A-Infos (en) France, OCL CA #353 - "The veil is a pretext, we want bread and we want the fall of the regime." A look back at the "Woman, Life, Freedom" uprising in Iran (1/2) (ca, de, fr, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]

We met with Assareh Assa, an Iranian comrade living in exile in France, 
for an interview that looks back at the 2022 Iranian uprising, following 
the assassination of Mahsa Jina Amini. Here, we discuss the success of 
this movement from the perspective of women's freedom, its impasses on 
social issues, its repression, and nationalism in Iran. In a follow-up 
interview, Assareh will discuss the Israel-Iran war, the situation of 
the working classes in Iran, and the "fascist" nature of the regime.

Can you look back on the "Woman, Life, Freedom" uprising, with the 
benefit of hindsight?
We recently marked the third anniversary of the assassination of Jina 
Amini, a young Kurdish woman arrested in Tehran by the morality police 
because, according to the regime, she was not properly dressed. She was 
struck in the head during her arrest, which cost her her life a few days 
later, on September 16, 2022. At her funeral, the residents of Saqqez, 
her hometown, gathered at her grave and wrote this sentence: "Jina, you 
will not die, your name is our password." I would like to dwell on this 
sentence, which proved to be true. Jina's name quickly became a thread 
that connected all those who wished to overthrow the current regime in 
Iran. Large-scale demonstrations swept across the country; we saw 
magnificent scenes of solidarity, courage, and rage in every corner of 
the country. However, I would like to add that the name Jina also gave 
rise to the emergence of a deep antagonistic division within Iranian 
society. Jina is indeed the unofficial name of the young girl, a victim 
of the Iranian state's structural misogyny, but it is a Kurdish name. 
This is why it is important to know how this phase of the movement is 
referred to in Iran: "Jina uprising" or "Mahsa uprising"? This name is 
not neutral and reveals, above all, political affiliation. Reactionary 
currents preferred "Mahsa"; in this simple "choice of word," however, 
there is a truth which, along with state repression, is one of the 
reasons for the failure of this uprising.

By referring to the failure of this uprising, do you mean that it 
achieved nothing?
No, the "Woman, Life, Freedom" uprising changed the face of cities, 
especially the big cities of Iran. Regarding the appearance of women in 
society, there is undeniably a before and after this uprising; today, 
women can dress relatively "freely," despite the state.

Is it comparable to before 1979?
Indeed, under the Shah's regime, wearing the veil was not compulsory. 
However, it is wrong to believe that all women enjoyed individual 
freedom during the Shah's time. Before the revolution, women from the 
upper classes, whether the lower middle class or the bourgeoisie, went 
out without a veil, unlike workers and the lower classes. There was 
certainly no morality police, but in small towns and villages, 
traditional relationships were much more deeply rooted. It was the male, 
but also female, members of the family who prevented a girl from 
dressing as she wished, even inside the house. I would also like to add 
that the Shah's father, considered by some to be the "father of modern 
Iran," abused women precisely so that they would not appear in society 
wearing the veil. The Islamic Republic brutalizes women in the opposite way.

In any case, after the Jina uprising, the regime made great efforts to 
prevent women from going out without a veil. It notably killed a young 
girl in Tehran for refusing to wear the veil. It also approved a law 
dramatically restricting women's rights, but it has not been able to 
implement it so far, as its efforts have been insufficient in the face 
of women's resistance and determination. But it must be emphasized: this 
is a relative freedom. Women from the privileged classes enjoy this 
individual freedom much more. Sometimes we see scenes on social media 
that are hard to believe are happening in Iran. But our astonishment 
diminishes when we understand that this is a celebration of the youth of 
the wealthy classes. The working class observes from afar the pleasure 
of this individual freedom. Above all, it must be added that a woman's 
life still costs half as much as a man's, that abortion is prohibited, 
and that, by pursuing its pro-natalist policy, the regime is making it 
increasingly difficult for women to access contraception. Certainly, the 
regime has backed down in the face of women's desire to appear "freely" 
in society, but this individual freedom is accompanied by bitterness. If 
we remember that people were shouting in the streets very early on that 
"the veil is a pretext, we want the fall of the regime," this bitterness 
takes on its full meaning. If we consider the question of the veil, that 
of women, that of political freedom, and that of bread as the four 
pillars of the Jina uprising, then only individual freedom, on a limited 
scale, was achieved. In this sense, if we do not lose sight of the fact 
that this was a radical uprising aimed at the entire theocratic state, 
it seems to me that it is not unfair to say that the uprising failed. 
What is important is to understand the reasons for this failure.

You mentioned the regime's repression, but also the question of the name 
of the uprising.
Yes. Without a doubt, the bloody and merciless repression suffered by 
the uprising is an important reason for its failure: thousands of 
demonstrators were injured and killed, thousands more arrested and 
tortured; hundreds were sentenced to death, ten of whom were executed, 
the last one a few weeks ago, as the anniversary of this movement 
approached. What is very important to note is that these people come 
from the working class. They are either workers or have working-class 
families. In other words, the regime can afford to kill opponents who do 
not have the support of the petty bourgeoisie or the bourgeoisie, and 
who do not have a voice in society.

The repression does not stop at activists directly linked to this 
movement, but is increasingly extending to all sorts of opponents. To 
cite just one example, the regime sentenced a worker activist, Charifeh 
Mohammadi, to death. This is, it must be said, almost unprecedented. The 
regime had already executed thousands of female communists and 
mujahideen during the black decade, as well as a few female Kurdish 
peshmerga. (Today, two Kurdish women have been sentenced to death and 
another to life imprisonment.) But the fact that it is targeting a 
simple worker for her activities within the labor movement shows that it 
intends to teach this dangerous class a lesson. Add to this the fact 
that, in an effort to instill fear in society, the regime has 
accelerated the execution of non-political prisoners over the past three 
years. More than 3,000 individuals have been executed, or three per day. 
This is why, in response to this aspect of the repression, a resistance 
movement has formed inside Iranian prisons. Hundreds of thousands of 
prisoners go on hunger strike every Tuesday to raise awareness among the 
rest of the population about the unchecked executions. But, to my 
knowledge, this resistance has not yet found an echo in Iranian society 
as a whole. In short, the intensity of the police repression has greatly 
weakened the movement as a whole. However, I believe it would be wrong 
to consider the repression as the sole reason for the failure of this 
phase of the movement. I would even go further and say that what 
reassured the regime of the effectiveness of these repressions 
constitutes the fundamental reason why the Jina uprising claimed so many 
victims without achieving its objective, namely the overthrow of the regime.

I try to explain this through the symbolic aspect of Jina's first name. 
This name symbolizes a strong sense of belonging to a region of Iran, 
Kurdistan, which has been a focus of Iranian nationalism since the birth 
of the Islamic Republic. Indeed, by opting for "Mahsa" rather than 
"Jina," the most nationalist elements immediately demonstrated their 
intolerance toward the Kurdish people's movement. Whether one approves 
or disapproves of the goal of this movement, namely the establishment of 
a Kurdish nation-state, is a separate issue, but it cannot and should 
not be ignored under any circumstances, as even some elements of the 
Iranian left do. The refusal to use the name Jina symbolizes, above all, 
the desire of Iranian nationalists to deny the existence of such a 
movement in Kurdistan. The regime has relied on this nationalism, or 
rather on the pan-Iranian tendency, to slow down the movement and avert 
the danger of its fall. What has held back the radicalism of this 
movement is undoubtedly the Iranian nationalists' fear of what they call 
Kurdish, Arab, Baloch, and other "separatists." For example, when 
Kurdish prisoners, arrested for their political activities, were 
executed during the "Woman, Life, Freedom" movement, few people in the 
center of the country were concerned. I would simply like to highlight 
an incurable disease within Iranian society. For various reasons, a good 
portion of Iranians harbor a strong nationalist sentiment that has 
always helped the Islamic Republic in its most difficult moments; the 
latest example is Israel's attack on Iran.

I'd like you to come back to this last point, but first, can you 
elaborate a little more? How did nationalism contribute to the failure 
of the uprising?
Indeed, while an unexpected and surprising solidarity between the 
various ethnic groups was observed at the beginning of the movement, it 
became divided over the question of territorial integrity. This division 
crystallized when the Shah's son, taking advantage of the situation, 
proclaimed himself the most suitable candidate to govern the country 
after the fall of the regime. He and his entourage launched a campaign 
entitled "I delegate to the prince," implying that the people delegate 
their vote to the prince. Although this campaign was a political scandal 
for the royalist camp and led to nothing, it was harmful enough to break 
the enthusiastic solidarity between the ethnic groups and direct the 
political struggle of the most radical elements against the royalist 
current. This was obviously only beneficial for the regime, which took 
full advantage of it. This is why, in my opinion, there are fairly 
strong hypotheses that the regime itself has strengthened the royalist 
current. It is very intriguing to note that those currently surrounding 
the Shah's son, who was very isolated and even non-existent on the 
Iranian political scene a few years ago, are former reformers of the 
regime who collaborated closely with the leaders of the Islamic 
Republic! The Shah's son has repeatedly stated that he intends to retain 
the current repressive force, the military elements, the Revolutionary 
Guards, etc., once he comes to the throne.

Symbols of the Shah and the Islamic Republic in the trash
The Islamic Republic of Iran always wants a corrupt opposition. A few 
decades ago, it was the Mujahideen who fulfilled this role. Today, it 
prefers the opposition to crystallize around the Shah's sons, not only 
because it is much easier to identify and repress opponents, but also 
because it knows that there is a deep dissension between the royalists 
and the more left-wing elements of society, or simply those who have not 
forgotten the corruption of the royal regime. But it also knows that as 
long as it can rely on Iranian nationalism, it can delay its fall. This 
is why it seems to me that the royalist forces are its best allies.

Can we therefore consider the nationalism advocated by the royalist 
movement as one of the reasons for the failure of the Jina uprising?
I would say yes and no. While nationalism has played a disastrous role 
in recent years, we should not believe that it was introduced into the 
movement by the royalists. We must abandon the dualist approach 
according to which an idea "penetrates" a "mass," and when it "takes 
hold" of the latter, the latter becomes active. In other words, ideas 
are not fabricated by a handful of intellectuals or politicians and then 
imposed on the masses. Unfortunately, many people believe that it was 
because of the royalists that the Jina uprising was bloodily suppressed. 
Certainly, there is some truth in this statement, but a superficial 
truth: the role of the royalist forces certainly led to the failure of 
the uprising. Yet royalists could not play such a role if their point of 
view were not already present in society, if they did not already have a 
popular base there, or if the conditions were not in place for them to 
have such a possibility. Some comrades still refuse to admit this truth.

There is indeed a solid basis in society that allows this reactionary 
force to exist and act. It seems to me that this basis can be explained 
schematically by three points: the political and the ideological, the 
economic.

In recent years, royalism has been politically promoted by a pro-Israeli 
media campaign that advanced the idea that Iran was experiencing its 
golden age under the Shah's rule and that the country was rapidly 
modernizing under the leadership of the Pahlavi dynasty. Thanks to this 
campaign, the royalists were able to present themselves as a progressive 
element, thanks to the Islamic Republic. This may seem paradoxical, but 
it is true! Indeed, by ferociously eliminating the most radical elements 
of society, namely the communists, the Islamic Republic was able to 
consider itself the sole narrator of the history of the revolution; by 
eliminating some of the actors of the 1979 revolution, it was able to 
censor the history of the revolution against the Shah and tell it 
according to its own interests. According to this narrative, it was not 
the misery of the working class, the crowding of the underclass into the 
slums on the outskirts of Tehran, the class struggle, or the lack of 
political freedom that drove Iranians to rebel against the Shah's 
dictatorial regime, but the desire to confront the Western world and 
establish a religious order in society. The younger generations, who 
have only known this narrative while experiencing the misery engendered 
by a theocratic regime, then ask themselves: was it not rather pure 
madness? This question was taken up by the royalists who made it their 
own myth: in the Shah's time, everything was fine, everything was 
harmonious and functional; it was the madness of a well-fed people that 
ruined everything! This is why I insist on the fact that it was even the 
Islamic Republic that gave royalism a second chance. With his falsified 
account of the 1979 revolution, he made it possible for the Shah's son 
to claim the throne, at least in the eyes of a section of society. Some, 
however, are better informed and do not overlook the corruption of the 
court and the misery of the poor, but they commit the common error of 
formal logic and judge thus: the Shah's era, although dark, was better 
than the era of the ayatollahs' regime. As if they were two distinct 
phenomena, without connection or continuity.

Economically, Iranians, especially the ever-shrinking middle class, find 
a way out of their deplorable situation, largely caused by the regime's 
geopolitical strategy, in renewing economic relations with the West, or, 
to put it simply, in becoming a "normal" country. But by "normal 
country," we mean a country where capitalism functions "normally." This 
is not to point out that capitalism has never been "normal" in its 
development. In any case, this dream of a "normal" capitalist economy is 
sold by liberals. Experts close to the royalist movement separate one 
part of the history of capitalism in Iran, modernization, and associate 
it with the Pahlavi dynasty, as if it was thanks to the benevolence and 
patriotism of the Shah and his father that Iran had experienced 
significant economic development. It is obviously much more complicated 
to explain Iran's modernization in terms of global capital relations in 
the years following the Second World War than to explain it by the 
Iranians' luck in having a benevolent king! The following question then 
automatically arises: is it possible to implement the same economic 
policies and carry out the same projects as more than 50 years ago? A 
part of society, referring to the life of the wealthy classes under the 
Shah's regime, believes that the economic catastrophe they are currently 
experiencing will end if the Shah's son comes to power.

Baluchi woman writing the slogan "Woman, life, freedom"
Ideologically, the values embodied by royalism, such as racism and 
archaic relationships between men and women, are still very present 
among a portion of the Iranian population. It is therefore not 
surprising that royalism, after a long period of hibernation, is waking 
up and demanding power.

It is not the royalists or reactionary elements in general who are 
manipulating the movement; the fact that they have a fairly significant 
margin of maneuver on the political scene demonstrates above all that 
there is a demand from a part of society. For my part, I think that it 
is very dangerous for those who campaign, directly or indirectly, 
against the Islamic Republic, to ignore the elements of the population 
who favor the existence of a reactionary political current such as royalism.

Do you think royalism is back in Iran?
Not really. Indeed, Iranian society is heterogeneous: not only are there 
national demands among various ethnic groups that oppose Iranian 
nationalism, but it is also unclear how royalism is distributed among 
different social classes, which makes it difficult to assess its 
strength. From my observations, I can only say that the idea of having a 
king does not bother a portion of the Iranian population. If I emphasize 
this point, it is not to give more weight to the elements favorable to 
royalism, who are few in number in society, but simply to emphasize 
their existence. This helps to highlight what is blocking the 
revolution: nationalism. It also helps to show that royalists and 
supporters of the Islamic Republic are joining forces to prevent any 
revolutionary process.

Furthermore, I refrain from making predictions. What is clear is that 
the regime's political situation is highly unstable: many are awaiting 
the second phase of Israel's attack, while the regime's economic 
bankruptcy suggests a popular uprising is coming. The royalists are 
counting on Israel to deliver the final blow to the Islamic Republic, 
while simultaneously hoping for a popular uprising in their favor. Yet, 
their call to take to the streets when the Israeli army was bombarding 
Iranian cities went completely unheeded.

Furthermore, I believe that Iran's geopolitical situation is important 
enough for world powers not to remain indifferent to its fate and the 
political form and structure it will take after the eventual fall of the 
current regime. In truth, royalist forces want to make people believe 
that royalism is an already existing alternative, but so far, the Shah's 
son has not been taken seriously by the leaders of Western countries. 
His best ally at the moment is Israel. Recently, the Shah's son visited 
Israel to prepare for the post-fall of the regime. This initiative has 
drawn much criticism, even from within the royalist camp, which, in the 
name of their nationalism, contests the idea of maintaining relations 
with a foreign country that has offended their own country.

Interview by zyg, September 2025

http://oclibertaire.lautre.net/spip.php?article4521
_________________________________________
A - I N F O S  N E W S  S E R V I C E
By, For, and About Anarchists
Send news reports to A-infos-en mailing list
A-infos-en@ainfos.ca
Subscribe/Unsubscribe https://ainfos.ca/mailman/listinfo/a-infos-en
Archive: http://ainfos.ca/en