A-Infos (en) France, OCL CA #360 - Italy - Hungary - Defeats That Are Pleasant But Change Not Much (ca, de, fr, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]

On March 23 in Italy and then on April 12 in Hungary, the two 
governments, personified by Meloni and Orban, fascists for some, simply 
neoliberals for others, suffered a resounding electoral defeat, with a 
high and strangely identical rejection rate of 54%. ---- Our romantic 
and emotional side could only rejoice in front of the television on the 
evening of April 12 when the results were announced in Hungary. Good 
news is not so frequent! But such is our nature that we have another, 
more rational side that cannot be guided solely by emotion! And then, 
disaster struck... Orban's successor, the aptly named Magyar, is a 
die-hard nationalist who defends the same line as his predecessor on 
immigration and LGBT rights. A former Orban protégé who wanted to become 
caliph in place of the Caliph. This ambition was conveniently received 
by a segment of Hungarian business leaders who needed more flexibility 
in their dealings with Europe while maintaining strong ties with Russia.

In Italy, Meloni wasn't ousted by the ballot box, as Orbán was. She 
simply received a resounding defeat in the March 23rd referendum on 
institutional reforms designed to give the government greater control 
over the judiciary by establishing oversight bodies selected by lot 
instead of elected by their peers. With a two million vote difference 
between "yes" and "no," and a lower abstention rate (45%) than in 
previous referendums[1], the blow was all the more severe because the 
election campaign focused more on Meloni herself and her government's 
overall policies than on the judicial reform, the details of which were 
largely unknown, except that it represented a further step towards state 
control over the judiciary.

It must be said that this reform involved a reshaping of the Italian 
Constitution, originally drafted by parties born from the Resistance, an 
icon that was untouchable. Modifying it could appear as a revenge of the 
post-fascists, allowing them to take down a judiciary perceived as "red" 
and "friendly to illegal immigrants." Especially since Meloni, for the 
occasion, relaunched a campaign based on fear, order, and religion: if 
the "no" vote prevails, rapists, pedophiles, and illegal immigrants will 
be set free, she proclaimed repeatedly!

It should also be noted that the vote confirmed the traditional divide 
between the North and the South of the country: a massive "no" in the 
South (60 to 65%, and even 75% in Naples); a "yes" in the North, but 
limited to three regions (Veneto, Lombardy - Milan - and Friuli), since 
the "no" vote prevailed in Piedmont - Turin, Valle d'Aosta, and Liguria 
- Genoa. It's worth noting that Turin is associated with the Askatasuna 
squat resistance, the No TAV movement, and workers' struggles in the 
automotive industry. Genoa is a major hub for the pro-Gaza movement and 
port blockades, while Naples and Sicily have distinguished themselves in 
recent decades through anti-militarist demonstrations against NATO bases 
and Italy's rearmament. Of course, this isn't a simple cause-and-effect 
relationship, but it's still striking that the recent surge of protest 
in certain urban centers hasn't triggered a wave of fear and rejection 
among voters, despite the media's efforts. The historical divide between 
Milan, the economic and financial capital, and Turin, the proletarian 
city with its (former!) workers' councils, remains.

300,000 people at the "No to Kings" demonstration in Rome on March 28, 2026.
According to post-election surveys, the "No" vote won with 62% among 
those under 35, and the "Yes" vote with over 50% among those over 55. 
These results are undoubtedly significant, but they should be qualified, 
as all these studies treat each category as a single group without 
distinction of social origin.

Yet, nothing compelled Meloni to initiate this judicial reform, much 
less to hold a referendum on it. So why? Either she was certain that 
this would be an opportunity to consolidate the government's authority 
through a resounding "Yes" vote, in which case she will be criticized 
for being a poor strategist who doesn't know her country well. Either 
she believed that, even with a modest victory or defeat, it would be an 
opportunity to reshape her government by removing her most unpopular 
ministers and reaffirming her authority.
This is what she did as soon as the results were announced, firing two 
high-ranking officials from the Ministry of Justice and the Minister of 
Tourism. The leader of the Forza Italia group in the Senate resigned and 
was replaced by the daughter of former Prime Minister Bettino Craxi 
under pressure from the Berlusconi clan, which finances Forza Italia 
but, more importantly, pursues an economic policy entirely focused on 
Europe. For them, anti-integrationist leanings, such as the "Europe of 
Nations" approach, must remain purely ideological and detached from 
political and economic realities. This orientation is ultimately quite 
similar to that of Magyar in Hungary.

Consequently, more than the results themselves, what most appeals to 
both our rational and emotional sensibilities is that the social 
movement, unlike so often the case, has not been extinguished by the 
electoral process.

The "No to Kings and Queens" demonstration against the war drew nearly 
200,000 people to Rome on March 28, far exceeding the expected 30,000. 
While this success was certainly partly due to the uplifting momentum 
generated by the defeat of Italy, it's clear that this went far beyond a 
simple rejection of Meloni, and that judicial reform was merely a minor 
detail compared to the cries of "For a World Without War" and the 
yearning for a different Italy.

In Hungary, too, demonstrations with clearly defined social demands 
continue, particularly among school-aged youth, even if, for the moment, 
"Europe, Europe, Europe again" is the dominant slogan. Let's hope that 
the Hungarian illusion will soon be dispelled when the European mirage 
proves utterly incapable of resolving the ongoing deterioration of the 
working class's situation.

JPD

Notes
[1]It should be noted, however, that this rate is much higher than that 
of the post-war years up until the end of the last century, when 
participation at one point approached 90%. The "Italian passion" for 
politics has, as in France, transformed into a fascinating mistrust....

http://oclibertaire.lautre.net/spip.php?article4700
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