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(en) France, OCL CA #341 - Pollution and report to the State in the mining and industrial regions of Tunisia (ca, de, fr, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]

Date Thu, 4 Jul 2024 07:22:37 +0300


A look back at a decade of protests following the 2011 uprisings ---- The revolutionary uprisings of 2010-2011 in Tunisia not only led to the retirement of dictator Ben Ali in Saudi Arabia and allowed cross-partisan debates on the drafting of a new constitution, supposed to guarantee the security of a "democratic transition" (which nonetheless, barely 7 years later, hit the Saïed Wall in the face). They also brought about the emergence of oppositional spaces, where social groups hitherto excluded from political life manifested themselves in the public space, outside of usual routines, where new issues, or at least new framing of these issues , have emerged. This is particularly the case for a set of local struggles which confronted the question of environmental degradation induced by a set of activities which structure the Tunisian economy.

Discharges of wastewater from textile factories on the Sahel coast (the region of Sousse and Monastir), supposedly "controlled" landfills which overflow and whose leachate spreads into the surrounding inhabited areas, brickworks and cement factories which emit fumes toxic, oil and gas drilling which drains water reserves, phosphate mines which release the ore with dynamite, raising clouds of dust laden with heavy metals, processing factories for these ores which emit fumes toxic and release enormous quantities of weakly radioactive sludge into the sea... Behind these phenomena constituting mining and industrial activity, there are farmers whose crops are contaminated and drying up due to lack of access to water resources , small fishermen who are no longer able to find fish in their nets, nor to buy the fuel that would take them further, asthmatic children, cancer patients forced to seek treatment several hundred kilometers away... There are also landscape transformations that make childhood memories disappear, a scarcity of walking and leisure spaces, constant pestilential odors, fatigue that seems heavier, etc. And then the feeling of being treated less well than the inhabitants of Tunisia in the capital (even if the latter also has its share of galley slaves). All this in a context where, mechanization, structural adjustment, relocations having taken place, unemployment is massive in several regions, without entitlement to any benefit.
Ben Ali had made the environmental issue a showcase for his regime. To maintain his image as a good student among international donors, he hastened to sign all the international conventions that came to hand: on the prevention of pollution, the fight against desertification, climate change, for the preservation of biodiversity... He had given impetus to the creation of dedicated institutions - national environmental protection agency, ministry of the environment, coastal protection agency, waste management agency - but also associations often retaining a link of subjection to the regime. He also commissioned the development of a fennec mascot, Labib, to teach children, in television spots, not to throw their waste anywhere and not to make too much noise under their neighbors' windows. Finally, he had renamed streets in every city in the country into "environmental avenues" and other "quality of life boulevards"... during the revolution, these plaques were adorned with additional characters: "...shit" . The Labib statues which adorned the entrance to the public gardens were stoned and destroyed.

Labib and the "quality of life" boulevards, the legacy of Ben Ali, Tunisian ecology
The reduction of environmental issues to matters of education, good moral conduct, or even markers of the degree of advancement of a society has left some traces. When during the first years following January 14[in 2011, the date of Ben Ali's flight], garbage piled up on the sidewalks, notably due to the garbage collectors' strikes, it was in the light of "lack of environmental awareness of the citizen" that various editorialists and commentators have analyzed the situation, renewing a well-rooted distrust towards a "people" who are too backward, not modern enough, which the political elites should hasten to address for his own good.

The analysis of local struggles, however, allows us to move away from idealistic visions of the relationship with the environment by showing how the taking of resources and toxic discharges are inseparable from the social organization which amounts to a way of arranging nature. , and cut across class divides.
Among the social groups that participated in these mobilizations, we can schematically distinguish three categories.
* The first corresponds to farmers and/or fishermen who denounce the loss of income they suffer due to contamination and increased competition for water resources attributable to the industry. In the aftermath of 2011, it is above all the anchors linked to the place of work and residence which fuel these mobilizations, while the Tunisian Union of Agriculture and Fishing (UTAP), the main agricultural union and historically close to the Constitutional Rally democratic (RCD, Ben Ali's party), was disavowed. However, little by little, UTAP, closer to the Islamist party Ennahdha, was able to regain control over certain mobilizations. These took the form of gatherings in front of places of political power (headquarters of the governorate, of the municipality) or in front of the buildings of the companies in question, but also, occasionally, of attempts to block production.
* The second category relates to residents of areas bordering industries, forced to live as close as possible to industrial nuisances and risks. They belong to categories of the population who have not had the means to go a little further, even if only a few kilometers. They encounter difficulties in treating the illnesses they catch due to air, soil and water pollution, especially since health infrastructures are concentrated in the richest coastal regions of Tunisia ( Tunis, Sousse-Monastir, Sfax). Among these populations, young unemployed people constitute a particular subgroup: in addition to being subjected to pollution, they are deprived of a job that allows them to marry, build a house and be considered adults in the eyes of the public. patriarchal society: single at 40, it's as if they were stuck in adolescence. The mobilizations of groups of residents are based on neighborhood networks, links of male acquaintance forged in cafes and an associative fabric which largely developed after the revolutionary uprisings with the creation of a myriad of small associations: the title of president of an association is seen as a mark of prestige likely to bring social recognition, even if the association in question only includes the members of the office (themselves often nominees). Among the preferred modes of action are street demonstrations, rallies, road blockades, and even industrial activities.
* Finally, we can distinguish a third category made up of local or regional sections of large organizations - the Tunisian General Labor Union, the Tunisian Human Rights League, the Bar Association, and sometimes even employers' organizations - , associations - recognized at regional level and most of the time eligible to receive development aid funds - and collectives, whose members are less directly exposed to nuisances, but who intend to take up a question having gained importance locally. These groups, often having communication and logistical capabilities, organize marches and rallies that are sometimes very well attended. They have access to the media and some are easily received by the authorities.

Chott Salem beach in Gabès, polluted by phosphogypsum (2017)

If all these groups claim to be "defending the territory", they do not put the same issues behind the notion of "defense" and do not delimit the "territory" in question in the same way. For groups of farmers and fishermen, as for groups of residents, there is rarely any question of demanding an end to industrial activity, which seems an inaccessible horizon and which, casually, would generate destruction of jobs, often better paid than their equivalent in other sectors, to members of their families. The challenge is therefore to push industries to optimize their processes so that discharges are less significant or less harmful, but above all to negotiate financial, material and employment compensation. Moreover, groups of unemployed people from neighborhoods bordering industrial zones, who regularly work to block them in the hope of being granted jobs, believe that they must be given priority over unemployed people from other areas by virtue of their status as victims. of pollution.
On the other hand, the dismantling of installations (in fact, their relocation to even more peripheral regions) may be a demand of certain organizations which bring together bosses and management classes. For example, in Sfax, the second Tunisian city in terms of population and economic activity, a coalition of associations specializing in the field of environment, leisure, human rights and development and organizations employers mobilized for many years (and ultimately successfully) for the shutdown of the SIAPE factory located to the south of the city. The speech articulated arguments on the quality of life, on the need to boost the development of the city through the tertiary sector and by strengthening its attractiveness, and advocacy against the "political marginalization" of the city by the Tunisian elites and Sahelian regions that would embody the industrial specialization of the city. Clearly, these mobilizations were driven by the dream of a clean and dynamic city center responding to the preferences of the wealthy social classes, at the risk of worsening unemployment among the working classes (who would not necessarily find their place in the projects of "hubs based on new technologies" intended to constitute the new economic orientations of the city) and to multiply the garbage peripheries where polluting industries and recycling centers congregate. In other cities, certain groups dreamed of it without managing to unite as much or develop "alternative development projects" tangible enough to convince central governments.
On the other hand, there is no trace, or only very marginally, of slogans like "let's leave the resources in the ground!"» or "neither here nor elsewhere!" ". In a context of persistent economic difficulties at a time when many textile and manufacturing companies have relocated their activities to other regions, where the tourist boom has weakened, where most farmers are struggling, few who envisage that the national economy can do without exports of resources, both in the raw and processed state. Degrowth does not appear to be an encouraging prospect: it is difficult to see how it would be distinguished from a recession. Furthermore, the purpose of the production does not matter: in any case, the latter is often intended to be exported. But the reference scale of the struggle also gives rise to debates and tensions. Among farmers and fishermen, among residents of industrial zones, the defended territory corresponds to the neighborhood, the locality, the village. It is because it is affected by nuisances and because we have our strongest ties there that we mobilize; it is also the level which appears relevant for compensation claims. On the other hand, certain organizations - league for the defense of human rights, UGTT, etc. - criticize this "localism" (category equivalent to that of NIMBY ("not in my garden"), not very used in Tunisia). It is the region - and not the neighborhood - that is supposed to be the "victim". For the latter, if there must be compensation, these should be public facilities (a new hospital for example).

Moulares, a mining town in the Gafsa region where phosphate is extracted and washed

To fully understand the forms that these mobilizations take and what the different groups are demanding, we must succeed in situating them in the context of the modes of governing collective action. On this level, it is clear that police and judicial repression decreased after the departure of Ben Ali. The event damaged the myth of the all-powerful State, at least partially. In the eyes of industrial companies, the latter has ceased to act as a buffer between them and the populations of their territories of establishment. Their efforts to claim "corporate social responsibility" by acquiring techniques supposedly more efficient and "clean" and by financing medical equipment for neighborhood medical dispensaries, school supplies, subsidies for sports clubs or associative projects have rarely managed to calm the protests.

But the State remained a privileged interlocutor of the protests, to which most of the demands were addressed. The authorities responded with a mixture of wait-and-see, never keeping their commitments - putting an end to discharge into the sea or relocating the installations - within the announced deadlines, and more or less discretionary distribution of compensation to individuals or groups mobilized or presenting themselves as such. In Gabès (see box), following actions carried out by fishermen against the Tunisian Chemical Group, whose activity pollutes the seas, the company announced that it would donate fishing nets to listed boats and that it would would take care of the social security of fishermen. It took several other blocking actions for it to pay the expenses announced in the first year, before it forgot again the next... Even the fishermen who hold responsibilities in groups financed by international cooperation say: "if we don't block, we get nothing!" ". Blocking does not necessarily appear to be a sign of political radicalism: it is what makes it possible to establish or re-establish contact with the authorities. The same is true for many young men in industrial regions. By blocking the transport of products or industrial activity, by installing a tent on a factory entrance, a road or a railway line, they hope to be able to negotiate, to enter into the customer networks in which they are excluded, to obtain a job in the industrial company or a subcontracting company (preferably linked to the State because the contract is better and there is social security). Sit-ins and blockades are thus seen as a means of recruitment. This establishes a routinization of protests, to which the authorities respond on a case-by-case basis, thus contributing to a fragmentation of protest dynamics. In the region of the Gafsa mining basin, sit-ins led by groups of four or five people each time follow one another without generating broader collective dynamics.
In the second half of the 2010s, we saw the emergence of forms of organization of mobilizations of the unemployed opening up prospects for combating the individualized treatment of collective demands, with the appearance of "coordination" (tansiqiyyat): in 2017, in El Kamour, in the Tataouine region where hydrocarbon extraction companies are concentrated, this mode of organization made it possible to block oil pumping, to hold a sit-in of several hundred demonstrators over several months and to create a more favorable balance of power to negotiate an ambitious agreement with the authorities (an agreement which, as usual, was not entirely kept...). This mode of organization was then replicated in other regions.

Even if the number of jobs created by the authorities was still lower than in their promises, the workforce of state industrial companies swelled after the revolution, which greatly displeased the World Bank and the IMF, benefactors of the "transition". democratic" (in the sense that they granted loans without too much difficulty for a time) but nevertheless adept at budgetary rigor. To overcome this constraint, state companies have created more or less fictitious subsidiaries called "environmental and planting companies" and/or "gardening companies" to hire the unemployed without exploding their workforce. Why more or less fictional? Because most of the time, employees are only asked to clock in in the morning, without any activity being required of them. If some CEOs of these companies have tried to set up activities from scratch - planting trees destined to die at the first heat stroke, cleaning public establishments, etc. - to occupy these employees whose idleness risked, in the eyes of many notables, causing the "value of work" to disappear in the region, a large part of the employees in question - and aspiring employees who did not lack demand to be hired there in turn - in fact consider these "jobs" as a form of social protection or unemployment benefit in a country which is almost completely devoid of them.
Since the end of the 2010s, mobilizations seem to have become less numerous. It would undoubtedly be too easy to attribute the cause to the establishment of the hyper-presidentialist regime of Kaïs Saïed in the aftermath of the Covid crisis, even if the legal attacks against certain activists who played a role in denouncing pollution may had the objective of warning potential future protesters. Thus, in 2023, charges with potential prison sentences were issued against several members of the Manich msab ("we are not a landfill") collective based in Agareb, where the second largest landfill in the country is located. It closed permanently in 2021 after the assassination by police of Abderrazak Lachhab, a demonstrator against the reopening of this landfill, increased the protest against the nuisance caused to residents. It is also probable that the context of latent economic crisis, the disappointed hopes, the weariness of never being heard weigh heavily on the desire for collective action, as if no one really believed in it anymore... But in these regions, the contaminations always constitute time bombs!

Gabès: The mobilizations cast a harsh light on a national industrial flagship

In Gabès, a (relatively) large oasis town on the southern coast, it only took a few weeks after January 14, the day of Ben Ali's departure, for the first street demonstrations to take place under the slogan "Pollution , cleared! ". In this urban center, from 1972, an imposing industrial complex was established for the transformation of phosphate ores (extracted in the region of the Gafsa mining basin) into phosphoric acid and fertilizer intended, for the most part, to be exported to from the industrial port built for the occasion. For 50 years now, enormous quantities of phosphogypsum, a by-product of these reactions loaded with heavy metals and slightly radioactive, have been released directly into the Mediterranean, at a rate of more than 10,000 tonnes per day. At this sea level, the seabed is not covered with Posidonia beds but with a sticky and toxic material. Factories spew a range of colored, smelly, or less perceptible but equally harmful gases: sulfur oxides, fluorinated gases, nitrogen oxides, ammonia, dust, hydrogen sulphide, etc. Water tables and soils are also contaminated by effluent over a radius of several kilometers.

In the field of phosphates, extractive activity was established at the end of the 19th century under the aegis of French colonial power. On the other hand, it is precisely to establish the economic independence of the country vis-à-vis the former colonizer that Habib Bourguiba, the nationalist leader who became the first president, assisted by his super-minister Ahmed Ben Salah from the central union of the Tunisian General Labor Union, have decided to enhance the Tunisian position in the value chain of the sector and to equip itself with processing industries. Industrial development was seen as a way out of the (neo)colonial yoke. Initially, at the local level, the creation of the industrial center in Gabès was rather well received, it seems: it brought better paid jobs than the agricultural and craft work thanks to which the populations subsisted, which which attracted new workers from all regions of southern Tunisia. But the damage was felt relatively quickly, firstly on water resources: before industrial installations, water flowed through the oasis from artesian springs. Afterwards, the flow rates collapsed and it was necessary to pump. State-led housing construction programs were not enough to respond to the influx of workers seeking industrial employment. We began to build in the oases, since due to changes in the economic orientation of the territory and agricultural income cut by contamination and expenses for access to water, many plots were left abandoned. The economic structure, the landscape, the social norms have been completely transformed.

In Gabès, the Tunisian chemical group had a wall erected around its site
The factories are today largely dilapidated. The numerous blockages in the delivery of phosphate ores from the Mining Basin cause them to stop and restart frequently, releasing enormous quantities of gas into the air with each stroke. For the most part, the installations are managed by the Tunisian Chemical Group, a national company linked to that of the Compagnie des Phosphates de Gafsa which takes care of extraction, even if a few private companies in turn use the Group's products. chemical, such as TIMAB, a subsidiary of Roullier: although several reports have recently appeared to question the Breton group, its factory has little weight compared to all the activities of the industrial zone, where the Tunisian chemical group remains a heavyweight . Most phosphate products are exported to emerging markets such as the Middle East, Asia and South America, and less and less to Europe where phosphate consumption tends to decline.

For several years, mobilizations were relatively intense in the region, carried out by diverse and sometimes antagonistic groups. Indeed, for example, the Islamists (the majority in Gabès) on the one hand, the Tunisian General Labor Union and center-left groups on the other, have sometimes made the fight against pollution an area of confrontation. These mobilizations broke certain taboos; they criticized territorial injustices and contributed to the politicization of many people. They also publicized the problem at the national level, or even beyond, motivating some interventions by development aid agencies which, by bringing in funding, have somewhat transformed the associative landscape. But after all these years, the air still smells bad and the emissions continue to accumulate. A project to relocate part of the factories in the industrial zone to the outskirts of the region did not come to fruition due to lack of financing; a seawater desalination project, wrongly presented as an ecological advance (sic) since it would allow less pumping of the water table, is on hold.

Diane

http://oclibertaire.lautre.net/spip.php?article4186
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