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(en) Italy, FDCA, Cantiere #47 - On the situation in Rojava and Syria - Internationalist Commune of Rojava* (ca, de, fr, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]
Date
Fri, 13 Nov 2026 08:23:47 +0200
Since the signing of the January 29, 2026, agreement between the
Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and the jihadist
Syrian Transitional Government, Syria and Rojava have been undergoing
profound political, military, and social changes. Misleading media
reports, combined with the rapid pace of events, have created confusion
in international understanding of the situation. In this document, we
outline the fundamental changes currently underway and their consequences.
What does the integration of the SDF into the Syrian army mean?
Reports have circulated in the media claiming the SDF has been
disbanded. However, in an official SDF statement on August 20, 2026, SDF
Commander Mazlum Abdi draws a subtle but significant distinction: rather
than speaking of dissolution, Abdi describes the process as the SDF's
integration into the Syrian Army. What does this mean? The fighters who
were formerly part of the SDF and who organized themselves into local
units will continue to serve as the local defense force for the Kurdish
regions of Syria. So far, the integration includes four different
divisions: Heseke, Qamishlo, Derik, and Kobane. From now on, these
divisions no longer constitute an independent military force, unlike the
SDF's previous status. More broadly, they are linked to the Syrian Army.
However, the local commanders are all former SDF commanders and retain
the initiative on the ground. This means that the Kurdish and Arab
fighters in these divisions can continue their own organization and the
defense of their cities as before. The extent to which their ties to the
Syrian army will impact local structures will depend primarily on our
political and social strength. What the Syrian army has so far refused
to accept is the integration of the Women's Protection Units (YPJ),
formerly part of the SDF.
Naturally, this integration reduces the initiative and mobility that the
SDF previously enjoyed. On the other hand, it opens up the possibility
of exerting significant influence over the Syrian army. In recent weeks,
several radical Islamist commanders in the Syrian army have already been
relieved of their duties. The influence of the new Deputy Minister of
Defense for Eastern Syria, SDF commander Sipan Hemo, cannot be denied.
The military situation in Syria is generally extremely unstable. Even
the Syrian army lacks real control over all areas of the country and its
population. Syrian society is multiethnic and educated. An army like the
HTS, supported by America and composed largely of foreign jihadists,
which in just one year has carried out devastating massacres against
Druze, Alevis, and Kurds across the country, will never earn the
population's trust. Therefore, it should never be forgotten that Syria
is still in a period of transformation. The stronger the political and
organizational power of democratic and socialist forces, the greater the
likelihood of transforming the military situation in the country.
What will happen to the YPJ?
For over a year, the integration of the SDF as an autonomous division
into the Syrian Army has been on the agenda of negotiations with
Damascus. From the outset, the Syrian transitional government has
attempted to exclude the female YPJ units from these discussions. The
transitional government immediately attempted to ensure that YPJ members
would only be integrated individually into the local security forces of
the Kurdish-majority regions, the so-called Asayish. In response, the
"We Are All YPJ" campaign was launched with the support of women from
around the world. During several diplomatic meetings with the
transitional government, the need to ensure the continued existence of
the YPJ was repeatedly reiterated.
In a press conference on August 4, 2026, YPJ Commander Ruken Cemal
stated that the YPJ would be ready to integrate as an "autonomous
counter-terrorism unit within the Ministry of the Interior." This would
mean that the YPJ units would remain intact, although they would not
become part of the Syrian Army. The Ministry of the Interior in Heseke
is led by former SDF commander Siamend Afrin and former YPJ commander
Nesrin Abdullah. As a counter-terrorism unit, the YPJ would therefore
retain a certain degree of independence and initiative.
A disadvantage of this proposal would be the inability to actively
participate in higher-level military units and the fact that only
individual women would be able to join the autonomous Syrian Army
divisions in the Kurdish regions. The advantage would be that, by
organizing themselves as a local counterterrorism unit within the
Ministry of the Interior, the YPJ would enjoy greater autonomy from the
Syrian Army and, as a local security force, would remain closer to
society and women. However, it is unclear whether this proposal will be
accepted. The results of the most recent meeting between YPJ commander
Newroz Ehmed and President Ahmed Shaara, which took place on August 25,
have not yet been made public.
Kurdish language: accepted or banned?
The second issue that has given rise to repeated discussions during the
implementation of the January 29 agreement concerns the Kurdish
language. For 15 years, Kurdish children have been educated in their
native language from primary school to university. This is a cultural
revolution in itself and one of the greatest achievements of the Rojava
Revolution.
However, in the name of "country unification," the Syrian transitional
government is placing obstacles to Kurdish-language education. Turkey
plays a key role in this, exerting immense political influence over
Syria. Turkey is actively preventing Kurdish from being recognized as
the primary language of instruction in the Kurdish regions, as this
would have enormous repercussions on the struggle for the Kurdish
language in Turkey and Northern Kurdistan.
Following lengthy discussions between representatives of the Autonomous
Administration of North and East Syria and the Syrian transitional
government, an agreement was signed on August 27. Kurdish was recognized
as the official language of instruction. In the future, Kurdish language
classes will be offered three hours per week and one hour of cultural
education in the Kurdish regions. For a transitional year, starting in
the next fall school year, social sciences, history, geography, and
philosophy will also be taught in Kurdish. Although representatives of
the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria insisted during
the discussions that Kurdish be recognized as the primary language of
instruction, the transitional government applied enormous pressure, and
the agreement for four hours per week of instruction in Kurdish was
ultimately accepted.
However, dozens of civil organizations-including the women's
organization KongraStar, Rojava University, as well as schools and
teachers' unions-have called protests. The goal is to exert civil
pressure during the transition year to expand the right to
Kurdish-language instruction in schools. The long-term goal is also to
guarantee the right to Kurdish-language schools before the new Syrian
constitution is adopted.
The critical situation in Heseke
Heseke is a multiethnic city on the edge of Rojava. The Arab population
in Heseke outnumbers the Kurdish population. Since the end of the war,
the Syrian transitional government has been trying to gain significant
influence in Heseke, particularly to gain favor with Arab society. A
psychological warfare ("special warfare") is underway to manipulate the
population.
This was evident, for example, when the displaced population of
Serekaniye was attacked by jihadist militias upon returning to their
hometown, sparking protests across Rojava. Although these were civil
protests, the situation escalated in several towns, including Heseke.
The municipality of Heseke, still administered by the local population,
was attacked by groups of youths. It was publicly claimed that the
provocateurs belonged to the "Revolutionary Youth," linked to the
Kurdish Freedom Movement. However, investigations revealed that the
attacks were carried out by supporters of the Kurdish nationalist party
KDP from Southern Kurdistan. Rather than fighting for Kurdish rights,
their main strategy is to spread propaganda against the Kurdish Freedom
Movement and the integration process, with the aim of taking control of
the region. The KDP supports Israel's plan to establish a small,
Israeli-controlled Kurdish state in Syria. This imperialist project,
coupled with the division caused by the KDP through its policies, is
causing immense damage to the process.
Following these provocations, the Syrian transitional government accused
the local security forces in Heseke of being unable to control the city.
Using this pretext, the transitional government is now positioning its
own security forces in Heseke. As a result, the transitional
government's security forces have been repeatedly moving into the Heseke
area, recently involving a contingent of 600 troops.
This is just one example among many of the subtle psychological warfare
tactics used to weaken the Kurdish Freedom Movement. Whenever objections
are raised, the transitional government threatens to resume the war.
Such a situation would be difficult for Rojava society to tolerate after
the massacres and hostage-takings that occurred earlier this year. In
order to guarantee long-term cultural and political freedoms, and with
them the foundations of self-defense, every effort is being made to
prevent the war from continuing. The only way to counter the
transitional government's provocations is massive social resistance
based on the population's self-organization.
Democratic integration: what does it mean?
After the imperialist forces began the genocide in Gaza on October 7,
2023, Reber Apo (Abdullah Öcalan) foresaw the grave danger that a
similar war of annihilation was taking place against other oppressed
peoples in the Middle East. To prevent a "Gaza-fication" of Kurdistan,
he proclaimed the phase of Peace and Democratic Society, with the
strategy of democratic integration.
In this context, integration does not mean assimilation, but rather the
struggle to expand social self-organization on the political and legal
levels. From Rêber Apo's perspective, three pillars must be pursued:
Democratic Society, Democratic Politics, and Democratic Integration. The
fundamental pillar of this strategy is the democratic organization of
society outside the state. According to Rêber Apo, integration within
the state constitutes only 10% of the strategy. The remaining 90% must
focus on organizing society to prevent dependence on the state and avoid
slipping into a wait-and-see position. At the same time, this strategy
represents an attempt to overcome the ongoing conflict with the state
and exert an active influence on state policy.
Generally speaking, however, what is currently happening in Syria is not
yet democratic integration. Within the Kurdish movement, there is strong
criticism of the transitional government's aggressive policies. It is
clear, however, that the situation cannot be resolved on a military
level alone. To prevent further massacres against society, an active
transformation of the state is essential.
Mazlum Abdi has now become an advisor to Ahmed Shaara, and Ilham Ahmed
will take up a post in the Syrian parliament's diplomatic service. This
doesn't mean, of course, that the transitional government will accept
the Kurds as a political entity. But it does open up the possibility of
exerting significant influence over Syria as a whole in the long term.
From now on, diplomatic ties with the Alevis of the coast, the Druze of
southern Syria, women's organizations, and the democratic forces of
Syria will be strengthened. This represents a great opportunity that has
opened up following integration. If all democratic forces in Syria
organize and unite, radical jihadist groups will lose their influence.
This is not a utopia: the struggle to achieve this goal is a necessity.
Until the new Syrian constitution is adopted, the goal is to strengthen
the influence of democratic forces within the structures of the
transitional government to make the constitution as democratic as possible.
The role of internationalism
It's understandable that there are many doubts and confusions. A great
deal of misinformation and misinterpretations circulate online, claiming
the Rojava Revolution is over. Criticism of the decisions made is
understandable. The Kurdish movement itself is dissatisfied with many of
the decisions made. However, after the war, the political bargaining
power of democratic forces in Syria has weakened. Therefore, concessions
are currently being made to protect society from the continuation of the
massacres.
Furthermore, the movement is embarking on a phase of analysis and
self-criticism to further strengthen democratic activity and society's
self-defense in the future.
However, this does not mean that the revolution or the goal of a
democratic-socialist Rojava and Syria have been abandoned. Especially at
this stage, it is more important than ever to stand by the people of
Rojava and defend the revolution's gains together. The revolution in
Rojava has been internationalist from the very beginning and will only
continue to exist if it remains connected to democratic and socialist
struggles around the world.
This is not the time to retreat, but to believe even more firmly in our
shared principles and to support the people of Rojava. As Rêber Apo
says: the fight for genuine peace is more difficult than any military
confrontation.
From Chiapas to Palestine to Kurdistan - together for peace and
self-determination!
* The Internationalist Commune of Rojava is a self-governing collective
and ideological center founded in early 2017 in northeastern Syria
(Rojava). The organization was born with the aim of welcoming, training,
and integrating internationalist youth and activists from around the
world into the Rojava Revolution .
https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amministrazione_Autonoma_Democratica_della_Siria_del_Nord-Est
https://alternativalibertaria.org/
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