A-Infos (en) Poland, FA: What is the war in Ukraine about? (ca, de, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]

Four years of war in Ukraine have cost the lives of 300,000 soldiers on 
both sides of the front, if only those known by name are counted. 
However, the losses are greater. The identities of those killed are not 
always established. Additionally, up to 200,000 people have disappeared 
without a trace. The vast majority of them are likely dead. This means 
that well over half a million soldiers have already lost their lives in 
Ukraine[1]. To this number should be added several thousand civilians 
killed by bombing, primarily on the Ukrainian side.

Why do wars break out?

The longer this conflict drags on, the more we ask ourselves: why are so 
many casualties being incurred? What, objectively speaking, is the war 
in Ukraine about? The governments of both sides offer at least a few 
reasons to justify continuing the fight. However, I would venture to 
agree that modern wars are primarily fought over economic spheres of 
influence. The situation in Ukraine is similar.

In other words, while there are non-economic explanations for the 
outbreak of wars, such as that their causes lie in ancient human nature, 
the warlike legacy of the past, the clash of aggressive cultures or 
civilizations, the ambitions of leaders and their personal 
predispositions or prejudices, and so on, economic issues at least in 
the case of contemporary armed conflicts have come to the fore. On the 
left (not necessarily strictly Marxist) since the late nineteenth 
century, several approaches to this issue have been distinguished. Some 
argued that it was related to the struggle for new markets (e.g., the 
theory of underconsumption); others argued that it was about achieving 
higher profits where labor costs were lower; subsequent researchers 
wrote about excess capital "seeking" investment opportunities, and so 
on. Proponents of particular concepts often engaged in heated debate, 
but sometimes attempts were also made to synthesize these positions.

In the second half of the twentieth century, amidst the growing 
globalization of the economy and the perceived negative effects of 
pressure on the natural environment, particular emphasis was placed on 
the importance of commodity flows and all strategic raw materials, on 
the one hand, and on the other, on ecological problems (depletion of 
natural resources, irreversible environmental degradation and pollution, 
climate change, etc.). Finally, the growing, and not, as some might have 
thought, diminishing, relationship between capital and the state was 
recognized. According to Noam Chomsky, for example, the most powerful 
states always strive for global domination, control over resources and 
markets, and keep weaker countries subservient. Chomsky, therefore, 
assigns considerable importance to the state, but it is obvious to him 
that the interests of specific capital groups lurk behind its back.

The fight for spheres of influence

Let's therefore attempt to reconstruct the argument regarding the 
economic causes of war. In short, today's economy is dominated by large 
capital, which seeks to dominate vast markets. Capitalist competition, 
therefore, extends from the national to the international, global level. 
To succeed, business forms an alliance with the state, and the 
boundaries between politics and economics are blurring.

Where large amounts of capital have accumulated, exporting them becomes 
important, contributing to external expansion. Establishing a business 
abroad allows for the exploitation and profiting from natural resources 
and labor in other countries. Each major economy, therefore, strives to 
establish its own sphere of economic influence. The amount of external 
investment it can make demonstrates the expansionist nature of a given 
country and its capital. External expansion allows capital to maintain a 
sufficiently high rate of profit and accumulation, while the state 
facilitates both the establishment of new paths and the maintenance of 
acquired influence.

As Russian economist Oleg Komolov[2]argues, one measure of these 
expansionist aspirations can be the value of direct investment, 
primarily through transnational corporations. Although they appear 
cosmopolitan, corporations are most often tied to specific centers of 
power. The state supports them with its own, i.e., public, funds, loans 
and loan guarantees, procurement contracts, or protection, and, if 
necessary, does not hesitate to use military force.

North American and Western European capital plays a key role in this 
expansion. Today, the United States, in particular, is perceived as an 
"imperialist" state, exploiting and imposing its will on others, a 
phenomenon we see almost daily. To this end, it utilizes economic policy 
(sanctions, tariffs, subsidies), diplomacy, and, of course, armed forces.

There are countries that are inferior to Western countries (the "core") 
in terms of capital size, and therefore power, yet they claim the right 
to subordinate countries not within the entire world, but within a 
specific region. Russia is certainly one such example. Russia has 
accumulated significant capital primarily through hydrocarbon exports. 
This money, circulating within the local economy, sometimes passes 
through various offshore financial institutions (e.g., Cyprus) to avoid 
paying taxes, but ultimately largely ends up in the form of direct 
investments in former Soviet republics. The Kremlin makes no secret of 
the fact that it treats this area as its own sphere of influence, both 
economically and geopolitically. Countries like Russia can be called 
"semi-peripheral," or, following the South African sociologist Patrick 
Bond, "sub-imperialist."

Completely "peripheral" countries, such as Ukraine, have no opportunity 
to establish their own economic sphere of influence, and lack developed 
transnational corporations through which they could explore other 
countries. In reality, they are merely recipients of incoming capital, 
"selling" their cheap labor and natural resources. Moreover, they become 
a venue for competition between various capitals and states.

Not just the export of capital

Some researchers argue that the value of accumulated foreign direct 
investment (FDI) relative to a country's gross domestic product (GDP) 
indicates the aggressiveness of its external economic policy. Of course, 
the "core," meaning Western countries, including the United States, 
spend the most on foreign investment relative to GDP; medium-range 
expenditures are typical of Russia, China, but also countries such as 
Brazil and South Africa, and very little in countries such as Ukraine 
and Bangladesh.

Direct investment is not the only measure of economic expansion policy. 
In the case of international trade, we speak of non-equivalent trade. 
This means that countries in the "core" of capitalism gain more than 
"semi-peripheral" and "peripheral" countries, which   as Italian 
researcher Andrea Ricci[3]demonstrated in his 2019 calculations   may 
even lose from such trade. Another tool can be lending   "peripheral" 
countries are dependent on the "core" through loans. The US benefits 
further from the fact that the US dollar is the world's reserve 
currency, which also facilitates a significant portion of trade 
transactions on the global market (the euro is in second place).

States are not, therefore, equal, but constitute a strictly hierarchical 
structure. However, the relationships between them are from a historical 
perspective changeable and dynamic. We are dealing with a constant 
struggle, sometimes escalating into direct, military confrontation. 
Today, "semi-peripheral" states challenge the "core" of capitalism, 
claiming that each has the right to its own sphere of influence (this is 
the thesis of so-called multipolarity). "Peripheral" states, in turn, 
seek to advance higher in the structure, vying for conditions that allow 
their capital and ruling class to achieve a higher rate of profit. 
Countries in the "core" of capitalism fight, at the very least, to 
maintain the status quo, and some argue that they strive to gain the 
greatest possible relative advantage over others.

Internal struggle

But how does this issue look from the perspective of societies within 
competing states? Individual governments argue that the pursuit of 
expanding influence, the fight for markets, growing exports, and so on, 
contribute to economic modernization and the material advancement of the 
entire country. Citizens are promised that they will share in the 
growing wealth pie, which is supposed to translate into an improvement 
in overall living standards. This is not just about economics, but also 
about more leisure time, a more pleasant environment, better public 
services, and a higher level of culture and education. Indeed, thanks to 
expansion (e.g., colonial expansion), some societies (or certain social 
classes) have been able and still are able to live disproportionately 
better than others. However, in the long term, prosperity gained at the 
expense of other groups is not a given. In other countries, where 
exploitation and abuse are more severe, subordinate classes demand 
better living conditions. In this sense, social unrest destabilizes 
interstate relations. Capital flowing from outside into a given 
"peripheral" country cannot feel safe. Society demands that profits not 
flow abroad, but that more of them remain for distribution among 
residents, for example, to improve education and services, create new 
jobs, finance environmental protection, etc. Therefore, not only in the 
"external" system, but also in the "internal" system, is the system 
unstable.

More than 50 years ago, the Greek economist Arghiri Emmanuel[4]expressed 
his belief that it is not the inflow of capital that ruins "peripheral" 
countries. "Developed" countries (with higher wages) always benefit from 
trade with "underdeveloped" countries (with lower wages), and the 
working class inhabiting them also benefits. "The population," he wrote, 
"of wealthy countries can consume more because the population of the 
rest of the world consumes less." At the same time, in the broader West, 
xenophobia is growing, fearing the preservation of one's own way of 
life, which is supposedly under threat. Arghiri Emmanuel uses a 
historical metaphor here, writing: "Rome will fall not under the 
influence of the Romans, but under the influence of the 'barbarians.'"

Let's examine how the mechanisms described above operate in specific 
historical realities. The economic and political collapse of the USSR 
created conditions in which competition for new markets and resources 
became particularly important for Western capital. Those who failed to 
take advantage of this opportunity squandered opportunities for 
development and greater profits. The countries of the so-called Eastern 
Bloc, including Poland, became targets not only for incoming direct 
investment from the West; a political transformation also took place. 
The state began to protect the interests of Western capital holders, and 
its spearhead was directed against its former ally, the Kremlin. NATO 
enlargement was therefore not only a geopolitical problem for Moscow but 
also a sign of a loss of economic influence. Private Russian capital, 
which emerged from the turmoil of the early 1990s, was treated not as a 
business partner (as expected), but as a competitor, and ultimately an 
enemy. This was, moreover, entirely consistent with the logic that 
capitalism is, above all, a hierarchical system that enforces 
subordination. The once-vaunted capitalist "free competition" is not 
only about who operates more efficiently in the market, but also about 
who occupies what place in the hierarchical power structure. Moreover, 
in the international arena, the game is usually not played according to 
fair rules. These are promoted only as long as they serve to maintain 
the global status quo   in reality, in the end, the stronger simply wins.

Incidentally, the rivalry between the economic interests of the East and 
the West did not begin in Poland after 1989. It had existed from the 
very beginning of the communist system, and took on a particularly acute 
dimension as a result of Gierek's economic policies and the foreign debt 
of that period. In her work "Ontology of Socialism" (published 1989), 
Jadwiga Staniszkis pointed out that Poland found itself in a dual 
dependence and was exploited by both sides. In the 1980s, our country 
was openly perceived   at least by some researchers   as an arena of 
clash between opposing geoeconomic and geopolitical interests. The 
problem, therefore, was not only dependence on the Kremlin (with which 
economic ties were ultimately extremely limited), but also what some 
called "duality on the Elbe." The point was, no less, no more, that 
Poland remained, and still remains, a "peripheral" country relative to 
the Western, capitalist "core."

Ukraine under pressure from capital

In the case of Ukraine, economic ties with the Kremlin proved much more 
enduring, and the rivalry ultimately more ruthless. It's worth noting 
that in the early 1990s, Ukraine's economic potential was greater than 
Poland's. Not only was its GDP per capita greater, but so was its 
industrial, scientific, demographic, natural resources, and so on. 
Eastern Ukraine, even during tsarist times, was a site of significant 
foreign investment   Western capital flowed in, building Donbas's 
industrial power. Grain grown on chernozem soil was exported to the West 
through Black Sea ports. Intensive industrialization also occurred 
during the Soviet era. In short, wealthy Ukraine had something to fight 
for, even more so than Poland.

Russian capital was heavily involved in Ukraine. Its direct investments 
totaled approximately USD 33 billion by 2014[2], including the money 
that arrived via Cyprus. Furthermore, Ukraine was an important transit 
country for Russian gas exports, and in this sense its economic 
importance for Russia was even greater.

When the Soviet Union collapsed and Ukraine formally regained its 
sovereignty, it sent a signal to Western capital, which also poured 
billions into investments. Because the state plays a crucial role in the 
fight for profits in modern capitalism, the rivalry took on a political 
dimension. The key question was: who would the Ukrainian government 
favor? Russian or Western companies? What legal norms would be adopted? 
And so on. The rivalry between Russian and Ukrainian oligarchs also 
played a significant role.

The turning point came with the public protests and the so-called 
Euromaidan at the turn of 2013 and 2014, the main axis of which was 
supposed to be Ukraine's accession to the European Union, which, of 
course, meant adopting Western-style political and legal solutions. 
Viktor Yanukovych, the incumbent president of Ukraine, refused to sign 
an association agreement with the EU. As a result of the protests, he 
lost power, and Russia annexed Crimea. The struggle for economic 
influence intensified. Russian capital was formally banned from 
participating in the privatization of state assets. Companies with 
Russian capital were threatened with nationalization. Various pressures 
were applied to force them to sell their assets at very low prices and 
withdraw from Ukraine. For example, Lukoil was forced to divest 240 gas 
stations and six fuel depots. The company also lost its oil refinery in 
Odessa, which was nationalized. Rostek lost its ore processing plants. 
Lukor, Karpatneftekhim[2]and dozens of other Russian companies investing 
not only in the fuel sector or industrial processing, but also in mass 
media, banking and logistics had to withdraw.

Having lost its Ukrainian assets, Russian capital resorted to a last 
resort. The Kremlin's special military operation, launched on February 
24, 2022, was intended to overthrow the pro-Western authorities in Kyiv 
and replace them with pro-Russian ones, but something clearly went 
wrong. What was supposed to be a quick change of government turned into 
a prolonged and bloody conflict. If Russia wanted to maintain its claim 
to regional dominance, it now had to prove its strength vis-à-vis not 
only Ukraine but the entire West, which supported it.

At the same time, Western companies, reportedly numbering several 
thousand, are investing in Ukraine despite the war. For example, NJJ 
Holding, a French telecommunications investor, acquired Lifecell, 
Ukraine's third-largest mobile operator, and TV Datagroup-Volia, a 
fixed-line internet provider. This is the largest foreign direct 
investment in Ukraine in nearly two decades, valued at $1.5 billion. 
Luxembourg-based ArcelorMittal, a global metallurgical giant, has 
invested a total of $1.2 billion in maintaining and modernizing its 
plants in Kryvyi Rih since 2022. Meanwhile, Rheinmetall, a German arms 
company, has announced investment plans totaling approximately EUR300 
million[5]. Arms companies, not only German but especially American, are 
clearly beneficiaries of the current war in Ukraine.

Regarding the United States, we must first and foremost mention the 
infamous agreement negotiated by Donald Trump with Vladimir Zelensky, in 
which the US president demanded privileges and concessions from the 
authorities in Kyiv for the extraction of Ukrainian natural resources, 
including so-called rare metals. Incidentally, the Trump family is not 
waiting for the end of the war but is already participating in the 
competition for the country's resources. Jared Kushner, the US 
president's son-in-law, while conducting "peace" negotiations with 
Moscow and Kyiv on behalf of the White House, simultaneously promoted 
the interests of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, 
which finance the assets of his company Affinity Partners worth $4.8 
billion[6]. This is, among other things, to prevent Russia from blocking 
the export of agricultural products via the Dnieper River and then 
through the Black Sea to the Persian Gulf, produced by agricultural 
holdings with Arab capital.

On the other side of the front, in territories captured by the Kremlin, 
we are seeing an influx of Russian capital. According to some estimates, 
several billion dollars have been allocated for this purpose.

Summary

While people are constantly dying on the frontlines and as a result of 
bombing, Ukraine is simultaneously being "parcelled," and its division 
seems inevitable. Incidentally, this is not the first time in history. 
Despite the alliance between Petliura and Pilsudski after World War I, 
the geopolitical struggle for influence ended with the division of 
Ukraine between Poland and Soviet Russia, a decision sealed by both 
sides with the Treaty of Riga in 1921. Most Ukrainian historians believe 
that their country was betrayed at that time, both by Poland and the 
Entente powers, which further paved the way for the subsequent 
incorporation of all of Ukraine into the USSR ultimately, it fell within 
the Russian sphere of influence. Will history repeat itself this time? 
Washington's stance seems to suggest that such a scenario is not out of 
the question.

And what about the aspirations of Ukrainian society? It turns out that 
today it must resist not only Russian but also American imperialism. 
This was evident from the very beginning of the conflict. Moreover, at 
the stake of victory is not, as some anarchists hoped, a new quality of 
"future social system across the region, with the possibility of 
realizing direct democracy and social justice"[7]. From the chaos of 
almost every war, ruthless dictatorships and exploitation emerge faster 
than democracy and justice. From the barrels of guns   to paraphrase Mao 
  springs not freedom, but power.

Jaroslaw Urbanski

www.rozbrat.org

Footnotes:

[1]The number of Ukrainian losses is provided by the following websites: 
 https://lostarmour.info/ukr200  and  https://ualosses.org/en/soldiers/ 
 (their credibility was confirmed by Western media); the number of 
Russian losses is provided by Mediazona:  https://zona.media/casualties

[2]???? ???????, "??????? ?????": "????????????? ????? ???", May 9, 
2023,  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6d0wcyXpNyQ ; "? ???????? ??? ??? 
??????", March 10, 2023,  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lgpQ0LWxO10

[3]Andrea Ricci, "Value and Unequal Exchange in International Trade. The 
Geography of Global Capitalist Exploitation", London   New York 2021, p. 
217.

[4]Filip Ilkowski, "Capitalist imperialism in contemporary theoretical 
approaches", Torun 2015, pp. 141-152.

[5]"Ukraine Investment Framework", European Commission, 
https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/countries/ukraine/ukraine-investment-framework_en; 
 "ArcelorMittal has invested $1.2 billion since 2022 to ensure the 
survival of its Ukrainian division", 
https://gmk.center/en/news/arcelormittal-has-invested-1-2-billion-since-2022-to-ensure-the-survival-of-its-ukrainian-division/; 
 "Rheinmetall enters the attack drone market. Germany signs a major 
contract", April 16, 2026, 
https://radar.rp.pl/przemysl-zbrojeniowy/art44170451-rheinmetall-wchodzi-w-drony-szturmowe-niemcy-podpisuja-wielki-kontrakt

[6]See, among others: Jon Queally, "Congressional Dems probe envoy Jared 
Kushner's Arab money ties," asiatimes.com, April 17, 2026, 
https://asiatimes.com/2026/04/congressional-dems-probe-envoy-jared-kushners-arab-money-ties/

[7]Aleksander Laniewski, "Anarchists and the Wars of Empires. The 
History of a Certain Dilemma (1914/2023)", in: "Methods and Means of 
Influence of Empires. Ideology and Practice of the 
Russian/Soviet/Russian State in the Years 1689 2022", ed. Andrzej Nowak, 
Warsaw 2024, p. 372.

https://federacja-anarchistyczna.pl/2026/04/22/o-co-trwa-wojna-w-ukrainie/
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