A-Infos (en) Italy, IFA, UCADI #200 - Moldova at a Crossroads (ca, de, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]

This coming September, we will hear a lot about Moldova, as an important 
deadline awaits the government of Mrs. Maja Sandù, currently President 
of the country on behalf of the European Union, on the 28th of that 
month. It was not the voters who nominated the President, but the 
support of Brussels, which mobilized the Western Moldovan diaspora, 
using their votes to overturn the election results of the resident 
population. It should be remembered that the country has a total 
population of three and a half million, but only two are residents. The 
remaining one and a half million are distributed between the West and 
Russia, where 80% of the Moldovan diaspora resides while maintaining 
dual citizenship. The electoral system allows all Moldovans to vote, but 
to do so, polling stations must be set up abroad and the necessary 
ballots must be sent out. While Western countries had numerous polling 
stations, spread widely across the country and equipped with the 
necessary ballots, in Russia only two were set up in Moscow, with only 
4,000 ballots available. This ploy was sufficient to influence and 
manipulate the outcome of the vote.
On September 28, Moldovans will vote to elect the new Parliament, which 
will prepare the conditions for the country's accession to the European 
Union. This will involve initiating the necessary anti-corruption 
reforms, modifying the judicial system, and overhauling the country's 
economic structure, redirecting its economy toward the West, while also 
convincing undecided voters that EU membership is a realistic and 
short-term prospect.

The issues to be resolved

It must be considered that, as in many Eastern European countries, 
corruption is widespread and pervasive in the West as well. A case in 
point is an incident at the country's customs office, involving a 
passenger leaving the country whose laptop was confiscated for security, 
risking him missing his flight.
The situation was resolved thanks to the advice of another experienced 
passenger, who suggested providing the splendid customs officer with his 
passport containing a EUR100 "alms," which was then surreptitiously 
withheld. The justification for this was the fact that the salaries 
earned by customs officers are extremely low. It's quite clear that 
these practices hinder the country's economic development, especially 
given that they are accompanied by scant protection from the judicial 
system. Economically, the country is experiencing a highly complex 
situation. The effects of the decentralization of production by Western 
countries, which have relocated many of their businesses to the country 
due to the extremely low cost of labor, the new production activities 
established by Ukrainians fleeing their war-torn country, and the 
profits from lucrative war-related activities, exploiting the country's 
proximity to the war front, are insufficient to economically offset the 
damage resulting from the politically motivated interruption of Russian 
gas and oil supplies, which were once made available to the country at a 
very affordable price.
This preferential treatment stems from numerous factors: the country has 
a Russian-speaking population of more than 50%, so much so that it is 
officially bilingual, with Romanian and Russian spoken interchangeably. 
The Russian-speaking population adheres to an autonomous Orthodox 
Church, but one linked to the Moscow Patriarchate. Part of the country's 
territory is autonomous and has established a de facto independent 
republic, Transnistria, which covers the entire border between Moldova 
and Ukraine. Its autonomy is guaranteed by the forty-year presence of a 
contingent of Russian troops who guard a vast depot of rusting weapons, 
remnants of the USSR, and still display the USSR coat of arms and use 
its anthem. Bordering this autonomous territory is the region of 
Gagauzia, whose population is predominantly Russian-speaking.
With the upcoming elections, the attention of Mrs. Sandù and the 
European Union has turned specifically to politicians from this region, 
and the Governor of Gagauzia, Evghenia Gutul, was complicit in the 
illegal financing of the Shor party, a political group that was 
subsequently declared unconstitutional and banned from participating in 
the elections. The charges focus on the period from 2019 to 2022, a 
period in which Gutul held the position of secretary of the party's 
Monitoring, Planning and Control Department. The governor allegedly 
played an active role in importing large sums of undeclared money into 
Moldova, originating from an organized crime group linked to the Russian 
Federation, to finance the party.
Furthermore, between October and November 2022, Gutul allegedly 
coordinated the party's local branches, knowingly accepting illicit 
funding of approximately 42.5 million lei. This money, also coming from 
the same criminal group, was allegedly used for the party's political 
activities. These are the reasons for the seven-year prison sentence.
Despite these preventative measures, it is highly likely that the 
election outcome will reduce the number of seats held by the 
pro-European ruling Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS). The result 
will determine the pace of Moldova's reforms, its energy security 
strategy, and will impact its alignment with EU foreign policy at a 
particularly delicate time in the war in neighboring Ukraine.
The outcome of the war on the battlefield is prompting the EU and NATO 
to closely monitor the situation in Moldova, a country poised to 
constitute a new front against Russia's presence in the region and to 
replace Ukraine in the extremely likely event of a defeat on the ground. 
The growing difficulties experienced by the West stem from the effects 
the Ukrainian war is having on its neighbor, where it has grown 
enormously due to the presence of Ukrainians, often viewed with 
displeasure by the population due to the subsidies they enjoy from the 
European Union due to their refugee status and the capital they possess, 
having accumulated thanks to bribes received from European and American 
war funding.

The Opposition's Response

To counter this plan, a "leftist"/pro-Russian bloc has been formed: in 
July, four opposition parties (PSRM, PCRM, "The Future of Moldova," 
"Heart of Moldova") announced the formation of a united electoral bloc, 
led by former President Igor Dodon. Their Platform focuses on "strategic 
ties with Russia," calls for the country's neutrality in foreign policy 
and the reduction of basic commodities and energy prices, while 
reestablishing supply relations with Russia.
To counter their propaganda, NATO and the European Union are taking 
action in the media, blocking Russian-language broadcasts and making 
every effort to thwart advertising on social media. They are preparing 
street protests, while the opposition is attempting to turn the 
conviction of Yevgeniya Gutsul, who enjoys significant popular support, 
against the ruling party.
In an effort to maintain control of the country, the European Union and 
NATO authorities are relentlessly deploying all available resources and 
have provided substantial financial support to the Democratic Party, 
whose public image they are attempting to clean up with the arrest in 
Greece of Vladimir Plahotniuc-the central figure in the 2014 "robbery of 
the century"-who reportedly expressed his intention to return to the 
country. To give an idea of the level of institutional corruption, it's 
worth remembering that in 2014, a group of ministers were hosted at a 
resort in the Maldives, in exchange for the Moon Church (a schismatic 
evangelical sect) allowing its catechism to be taught in public schools 
in Moldova, a notoriously Orthodox country.
In this situation, Maia Sandù's cries of alarm are incessant, denouncing 
alleged Russian interference of an "unprecedented" intensity. She 
denounces the country as an active testing ground for Russian 
narratives, conflating complaints about the deteriorating economic 
situation with claims of Western "control," amplifying tensions between 
the center and the periphery (Gagauzia, Transnistria), sowing doubts 
about the fairness of the elections and EU membership and the timeframe 
required for implementation, even though Moldova has reportedly made 
progress in 31 of 33 negotiation chapters since its candidate status, 
albeit from a low starting point.

Possible scenarios

Given all this, the likely deterioration of the Democratic Party means 
it will not achieve a majority; it will seek allies among centrists and 
supporters of a civic platform. This will allow for a steady path toward 
the EU, a push for justice reforms, and continued enforcement of media 
and party financing laws to counter attempts at Russian interference, 
providing a more decisive institutional response to reform demands. The 
prevalence of a PSRM-led alliance could block or reverse some parts of 
the EU agenda, slowing the opening of new chapters and reformulating 
foreign policy in a more "balanced" direction. This will lead to 
friction with Brussels, a shift toward Gazprom's "energy pragmatism," 
and renewed pressure on oversight institutions. This situation will be 
accompanied by a fragmented Parliament, with influential figures who 
will make the country's politics unstable. Smaller groups, or remnants 
around banned networks and parties, become crucial in determining the 
election outcome. Coalition bargaining will extend until October; 
external financing and information operations will intensify. The risk 
of political paralysis is evident, just as EU decisions on the 
timetables for opening chapters are expected.
Meanwhile, the cost of living and energy will rise, despite EU aid and 
diversification; energy prices and wage pressures will remain high. 
Those aligned with the The Kremlin will have a field day arguing that 
Moscow can supply gas at lower prices; the PAS will respond with 
medium-term security measures and EU-funded infrastructure. Regarding 
the rule of law/fight against corruption, we note that the high-profile 
cases (Sor, Gutsul, Plahotniuc) have a two-way effect: they galvanize 
reformists and fuel the opposition's claims of "selective justice."
Regarding the unresolved institutional issue of relations between 
Moldova and Transnistria, the evolving conflict is once again drawing 
international attention to Chisinau's de-escalation stance, while 
pro-Russian forces are warning against "dragging Moldova into war."

Gianni Cimbalo

https://www.ucadi.org/2025/09/04/la-moldavia-al-bivio/
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