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(en) Italy, FDCA, Cantiere #47 - Who decides what anti-Semitism is? - Totò Caggese (ca, de, fr, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]

Date Wed, 18 Nov 2026 08:54:39 +0200


A definition created to recognize and measure antisemitism is entering legislation, schools, universities, and institutions. The question is not only what it says, but what it becomes. What is antisemitism? The question would seem to have an obvious answer. It becomes much less simple when the answer must be written into a law. As we write, in mid-September, the Chamber of Deputies is examining the bill to combat antisemitism, already approved by the Senate on March 4, 2026. By the time this article is published, the text may have been further amended. But its very parliamentary journey allows us to observe a problem that goes far beyond Italian legislative history: who draws the line between antisemitism and political conflict, and what happens when a definition born as an operational tool becomes a criterion for state action?

That antisemitism exists, that it has a specific and catastrophic history in Europe, and that it continues to manifest itself should not be a matter of debate. Attacks, threats, profanations, stereotypes about Jewish power, conspiracy theories, Holocaust denial, and attributing collective responsibility to Jews for the Israeli government's actions are real phenomena. Combating them does not mean limiting political freedom: it means defending individuals and communities from discrimination and violence.

The problem begins when one has to decide where anti-Semitism ends and where criticism of the State of Israel, anti-Zionism, opposition to nationalism, or the proposal for a different political order for Israelis and Palestinians begin.

And it is precisely on that boundary that the controversy over the IHRA definition focuses.

A definition born to count

In 2016, the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance adopted a "working definition" according to which antisemitism is "a specific perception of Jews that may be expressed as hatred towards them." The definition is associated with eleven examples that help to recognize its manifestations.[2]

Some are hardly controversial: accusing Jews as a people of controlling governments, the economy, or the media; denying the Holocaust; holding Jews collectively responsible for the actions of the Israeli state.

Others enter directly into the political conflict over Israel: denying the Jewish people the right to self-determination, arguing, for example, that the existence of the State of Israel is a racist undertaking; applying to Israel standards not required of other democratic states; comparing contemporary Israeli policy to Nazi policy.

The IHRA itself specifies that criticism of Israel, similar to that leveled at any other country, cannot be considered antisemitic and that examples must be evaluated in context. The problem, therefore, isn't a definition that automatically declares all criticism of Israel antisemitic. It's more subtle: who interprets the context, and with what consequences?

To understand this, it is useful to go back to the origins.

Kenneth Stern, one of the main authors of the Working Definition from which the IHRA definition derives, has repeatedly pointed out that the text was created in the early 2000s to resolve a very concrete problem. Different European countries collected data on anti-Semitism according to different criteria and the results were not comparable. A tool was needed that would help those collecting the data to decide which incidents to classify as anti-Semitic.[3]

Not a penal code. Not a university disciplinary regulation. Not a criterion for determining what opinions could be expressed.

Stern, who has not renounced the definition he helped develop, has instead challenged its use as a hate speech code , especially in universities. The question, therefore, is not whether the definition is "good" or "bad." It is what happens when a tool designed to classify phenomena changes its function.

From definition to device

This is exactly what makes the Italian case interesting.

The text approved by the Senate does not limit itself to citing the IHRA. It establishes that the Republic adopts its operational definition, "including the related indicators, necessary for the purposes of applying the law itself". In the same article, after the amendments introduced during the parliamentary examination, it is specified that "the freedom of political criticism and expression of thought and the freedom of assembly and association" remain unchanged.[1]

The simultaneous presence of the two formulas explains the problem well.

The law aims to use IHRA indicators and at the same time feels the need to clarify that political criticism must remain free.

It was not an editorial detail. That guarantee entered the text during the parliamentary debate. And the Senate discussed and rejected amendments that proposed replacing the IHRA with the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism or, at least, excluding examples relating to historical comparisons, state qualifications and double standards.[5]

The proposal to explicitly state that free criticism of the Israeli government's political actions does not constitute anti-Semitism was also rejected in the Chamber. The rapporteur argued that the clarification was superfluous because the IHRA itself already protects such criticism and because examples are essential to make the definition operational.

The conflict, therefore, was seen by Parliament. It is not an objection invented subsequently by opponents of the law.

And the original text showed this even more clearly.

The first version of the bill provided that a demonstration could be prevented in the presence of a "serious potential risk" that symbols, slogans, messages or behaviors attributable to the IHRA indicators would appear. During the examination in the Senate that provision was entirely replaced by a provision concerning the National Coordinator for the fight against anti-Semitism.[6]

Proposals for new criminal sanctions were also abandoned.

The result is significant: the Senate has toned down the directly coercive instruments, but has retained the definitional crux.

And perhaps this is precisely the most interesting question.

Prison is not necessary for a definition to produce effects

One might argue that if no new crimes are introduced and if freedom of criticism is expressly safeguarded, the problem will disappear.

But a law does not operate only through the penal code.

The text approved by the Senate provides for the IHRA to be included in the national strategy against anti-Semitism and in the activities of institutions that collect data, fight online hatred, and train teachers, police forces, prefects, and magistrates. It intervenes in schools and universities; it provides for prevention, monitoring, and counteraction activities; and it involves the public radio and television service.[7]

A definition can therefore remain formally distant from the criminal offense and still become a criterion through which an administration classifies an incident, a university evaluates an initiative, a school interprets behavior, and a worker decides what to report.

It is the passage from definition to device.

And this is a point on which there is no consensus even among those who consider the IHRA useful.

In Italian parliamentary hearings, some supporters explicitly called for the definition and its eleven examples to move from their previous status as soft law to a truly "normative effectiveness." Others, including representatives of Italian Jewry and scholars engaged in combating anti-Semitism, instead insisted on the operational character of the definition: an orientation tool, not something to be copied into the penal code or automatically transformed into a sanction.[8]

This is a far from insignificant difference: even among those who support the IHRA, there is no full agreement on what adopting it means.

There is not only the IHRA

The controversy would be less relevant if the IHRA represented the only available way to define contemporary antisemitism.

It is not so.

In 2021, hundreds of scholars developed the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism. Its definition is much more concise: antisemitism is "discrimination, prejudice, hostility, or violence against Jews because they are Jews, or against Jewish institutions because they are Jewish."[9]

The difference becomes especially evident when you get to Israel.

For the Jerusalem Declaration, support for Palestinian rights, criticism or opposition to Zionism as a form of nationalism, the proposal for a binational, federal, unitary, or democratic state with equal rights for all, nor the use of concepts such as settler colonialism or apartheid, when supported as political and historical arguments, are not in themselves antisemitic.

The Nexus Document, developed by scholars specifically working on the relationship between anti-Semitism, Israel and Zionism, also acknowledges that Israel can become the target through which anti-Jewish stereotypes are re-proposed, but warns that opposition to Zionism and criticism of the Israeli state are not, as such, anti-Semitism.[10]

This does not mean that JDA or Nexus have the "true" definition while IHRA has the false one.

This means something more politically important: the border is the subject of an ongoing scientific, historical, and political discussion.

And the same dossier prepared by the Italian Chamber presents the Jerusalem Declaration as "an alternative to the IHRA definition".[4]

The legislator, therefore, is not simply adopting a well-established concept. It is choosing, among competing definitions, the one that will guide the institutions' action.

When the definition starts to work

There's no need to imagine what might happen. In other countries, the IHRA has already become part of government and university practices.

A report by the European Legal Support Center has reconstructed 53 incidents between 2017 and 2022 in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Austria in which the definition was invoked directly or indirectly against initiatives related to Palestine. This is a source to be used with caution: the ELSC provides legal assistance specifically to individuals and organizations engaged in Palestinian solidarity. But some of the cases described can be verified through administrative documents and judicial decisions.[11]

In 2017, at the University of Leeds, former British diplomat Craig Murray was scheduled to discuss a highly political issue: Palestine/Israel: A Unitary Secular State or a Bantustan Solution. He was asked for the text of his speech in advance, and the university assigned staff to monitor the meeting. The university's protocol on freedom of expression specifically referred to the IHRA. The meeting eventually took place.[12]

The point is not whether Murray was right.

The point is that discussing what form of statehood should exist between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean can fall within the scope of an instrument created to recognize anti-Semitism.

For an anarchist, the paradox is even more evident. We can challenge the French, Italian, Russian, or Palestinian nation-state. We can imagine federations, confederations, and stateless communities. Why should the discussion of Israel's political form have a different status?

Of course, there is a crucial limit: denying Jews security, equality, collective rights, or even the possibility of living in that land because they are Jewish is not an anarchic critique of the state. It is discrimination. But challenging a national or ethnonational order is not necessarily equivalent to challenging the existence of a people.

It is precisely this distinction that a definition used by institutions must be able to preserve.

The opposite risk

Finally, there is one objection that a libertarian critic of the IHRA cannot afford to ignore.

Anti-Zionism can be used as the language of anti-Semitism.

It happens when "Zionist" simply becomes a substitute for "Jew"; when Italian Jews are held accountable for the Israeli bombings of Gaza; when images of Jewish financial power, global conspiracy, and dual loyalty reappear in a different guise; when a synagogue is treated as a representation of the Israeli state.

To call all this simply "criticism of Israel" would be as misleading as calling all criticism of Israel anti-Semitic.

And this is probably where the IHRA hits a real problem: contemporary antisemitism does not necessarily present itself with the vocabulary of twentieth-century antisemitism.

But acknowledging this transformation does not automatically solve the problem of how the boundary should be drawn.

In fact, it makes it more difficult.

Who guards the border?

The Italian question, therefore, is not whether the state should fight anti-Semitism. It must do so, just as it must combat racism, discrimination, and violence against any minority.

The question is different.

Who decides what constitutes anti-Semitism? A historian? A Jewish community? A parliamentary majority? A police officer? The rector of a university? An algorithm tasked with searching for hate speech?

And above all: should a definition constructed to help recognize a phenomenon become the criterion by which institutions classify political discourse?

Over the years, Kenneth Stern has raised a paradoxical concern: overly broadening the accusation of antisemitism can end up weakening the fight against antisemitism itself. If the same word is used for a graffiti against a synagogue, a theory about a Jewish financial conspiracy, and a discussion of the possibility of a binational state in Palestine, we risk losing the ability to distinguish profoundly different phenomena.

Precision, in this field, is not indulgence. It is a political necessity.

Combating antisemitism means acknowledging it, even when it hides behind the language of anti-Zionism. But it also means refusing to allow the accusation of antisemitism to become a tool to exclude nationalism, Zionism, the policies of the Israeli state, or the very form of the state from political discussion.

For this reason, the question posed by the Italian debate will remain open, regardless of the text that emerges from the Chamber. Not only what anti-Semitism is, but who has the power to define it-and what they can do, once they have that power.

Note

1. Senate of the Republic, 19th Legislature, Bill S. 1004, Provisions for the Adoption of the Working Definition of Anti-Semitism and for Countering Anti-Semitic Acts, introduced on January 30, 2024; approved by the Senate, with amendments, on March 4, 2026, and transmitted to the Chamber as AC 2830. The approved text establishes in Article 1 the adoption of the IHRA definition, "including the related indicators necessary for the purposes of applying the law itself," without prejudice to freedom of political criticism, expression, assembly, and association.

2. International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), Working Definition of Antisemitism, adopted in 2016. The definition is accompanied by eleven illustrative examples; those referring to Israel include the denial of the Jewish people's right to self-determination, the application of double standards, and comparisons between contemporary Israeli policies and those of Nazi Germany. The IHRA itself specifies that criticism of Israel similar to that leveled at any other country cannot be considered antisemitic.

3. Kenneth S. Stern, the principal drafter of the previous Working Definition developed within the EUMC in the early 2000s, traced its origins as a tool primarily intended to facilitate the comparison of the collection and classification of antisemitic incidents. Stern subsequently criticized the definition's use as a disciplinary code or instrument for regulating freedom of expression, particularly in universities. See Kenneth S. Stern, A Bad Deal: By Adopting the IHRA Definition of Antisemitism, Universities are Sacrificing Academic Freedom, Knight First Amendment Institute, 2025.

4. Chamber of Deputies, Research Service, Provisions for the Counteracting Antisemitism. AA.C. 2376, 2383, and 2830, Reading Sheets no. 603, April 15, 2026. The dossier defines the IHRA as a "non-legally binding" definition and dedicates a specific section to the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism as "an alternative to the IHRA definition."

5. During the Senate's examination by the Constitutional Affairs Committee, amendments were introduced both to replace the reference to the IHRA with the Jerusalem Declaration and, secondarily, to exclude some of the most controversial indicators relating to Israel. The amendments were rejected. During the same process, however, the clause safeguarding the freedoms of political criticism, expression, assembly, and association was approved, based on an initial proposal by De Cristofaro, Cucchi, and Magni and after a rewording agreed upon with the rapporteur and the Government.

6. The original text of S.1004 provided in Article 3 the possibility of preventing a demonstration in the presence of a "serious potential risk" of anti-Semitic symbols, slogans, messages, or behavior attributable to the adopted definition. During the committee's examination, amendments were presented to delete it and proposals were made to at least replace the "potential risk" with a "concrete and present" risk. On February 25, 2026, the article was finally replaced entirely, through the approval of Amendment 3.4, Text 2, with a provision regarding the National Coordinator for the Fight against Anti-Semitism.

7. The text approved by the Senate provides, among other things, a three-year national strategy, data collection and classification activities, countering online hate speech, training in schools, interventions in universities, training of the armed forces and police, prefects and magistrates, as well as campaigns by the public radio and television service.

8. The Senate hearings revealed differing positions even among supporters of the IHRA. The Union of Italy-Israel Associations called for a transition from soft law to a definition with "normative force." UCEI, on the other hand, emphasized the operational and illustrative nature of the definition, specifying that it was not intended to be simply copied and pasted into the penal code or to directly sanction behavior. Gadi Luzzatto Voghera, director of the CDEC Foundation, while considering the reference to the IHRA necessary, acknowledged its academic criticism and noted that existing repressive norms could be sufficient if properly applied.

9. The Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism (2021) defines antisemitism as "discrimination, prejudice, hostility, or violence against Jews as Jews (or Jewish institutions as Jews)." Its guidelines distinguish antisemitism from criticism or opposition to Zionism as a form of nationalism and consider the proposal for different constitutional systems-two states, a binational state, a federal state, a democratic unitary state, etc.-not antisemitic as such, as long as full equality and rights are guaranteed. See also Chamber of Deputies, dossier cited in note 4.

10. The Nexus Document, Understanding Antisemitism at Its Nexus with Israel and Zionism, Nexus Project, ed. 2024. The document considers the application of anti-Jewish stereotypes and myths to Israel or Zionism and the attribution of collective responsibility to Jews to be antisemitic, but clarifies that criticism of Israel, opposition to its policies, and opposition to Zionism are not, as such, antisemitic. It also emphasizes that using the accusation of antisemitism to suppress criticism of Israel can harm both freedom of expression and the fight against genuine antisemitism.

11. European Legal Support Center (ELSC), Suppressing Palestinian Rights Advocacy through the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism, June 2023. The report claims to have documented 53 incidents between 2017 and 2022 in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Austria in which the IHRA was allegedly used against individuals or organizations working for Palestinian rights. The ELSC is directly involved in legal assistance for Palestinian solidarity: the data and interpretations in the report must therefore be distinguished from the individual facts verifiable through the primary sources cited in the report's footnotes.

12. Regarding the 2017 University of Leeds case, regarding Craig Murray's lecture "Palestine/Israel: A Unitary Secular State or a Bantustan Solution," the ELSC report documents the advance request for the text of the speech and the presence of university staff to monitor the event; the university's protocol on freedom of expression referred to the IHRA definition. The meeting took place.

13. For an overview of the effects that may arise from the institutional use of non-legally binding definitions, see also E. Tendayi Achiume, United Nations Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fueling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, A/77/512, 7 October 2022, especially pp. 15-16. The report pays attention to the IHRA definition and its possible effects on the rights to freedom of expression, assembly and political participation.

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