A-Infos (en) Italy, FdCA, IL CANTIERE #37 - Libya - From the Gaddafi Regime to Armed Gangs Lino Roveredo and Virgilio Caletti (ca, de, fr, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]

After the 2011 uprising and the ensuing NATO military intervention that 
contributed to the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, Libya has not found 
stability. Recent political and military tensions, following the killing 
of powerful militia commander Abdel Ghani al-Kikli (Kikli was head of 
the Stability Support Facility (SSA), a powerful militia previously 
linked to the Government of National Unity (GNU) but recently operating 
more independently; a Western ally in the fight against irregular 
immigration, he is accused of serious human rights violations), which 
have brought Libya to the brink of new conflict, are the inevitable 
consequence of a politically and territorially fragmented country.

Libya's ethnic division is part of a complex mosaic of ethnic groups 
(Arabs, Berbers, Tuareg, and Toubous), tribes (approximately 140), and 
historical regions (Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan), deeply rooted 
in the country's history. This ethnic and tribal fragmentation has 
contributed to a strong development of rivalries and conflicts, which 
intensified after the fall of Gaddafi in 2011, marking the end of 
artificial national unity and the return of multiple local and national 
particularisms.

Hundreds of armed militias, estimated at more than 200 according to 
recent estimates, divide the territory between two main, opposing 
factions: the Government of National Accord (GNU) led by Prime Minister 
Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, which controls Tripoli and the northwestern 
territory, supported by the High Council of State, the Presidential 
Council, and with the support of Turkey; and General Khalifa Haftar, 
who, through the House of Representatives and the Government of National 
Stability, controls the east of the country and vast regions of central 
and southern Libya with the support of Russia.

Social crisis and union struggles

Over the past three years, Libya has experienced a very difficult 
economic situation, with low average incomes and growing social 
tensions. In 2025, the average monthly salary in Libya is approximately 
300 euros, with substantial variations depending on the size of the 
company and the sector: while in large companies it reaches 430 euros, 
in micro-enterprises the average drops to 180 euros. In the public 
sector, the average salary is around 240 euros.

Libya, once among the countries with the highest per capita income in 
Africa, has seen a significant decline, especially since 2011, further 
exacerbated by conflict and instability. GDP is expected to partially 
recover in 2023-2025, but unemployment remains high, above 15%.

The challenging economic situation has generated intense labor and 
social struggles. In recent years, popular discontent has exploded in 
protests against the rising cost of living, the lack of essential public 
services, and the lack of labor protections. Independent unions and 
labor groups have organized strikes, demonstrations, and demands for 
wage reforms and better working conditions, especially in the public and 
oil sectors.

These union mobilizations have not been limited to wage demands, but 
have also denounced widespread corruption and a political situation that 
fuels wealth inequality. Political fragmentation and the presence of 
armed militias complicate the possibility of unified union organization 
and representation, slowing the process of working-class emancipation.

The hydrocarbon industry

Libya's economy is primarily based on oil and natural gas extraction. 
With reserves of 48 billion barrels of oil, it is among the top 10 
producing countries in the world and the largest in Africa. Libya also 
has significant natural gas reserves and is the fifth largest gas 
producer on the African continent. It's worth noting that Italy is a 
major buyer of Libyan oil and gas.

The strategic role these two resources have assumed in the country's 
economy is central to understanding Libya's past and present history.

It was following the Suez Crisis of 1956 that Libyan oil production 
became of extreme importance to Western countries.

As reported in Giampaolo Cadalanu's book "Under the Sand": "King Idris's 
government had granted around sixty geological exploration concessions 
to a dozen foreign companies" and "the first productive oil well was 
drilled in 1959 in the Sirte region, at Zelten (now Nasser)." Given the 
size of the field, Exxon, the concession holder, built a pipeline and a 
terminal on the Mediterranean: the 167-kilometer pipeline had the 
capacity to transport approximately 200,000 barrels of crude oil per day 
to the Marsa al Brega terminal. Inaugurated in October 1961, the project 
guaranteed the export of seven million barrels for that year alone and 
represented a turning point for Libya.

In 1962 Libya, with an annual production of 67.1 million barrels, joined 
OPEC, and by 1965 oil production from its fields had reached 445.4 
million barrels.

It is well known that one of the objectives of the 1969 military coup, 
known as "Operation Jerusalem," which brought about the fall of the 
"reactionary, corrupt, autocratic, and rotten" regime of King Idris and 
brought Muammar al-Gaddafi to power, was the monarchy's inadequacy in 
managing oil resources.

Indeed, upon taking office, Gaddafi initiated a renegotiation of oil 
concessions with foreign companies, obtaining more advantageous terms 
and, through the nationalization of resources, forced them to cede 
significant portions of their holdings to the Libyan government. Oil 
represented the country's main source of revenue, accounting for 
approximately 95% of exports and generating considerable wealth. It was 
on the basis of the interests surrounding oil and gas and the active 
role of the Libyan state in economic management that an elite would 
emerge, made up of political and military leaders intertwined with 
Gaddafi and his entourage, which would represent the new national 
bourgeoisie.

Since the fall of Gaddafi in 2011, Libya has been plagued by internal 
conflicts and territorial divisions. The redistribution of oil revenues 
is a key cause of disagreements between the two rival governments vying 
for power and dividing the country: the Government of National Unity 
(GNU), based in Tripoli, and the Government of National Stability (GSN), 
based in Tobruk.

The recent change in leadership of the National Oil Company (NOC) is 
also a key element of the country's broader political and military 
crisis, where control of oil resources is becoming a weapon of power 
between various rival governments and militias, with direct impacts on 
the national economy, political stability, and security.

Farhat Bengdara, appointed president of the NOC in July 2022 and 
recently replaced by Massoud Suleman, officially resigned for health 
reasons but is accused of facilitating illicit trafficking for the 
benefit of the Haftar clan.

A UN panel of experts recently focused on the activities of Arkenu, a 
private oil company founded in 2023 and effectively controlled by Saddam 
Haftar (son of General Khalifa). Arkenu is the only private company in 
Libya formally authorized by the NOC to produce and export oil. 
According to Reuters, since last May, Arkenu has exported oil worth at 
least $600 million, managing the funds outside of the Central Bank. Key 
figures in Arkenu's administration include not only several members of 
the Haftar clan, but also figures close to Prime Minister Dbeibah. The 
company could therefore represent one of the main tools for dividing oil 
revenues between East and West.

The business of human trafficking

After the embarrassing rejection of the European Union 
delegation-composed of Italian Interior Minister Matteo Piantedosi, his 
Greek and Maltese counterparts, Thanos Plevris and Byron Camilleri, and 
the European Commissioner for Migration, Magnus Brunner-set up by the 
parallel government in Benghazi, under the control of Khalifa Haftar, 
the Interior Ministry has taken action, declaring that "relations with 
both factions in Libya are excellent."

For Europe, and especially for Italy, Libya is a strategic interlocutor 
for managing the flow of migrants departing from the Libyan coast and 
arriving from sub-Saharan Africa. Even the ministers forced to leave 
Libya are well aware that Haftar's influence, as he leads the militias 
controlling the coasts from which the largest number of migrants depart 
for Italy, is of fundamental importance.

The European delegation has reduced the matter to a question of 
protocol, but it is more likely that the authorities in eastern Libya 
are aiming for international recognition and asking for more money in 
exchange for their commitment to carry out the "dirty work" on behalf of 
the Europeans with the aim of reducing migrant departures by sea.

Relations between Libyan militias and Europe on the issue of migrants 
are nothing new, but agreements have been reached in previous years. 
These agreements are part of a "border externalization" plan that 
exposes Europe's inadequacy in managing the relatively new phenomenon of 
mass migration, recruiting countries like Libya that have never signed 
the UN Refugee Convention.

Indeed, the case of the Italian government's failure to hand over Libyan 
General Najeem Osama Almasri to the International Criminal Court is 
emblematic. Accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity related to 
cases of "cruel treatment, torture, rape, sexual violence, and murder, 
committed in Mitiga prison," after being arrested by Italian police and 
incarcerated in Turin, the Italian government released him and 
repatriated him to Libya on a state plane. And to think that during a 
press conference on March 11, 2023, in Cutro, where two weeks earlier a 
ship loaded with migrants had sunk off the coast of the Ionian town (94 
confirmed deaths were reported, and a number of missing persons were 
never returned from the sea), Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni declared: 
"We are accustomed to an Italy that is primarily concerned with 
searching for migrants throughout the Mediterranean. What this 
government wants to do is search for smugglers across the globe because 
we want to break up this trade."

The business surrounding the migrant flow managed by Libyan armed 
militias is deeply intertwined with human trafficking and systematic 
exploitation. The total human trade in the Mediterranean is estimated at 
billions of euros (about 6 billion euros in the Mediterranean alone in 
2017), a significant portion of which is linked to the Libyan route.

Militias, often linked to state or autonomous armed forces, control 
detention centers where migrants are held in extremely harsh conditions, 
suffering torture, sexual violence, and forced labor. This system, which 
has become an extremely lucrative business, is also exploited to gain 
recognition and political advantage in negotiations with European 
governments, which often make formal and informal agreements with these 
factions to control and reduce sea departures.

The first agreement between Europe and Libya was in 2011 to collaborate 
on security, stability, and migration. The fall of Gaddafi and the civil 
war significantly accelerated the increase in the number of migrants and 
asylum seekers crossing the Mediterranean, and the migration emergency 
has become a crucial issue in Europe's relations with Libya.

Among the key agreements worth mentioning are the Italy-Libya Memorandum 
of 2 February 2017 and the Malta Declaration of 3 February 2017. They 
represent the operational heart of the European strategy to stem 
migration flows through training, resources, and funding in exchange for 
blocking departures and managing detention centers.

The Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding of February 2, 2017, was 
signed in Rome by Italian Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni and the head of 
the Libyan Government of National Accord, Fayez al-Sarraj. It stipulates 
that Italy will provide logistical and technical support to Libya, 
including providing naval vessels, equipment, technology, and training 
to the Libyan Coast Guard for patrolling the Mediterranean, and 
cooperating to strengthen control of Libya's southern borders through 
support for transit and reception centers at entry points. Furthermore, 
the agreement provides for the renovation and upgrading of existing 
centers in Libya with Italian technical and financial support. Formally 
designated as "temporary reception" centers, in practice they are often 
identified as migrant detention centers, with documented serious human 
rights violations.

Finally, the agreement provides for the involvement of the EU and UN 
agencies (such as IOM and UNHCR) in the financing and management of 
certain interventions, while Italy commits to mobilizing European and 
Italian funds. The Memorandum is valid for three years, with automatic 
renewal unless terminated by either party with three months' notice. It 
was automatically renewed in 2020 and again in 2023.

The day after the Memorandum was signed, European leaders adopted the 
Malta Declaration, aiming to "ensure effective control of our external 
border and stem illegal flows towards the EU." Among the Declaration's 
priority objectives: strengthening the Libyan coast guard, blocking 
maritime routes, and improving repatriation mechanisms.

This is a further step forward toward the border externalization 
program, which will be implemented thanks to significant funding, 
including EUR1.8 billion from the EU Trust Fund for Africa, EUR152 
million from Member State contributions, and EUR200 million for the most 
urgent operations.

With these agreements, the European Union and Italy are abandoning their 
duty to welcome people fleeing persecution and war, with a foreign 
immigration policy based on agreements with dictatorial governments or 
criminal actors (i.e., armed groups) who exploit migrants for personal 
gain, trampling on the fundamental human rights of those who have chosen 
to build a better life and who, to pursue this goal, have been forced to 
abandon their country of origin.

The international actors

From an imperialist perspective, the interference of Turkey, Russia, 
Europe, China, and the United States in Libya represents a competition 
for strategic, military, and economic control of a key region for the 
Mediterranean, Africa, and global energy routes.

Turkey supports the Tripoli-based government (GNU) through direct 
military intervention, providing mercenaries and military equipment, 
thus consolidating a foothold in the Eastern Mediterranean to increase 
its political and economic influence. Its neo-imperialist agenda 
includes control of disputed maritime zones and a key role in North Africa.

Russia, on the other hand, supports the eastern government in Tobruk, 
led by Khalifa Haftar, by sending weapons, mercenaries (particularly 
from the Wagner group), and political and economic support, aimed at 
establishing a military base and influencing oil production and trade 
routes. Russia's positioning is part of a strategy to increase its 
global influence and contain Western influence.

Europe, fragmented but engaged, maintains official relations with 
Tripoli, but moves pragmatically, also engaging with Cyrenaica and 
seeking to manage the migration crisis and access to energy resources. 
In reality, Europe suffers from a lack of a unified and incisive 
project, often remaining subordinate to the dynamics of the stronger powers.

China is primarily involved with economic and infrastructure investments 
aimed at building a strong economic presence, seeking to position itself 
as a strategic partner to both the Tripoli and Tobruk governments, 
albeit without direct military involvement. Its imperialism is 
manifested in the Silk Road project and the acquisition of strategic, 
mineral, and energy interests in Libya and Africa at large, aiming to 
strengthen its position in the multipolar world system.

Finally, the United States maintains a strategic supervisory role aimed 
at safeguarding its energy and security interests, limiting Russian and 
Turkish expansion and attempting to stabilize the region through 
selective support for political interlocutors, but without a massive 
military commitment. Washington uses diplomacy, sanctions, and support 
for international missions as tools of control.

The role of Italy

The Italian presence in Libya has deep roots dating back to 1911, when 
Italy launched a campaign of colonial conquest of Tripolitania and 
Cyrenaica, then provinces of the Ottoman Empire.

With the rise of fascism in 1922, Mussolini ordered an aggressive and 
unrestrained "reconquest" of Libya. Italian generals, particularly 
Rodolfo Graziani, unleashed a ferocious repression using 
counterinsurgency tactics, mass deportations of civilians, concentration 
camps, and extreme violence, including the use of gas and bombing of 
Libyan populations.

After World War II, with Libya's independence in 1951, many Italians who 
remained in the country were expelled or gradually left Libya, 
especially after the rise of Gaddafi, who in 1970 ordered the expulsion 
of most Italians and the confiscation of their property (valued in 1970 
at more than 400 billion lire). However, the properties of FIAT and, 
above all, ENI were spared from confiscation.

Under Idris's reign, collaboration between Italy and Libya focused on 
the oil sector, leading to the construction of major facilities such as 
refineries in Tripoli and industrial plants, and agreements that 
guaranteed Italy increased oil supplies, paid for by investments in 
Libyan infrastructure and industries. In 1959, the Compagnia Ricerca 
Idrocarburi (CORI), controlled by Agip and Snam Progetti, obtained 
concessions to begin extraction in the Cyrenaica region.

But it was with the 1973 oil crisis that Libya assumed a strategic role 
for European countries, and in particular for Italy, in obtaining energy 
sources.

During Gaddafi's rule, despite international political tensions, ENI 
maintained stable relations with Libya, fostering operational agreements 
between AGIP (the Italian oil company owned by ENI) and the Tripoli 
government, as occurred in 1975. The collaboration was also part of a 
broader Italian energy strategy aimed at the so-called "methane option," 
that is, the import of natural gas to diversify Italy's energy sources, 
including the construction of gas pipelines and the export of Italian 
technology. As reported in Giampaolo Cadalanu's book "Under the Sand": 
"Meanwhile, Italy had embarked on an arms trade with Tripoli, which over 
the years was to develop into the supply of entire arsenals-from 
corvettes to transport aircraft, from armored vehicles to 
surface-to-surface missiles, and even mines-with its national conscience 
safeguarded by the clause requiring these weapons to have a defensive 
function."

It's also worth mentioning here the brief interlude of Libya's stake in 
FIAT: after lengthy secret negotiations, in 1976 the Libyan Arab Foreign 
Investment Company, the Libyan Central Bank's foreign investment arm, 
purchased a 9.7 percent stake in FIAT for $415 million. The stake in the 
Turin-based company ended about ten years later, and Tripoli resold the 
shares to FIAT at a healthy profit.

Energy cooperation between Italy and Libya in 2025 is characterized by a 
significant strengthening of agreements and growing synergies, 
especially in the oil, gas, and renewable energy sectors.

Italy remains Libya's main trading partner and largest importer of 
hydrocarbons, with a strategic energy relationship reflected in major 
agreements, such as the $8 billion deal between Eni and the Libyan 
National Oil Corporation to increase oil production. However, Libyan oil 
and gas exports have been negatively impacted by the country's political 
instability, declining in recent years.

In the context of the global energy transition, there is a shared 
interest in the development of renewable energy. Specifically, Italy is 
supporting Libya in its Strategic Plan for Renewable Energy through 
2025, with projects for solar and wind power generation and the 
development of green technologies, also thanks to Eni's participation 
and the Italian government's interest in economic and industrial 
cooperation in this area.

Furthermore, diplomatic and commercial contacts have intensified in 
2024-2025, including the signing of agreements at the Italy-Libya 
Business Forum, which sees the participation of Italian companies such 
as Confindustria, Saipem, Intesa Sanpaolo, and Unioncamere. The Mattei 
Plan, promoted by the Italian government, aims to consolidate these 
energy relations by enhancing Italy's role as a natural hub for energy 
flows between Africa, the Mediterranean, and Europe.

Direct air travel between Italy and Libya will also be reinstated (with 
ITA Airways starting in 2025), consolidating trade relations and 
facilitating exchanges.

Libyan Refugee Camps: Institutionalized Immorality

On the Democratic Magistracy website "Questione Giustizia," the refugee 
camps in Libya are described as "a concentration camp institution" that 
includes the individuals whose distinctive traits Primo Levi so 
thoroughly conveyed to us: the Kapos. These men, as in the past, are 
capable of casually, daily, and repeatedly (as all the testimonies 
attest) transmitting lofty concepts such as "I can kill whenever and 
however I want, I can do whatever I want" or "I am not Somali, I am not 
Muslim, I am your master," etc.

The main centers are located in Tripoli, Misrata, Khoms, Zliten, and 
Dhar El-Jebel. A worryingly vast and varied range of diseases (primarily 
tuberculosis) periodically decimates the camp populations. For at least 
six years, Amnesty International and Doctors Without Borders have been 
documenting the gravity of the situation, launching repeated, yet 
unheeded, appeals.

Memorandum

The Italy-Libya Memorandum (the text of which was mentioned earlier) is 
eight years old and can rightfully be described as a "tragic fiasco." 
It's unnecessary to list the atrocities that have characterized it thus far.

In addition to the ignominious "Najeem Osama Almasri affair and the 
return trip on a state plane" mentioned above, it is sufficient to 
recall that top figures in the apparatus that forms the Libyan Coast 
Guard, the repository of Italy's trust and celebrated ad nauseam, such 
as the late Abd al-Rahman al-Milad, are considered by the UN to be 
"criminals and human traffickers".

Finally, regarding numbers that are enough to keep many sectors of 
society awake at night, it should be noted that, to date, between Libya 
and Tunisia, approximately 60,000 migrants are stranded in currently 
operating concentration camps. And given that the chosen route 
(considered the "most dangerous in the world"), the stretch of the 
Mediterranean that leads to the Bel Paese (not necessarily to settle in 
the pleasant town of Caronno Pertusella), is heavily enriched by our 
fellow human beings in the process of decay (as we write, we learn of 
another 26 confirmed deaths and numerous others being ascertained, the 
result of yet another shipwreck), it is natural to conclude that the 
ambitious yet noble plan announced by our Prime Minister (to 
relentlessly pursue human traffickers throughout the entire 
continent...) has thus far failed to yield remarkable results.

As a corollary to such assertions, which once again seem obvious, and in 
order to remind us of the degree of organic construction afforded by the 
strength of the obstacles that arise, it is better to draw attention to 
the paragraph here entitled "International Actors", where just enough is 
clarified to understand how even in this "minor theatre" (the adjective 
is appropriate, considering the grandiose bellicosity that unfolds 
before our eyes) global and regional powers move and operate with the 
usual rapacity and voracity that permeate the "spirit of the times".

Conclusion

Trying to draw any noteworthy conclusions is undeniably a difficult task.

One thing, however, is certain for us: we firmly reject the common 
belief that Libya (and with it, in good company, Mauritania) is the only 
area in the Maghreb completely devoid of our tradition (i.e., 
Anarchism). We refer you to the 2011 page (precisely dated 17-03-2011 
and 24-11-2011; translated by the International Relations Office of the 
FdCA) of Anarkismo.net, where you can find and appreciate a short text 
entitled "The Signs of the Defeat of the Revolution in Libya," signed as 
follows: Saoud Salem - Libyan Anarchist.

Simplicity, elegance and clarity worthy of a mathematical diagram are 
its distinctive features.

The comrade who writes appeals to the people, "to all the peoples of the 
world", and not to governments, "to any government".

It is truly unlikely that one would find a clearer, more intelligible 
and luminous "path" than the one indicated by comrade Saoud Salem.

To the exploited Libyans, to the migrants detained there and to us with 
them the duty to follow it.

Documentation:

https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/libia-un-paese-ostaggio-di-elite-politiche-rivali-206588

https://ilmanifesto.it/la-crisi-libica-ha-tre-facce-politica-militare-ed-economica

https://www.infomercatiesteri.it/indicatori_macroeconomici.php?id_paesi=109#

https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/libia-il-consolidamento-di-un-fragile-equilibrio-fondato-sul-clientelismo-124011

https://www.nigrizia.it/notizia/libia-conflitto-banca-centrale-petrolio

https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/12/17/libya-s-economic-outlook-pathways-to-sustainable-growth-and-increased-productivity

Giampaolo Cadalanu - Under the Sand - Laterza Publishers

Porsia Nancy - Libya Sickness: My Days on the Mediterranean Front - 
Bompiani Munizioni

https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iai1516.pdf#:~:text=With%20the%20fall%20of%20Gheddafi%20regime%20and%20asylum-seekers%20who%20try%20to%20reach%20Europe 
.

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/it/press/press-releases/2017/02/03/malta-declaration/

https://www.swissinfo.ch/ita/libia-video-cnn-mostra-aste-di-migranti/43675752

Del Boca Angelo - Italians, Good People? - Neri Pozza Editore

A-Infos (it)[Anarkismo.net Editorial]Signs of the Defeat of the 
Revolution in Libya

https://alternativalibertaria.fdca.it/
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