A-Infos (en) France, UCL AL #374 - International - Iranian Kurdistan: Facing War, Uniting the Resistance (ca, de, fr, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]

At the start of the war, the Kurds of Iran were the focus of U.S. 
fantasies, portrayed as potential proxies for the conflict. Since then, 
however, they have dropped out of the conversation. Let us attempt to 
unravel their complex situation and understand their struggle, stripping 
away imperialist fantasies. ---- Without the capacity for ground 
operations, it was predictable that a bombing campaign alone would not 
enable the U.S. to achieve the desired regime change in Iran. Among the 
most widely discussed options, the most concrete was military action by 
Iranian Kurdish political forces. Talk of this option largely subsided 
after Trump accused them of diverting weapons intended for protesters 
shortly after the war began.

Yet, these news headlines offer little insight into the true situation 
in Rojhelat-Iranian Kurdistan. The sheer number of resistance groups 
(see sidebar) further complicates matters. Nevertheless, the vast 
majority formed an alliance during the winter of 2025-2026. While this 
represents a significant step forward for parties long plagued by 
internal rivalries, the move cannot be understood in isolation from the 
broader context of Kurdistan.

A Coalition to Exert Influence
Following the fall of Bashar al-Assad, the situation in Rojava-Syrian 
Kurdistan-became increasingly complex[1]. The United States opted to 
support the political solution proposed by Turkey for Syria: a new, 
centralized state led by the jihadist figure Ahmed Al-Sharaa. This posed 
an existential threat to the gains of the revolution, particularly for 
marginalized minority groups-and, by extension, the Kurds. This climate 
paved the way for a form of region-wide alliance. Rivalries were set 
aside based on a simple realization: the United States and its allies 
(Israel and Turkey) are rapidly reshaping the Middle East, and unless 
the Kurds present a united front, self-determination will be impossible 
in the face of the imperialist steamroller.

Iran-whose regional influence runs counter to U.S. interests-was the 
obvious next target for the United States and Israel. It was essential 
to replicate this spirit of unity among the various Iranian Kurdish 
parties to avoid becoming mere spectators to the impending 
restructuring. The platform of the coalition of Iranian Kurdish 
political forces has been shaped by nearly half a century of struggle 
against the reactionary regime of the Islamic Republic. It champions the 
secularization (separation of clergy and state) and democratization of 
Iran, gender equality, and, of course, Kurdish self-determination. Due 
to the clandestine nature of their operations, all these parties 
maintain military wings, collectively fielding several thousand 
fighters-a figure that reportedly reached as high as 25,000 in March, 
according to Iranian intelligence.

Reasons for non-intervention
The stars seemed to be aligning for the United States to secure a proxy 
force capable of supporting a war against Iran. Yet, this did not 
happen-primarily for ideological reasons. While the Iranian state 
remains the coalition's principal enemy, U.S. imperialism and its 
genocidal ally are viewed with anything but favor by many within the 
movement. With the exception of the PAK (see sidebar), which advocates a 
clearly pro-U.S. stance, the other parties view this wave of 
warmongering in the Middle East with suspicion, if not outright 
hostility. Map prepared by The Amargi, based on internal research, local 
sources, and field information.
The Amargi
This ideological mistrust is reinforced by history as well as by recent 
events. The United States supported the Kurds against the Islamic State 
in Syria but ultimately abandoned them. The conditions that led to such 
an abandonment-including Turkey's influence over the US-persist and fuel 
this mistrust. Indeed, Turkey's primary objective is to prevent the 
creation of what it terms a "PKK state," a goal that has even led it to 
form expedient military alliances with Iran against the PJAK.

Ultimately, the US's inability to prevent Iranian airstrikes (other than 
those targeting Israel) deterred Kurdish forces. While the coalition 
might be confident in its ability to liberate Iranian Kurdistan, it 
would be impossible to withstand Iran's conventional army if the latter 
were to deploy its full aerial bombardment capabilities. Consequently, a 
military intervention would almost certainly have resulted in the 
massacre of civilians in the liberated areas.

This inaction also sheds light on the balance of power within the 
coalition. Despite reports hailing it as the fastest-growing 
organization, the PAK's pro-US and pro-Israel, hawkish strategy has not 
been accepted by the coalition. Komala and the PDKI-also based in the 
Kurdistan Region of Iraq-have paid the heaviest price, suffering Iranian 
bombardments targeting their bases. Furthermore, the regional government 
has directly deprived them of their facilities in an effort to appease Iran.

A shifting balance of power
Conversely, the PJAK has emerged as the force with the greatest military 
leverage. Unlike other political forces, this PKK sister party has for 
decades employed the same guerrilla tactics used against the Turkish 
state. Consequently, PJAK revolutionary forces possess an extensive 
tunnel network deep within the Zagros Mountains, granting them 
independence and making them less vulnerable to bombardment by the 
Islamic Republic. On a more specific note, they successfully carried out 
threats of military action against a gold mining project deemed 
environmentally destructive.

Another arena in which the various Kurdish parties operate must also be 
mentioned: the diplomatic stage. The situation is complex, yet all the 
parties oppose a return of the Shah-a solution favored by the Trump 
administration but synonymous with a new, reactionary Persian 
nationalist regime. Faced with this threat, Iranian opposition forces in 
exile established the Congress for the Freedom of Iran[2].

However, during the initial sessions, Kurdish forces were marginalized, 
and the PJAK was outright excluded-likely due to its ties to the PKK, 
which the Western bloc designates as a terrorist organization. The Kurds 
must therefore fight to assert their presence on the international 
stage-and not merely as cannon fodder. Other Iranian 
minorities-particularly the Baluchis[3]-are among their key allies in 
attempting to exert influence.

The UCL has supported the Kurdish Left and its vision of grassroots, 
multi-ethnic democracy. A significant segment of Kurdish forces seeks to 
bring such a project to fruition in Rojhelat. As the PJAK explains, this 
political project cannot simply be the product of bombs; the peoples of 
Iran themselves must be the ones to change the system.

To achieve this, clandestine political work among the masses is at least 
as important as armed resistance. Navigating the clash of regional and 
global imperialist interests is no easy task. Yet, this path is 
viable-as exemplified by the Kurdish Left's slogan "Woman, Life, 
Freedom," a rallying cry that has transcended ethnic divides and been 
taken up by mobilized masses across Iran in their quest for emancipation.

Corentin (UCL International Relations Commission)

Peshmerga (Kurdish for "those who face death" / fighters) of the PDKI.
Kurdishstruggle
Political parties of Iranian Kurdistan
* Founded in the 1940s, the PDKI is the oldest party in Rojhelat. It 
spearheaded several attempts at self-governance in 1946 and during the 
1979 revolution. While primarily composed of the urban middle class, it 
has been shaped by various influences. It advocates a program of 
national autonomy-and eventually federalism-within Iran, coupled with 
social justice. Successive military defeats drove the party to focus on 
diplomatic efforts in exile, though it has rebuilt a paramilitary force 
in recent years.

* * Originally a network of Marxist students, Komala evolved into an 
influential party rooted in the working class and peasantry, playing an 
active role in the 1979 Iranian Revolution. It became the Kurdish branch 
of the Communist Party of Iran (CPI) in 1983. Following the end of the 
Cold War, Komala underwent numerous splits; today, three factions exist, 
representing a fragmented yet still influential force.

* Khabat (sometimes spelled Xebat) is a party founded after the 
establishment of the Shiite theocracy following the Revolution. It 
initially blended Sunni Islamism with Kurdish nationalism before 
becoming secular in the 2000s.

* The PAK emerged from the splits and realignments of the 1990s. It is 
closely aligned with the Barzani clan's KDP-the party governing Iraqi 
Kurdistan-and shares its pro-US stance. It is also distinguished by its 
pan-Kurdish independence agenda.

* The PJAK is the sister organization of the PKK. It shares the ideology 
of democratic confederalism as well as militant practices with the PKK. 
It took advantage of a vacuum left by the fratricidal struggles between 
Iranian Kurdish organizations in the 1990s to establish itself. For a 
long time, it faced hostility from traditional parties, until its 
popularity among the youth-demonstrated by the "Woman, Life, Freedom" 
movement-made it an actor too significant to ignore.

Submit

[1]"Northeast Syria: Democratic Confederalism in Question," *Alternative 
libertaire* No. 370, April 2026.

[2]Or IFC, for Iran Freedom Congress.

[3]An Iranian people living today across Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan.

https://www.unioncommunistelibertaire.org/?Kurdistan-iranien-Face-a-la-guerre-unir-la-resistance
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