was thus less the result of a popular 
uprising than of a military campaign led by Tshisekedi (Tshisekedi), an 
Islamist organization affiliated with Al-Qaeda, which capitalized on the 
regime's exhaustion, the divisions within the opposition, and Turkish 
logistical support. This victory is not that of a social revolution but 
rather of an authoritarian reconfiguration, where Al-Shara and its 
supporters, bolstered by their military legitimacy, are now attempting 
to gradually impose an Islamist power-not jihadist, but profoundly 
reactionary-that marginalizes ethnic and religious minorities and 
criminalizes forms of popular autonomy.

Consolidation of the Repressive Apparatus and Authoritarian Legitimization
Since coming to power, de facto President Al-Shara has recreated a 
centralized security apparatus, structured around the National Security 
Council, whose structure strongly resembles the former Assad-era 
National Security Directorate. Key positions are overwhelmingly held by 
former Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) officials or Al-Shara's close 
associates. Formalized in March 2025 with the adoption of the interim 
constitution, this structure, to which the Ministry of the Interior 
(historically weak in Syria) is subordinate, brings together the 
partially purged former intelligence services (Mukhabarat), the internal 
security forces, and units from allied rebel factions (the aim being to 
strengthen their integration). It is directly attached to the 
presidency, which reinforces Al-Shara's personal control over the levers 
of coercion, while the interim constitution authorizes exceptional 
measures to "preserve national stability," thus providing a legal basis 
for repression. For the past year, arbitrary arrests have multiplied, 
particularly in the Alawite neighborhoods of Latakia (the Alawites being 
associated with the former regime), the Druze areas of Suwayda (now 
largely autonomous and in direct conflict with the central government), 
and the suburbs of Damascus. The pretext is always the same: the fight 
against the "remnants of the old regime," a vague category encompassing 
former civil servants, secular activists, critical journalists, trade 
unionists, and various ethnic or religious minorities. This rhetoric 
serves to criminalize any form of opposition, even non-violent, and to 
justify mass surveillance, detentions without trial, and enforced 
disappearances.

However, it remains difficult to pinpoint responsibility after each 
outbreak of violence and to understand precisely the role played by the 
presidency: after the fall of Assad, many armed groups were nominally 
integrated into the national forces while retaining their command 
structures. This is for example the case of the Syrian National Army 
(SNA), created from scratch by Turkey after the invasion of the 
territories of Afrin and Serekaniye (2018 and 2019), which were then 
part of the AANES (Autonomous Administration of Northeast Syria, which 
became the Democratic Autonomous Administration of Northeast Syria since 
the promulgation of their new "social contract" serving as a 
Constitution in December 2023).

Although officially integrated into the new armed forces, the Syrian 
National Army (SNA) retains a degree of de facto autonomy within the 
military structures of the new government. This situation sometimes 
makes tracing the chain of command difficult. In March 2025, during the 
massacres of Alawites on the coast, for example, it took a very long 
time to establish responsibility: it was clear that fighters from the 
former SNA had participated, but government responsibility (which has 
since been confirmed, notably by Reuters, without being accepted by the 
Syrian government) was only seriously demonstrated in July, four months 
later. These are the same processes that may have been at play during 
the offensive by tribal armed groups in the Druze territories of Suwayda 
in July 2025. The elections of October 5, controlled by Al-Sharaa (a 
third of the 210 seats were directly filled by Al-Sharaa, while all 
candidates elected indirectly through local committees first had to be 
validated by a commission whose members had also been chosen by the 
interim president), may allow him to get rid of some of his most 
troublesome allies-warlords or otherwise-while consolidating his 
personal exercise of power under the guise of popular legitimacy.

Kurdish Fighters
A Neoliberal Shock Therapy Under an Islamist Veil
Economically, the policy adopted by Al-Charaa over the past year is 
based on brutal liberalization, presented as necessary for national 
reconstruction, in a context where the country's infrastructure has 
practically collapsed and nine out of ten people live below the poverty 
line (figures from the United Nations Development Programme for 2024). 
This "shock therapy" is inspired by the models applied in the 1990s in 
Russia or in post-2003 Iraq: massive privatizations, deregulation, 
opening up to foreign capital, and dismantling of social protections, 
risking further worsening the conditions of the working classes already 
devastated by thirteen years of civil war.

This represents an extension to the national territory of the policy 
that HTC adopted when the group controlled only the Idlib enclave: a 
crony capitalism favoring the private sector, which, as was the case in 
Bashar al-Assad's Syria, allows for the enrichment of networks close to 
the regime and al-Shara.

Syrian strategic sectors-energy, telecommunications, infrastructure-are 
thus now entrusted to Turkish, Saudi, or Emirati consortiums, often 
linked to HTC. The Caesar Act, which imposed economic sanctions on 
Syria, was partially lifted under pressure from Qatar and Turkey, 
allowing the influx of financial resources and the rise of a new 
Islamist-comprador bourgeoisie: a religious bourgeoisie allied with 
foreign interests, profiting from the war and reconstruction.

While the new government is not jihadist (its Islamism remains confined 
to the national level), Sharia law has nonetheless become the legal 
basis of the interim constitution, which officially establishes Syria as 
a "Muslim state," even though it also recognizes freedom of religion. 
While Sharia is being progressively integrated into the judicial system, 
particularly for civil matters (marriage, divorce, inheritance) - 
although without the stipulated corporal punishments - attempts to 
impose certain Sharia-inspired restrictions, such as those concerning 
alcohol or a potential dress code (mandatory hijab), are meeting with 
strong opposition, especially in urban areas and among minorities. 
Similarly, educational reforms (such as the elimination of courses on 
evolution, replaced by courses on Sunni jurisprudence) are drawing 
criticism on social media and in local media, forcing the new government 
to promise an "inclusive dialogue." These internal pressures, such as 
the desire for full integration into the international community, are 
forcing Al-Sharaa to adopt at least a superficial moderation in order to 
secure the lifting of economic sanctions and reconstruction aid. The 
gradual normalization with Israel (despite Israeli interventions in 
Syrian territory) and the country's potential future entry into the 
Abraham Accords signal an alignment with the Western sphere of 
influence-a process facilitated by Western governments, which have 
rapidly forged closer ties with Al-Sharaa (for example, France gave the 
interim president a lavish welcome last May, turning a blind eye to his 
past involvement with the Islamic State group). This process, aimed at 
opening the floodgates to Western capital, risks accelerating Syria's 
transformation into an economic protectorate. A Fragmented Territory
The main territory escaping the control of the central government is 
that of the Autonomous Democratic Administration of Northeast Syria 
(ADANS). Initially limited to Kurdish-populated areas (Rojava) and 
implementing the political project of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) - 
a sister party of the PKK - the ADANS territory has, with the fight 
against the Islamic State, expanded beyond its Kurdish core to include 
diverse populations (particularly and especially Sunni Arabs). Operating 
according to a decentralized model inspired by the "democratic 
confederalism" theorized by Öcalan (whose three main pillars are the 
system of communes, women's self-organization, and political ecology), 
itself inspired by Bookchin's libertarian municipalism, ADANS presents 
itself as the only actor truly capable of integrating the diverse 
ethno-religious components of Syrian society and offering an inclusive 
alternative to the Al-Shara regime. Since the fall of Assad, ties have 
been forged with the Druze of Suwayda and with certain Alawite groups in 
Latakia, with the aim of imposing a decentralized model on the new regime.
While negotiations (driven in particular by the United States and the 
European Union) have begun between the Syrian regime and the Syrian Arab 
Nationalist Movement (SANMAM), aiming for a gradual integration of 
civilian and military institutions into the structures of the Syrian 
state-while maintaining an autonomy whose contours have never been 
clarified-the events in Suwayda, as well as the recent tensions between 
these two actors (clashes near Tel Tamer, attempted blockade of the 
Kurdish neighborhoods of Aleppo), make the continuation of this already 
tentative process highly uncertain. This is without taking into account 
Turkey's opposition, whose main objective-besides ensuring the return of 
Syrian refugees on its soil and taking advantage of the economic 
opportunities opened up since its allies came to power-remains to 
prevent any Kurdish self-determination project, whether a peace process 
is underway or not, on its own territory.

In Suwayda, clashes between Druze and Bedouins and the regime's military 
intervention alongside Bedouin militias last July led to an Israeli 
intervention (which thus positioned itself as a "defender of minorities" 
in order to secure its own interests, namely the regime's fragility). 
Since then, part of the region has been de facto independent, and ties 
with the regime appear to be permanently severed.

In addition to these two territories, there are the areas previously 
held, both in the north and south, by various militias. While these 
militias have been formally integrated and are therefore accountable to 
the central government, they remain liable to secede if they feel 
threatened. This is currently the risk posed by the jihadist forces, 
long allied with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) but who now feel abandoned 
by the government, which sees these forces as an obstacle to Syria's 
integration into the international community.

Conclusion: The future of the Syrian state appears more uncertain than 
ever. For the past year, the new government has done far more to fuel 
resentment than to heal the divisions left by decades of Baath Party 
dictatorship. Syria now appears politically divided, and its sovereignty 
is precarious due to the constant intervention of third-party countries.

The establishment of a personal power structure, the maintenance and 
intensification of the neoliberal policies initiated by Bashar al-Assad 
in the 2000s, and the continuation of the same clientelist dynamics can 
only lead to the same consequences: impoverishment, repression, and a 
rise in opposition. Perhaps AANES will have a role to play at that point.

F.M., October 23, 2025

http://oclibertaire.lautre.net/spip.php?article4559
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