A-Infos (en) Italy, UCADI, #206 - The Orange Thug (ca, de, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]

Not since the days of Trajan have we seen an emperor so intent on the 
constant plundering of surrounding countries, friendly or otherwise. The 
Orange villain spares nothing, from vassals to Venezuela and now Iran . 
However, we must not be confused by the increasingly hyperbolic language 
of the White Dome, which in effect conceals the panic of having screwed 
up everything. A clear winner doesn't need to shout it from the 
rooftops: it shows in the facts. If you declare, like Secretary of War 
Pete Hesgeth, that the Iranian leadership has been decapitated and is 
living underground, and then it is discovered that the President of the 
Islamic Republic, Pezeshkian, and the Secretary of the Security Council, 
Larijani, are walking in the center of Tehran, there is something wrong 
with the narrative. It matters little if Larijani is later assassinated: 
the Iranian attitude is not one of surrender. Even more significant is 
the grotesque statement by Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announcing 
his intention to temporarily lift sanctions on Iranian oil, to control 
oil prices. There is no better proof of America's lack of strategy.
It seems they have once again underestimated their adversaries, as they 
did with Russia in Ukraine. Iran has been preparing for this war for 
over twenty years and even took advantage of the 12-Day War to update 
its strategies. Saddam's fall taught Iran that a centralized structure 
is more vulnerable to external attacks, especially when the adversaries' 
strategy is to assassinate their leaders. Indeed, beyond the fact that 
Iran has a supreme leader, the role and image of Khamenei are different 
from those of Saddam Hussein or Muammar Gaddafi. Iran has created a 
mosaic structure, composed of modules capable of operating independently 
in the event of the assassination of a senior official or a disruption 
of communications. This independence extends not only to 
decision-making, but also to the logistical capacity to operate.
Iran has also understood that the only way to resist American firepower 
is to fight an asymmetric war, similar in some ways to the US's war in 
Afghanistan and, going back in time, in Vietnam, where the adversaries' 
goal was to make the war too expensive to continue even for a rich 
country like the US (one of the key factors in the American defeat in 
Afghanistan was the cost per liter of fuel to the places where it needed 
to be transported for use). In this sense, the duration of the war 
becomes a relevant factor, especially as the midterm elections approach, 
with a president who had vowed to never again wage endless wars .
In this context, the Orange thug's claims about the obliteration of the 
Iranian navy and air force are nonsense. Iran didn't have a significant 
navy or a large air force: they knew they would be destroyed anyway. 
Instead, Iran equipped itself with fast speedboats, drones, and 
ballistic and cruise missiles.
Intercepting missiles is a very expensive and inefficient operation. 
American researcher Ted Postol, who has long studied the effectiveness 
of anti-missile missiles, has repeatedly debunked the touted efficiency 
of various Patriot, Thaad, and other missiles. In reality, this has 
never been true since the first Iraq war, when the Americans boasted of 
intercepting SCUD missiles with the first Patriots. A rigorous analysis 
of the footage, done retrospectively, has shown that the Patriots were 
NOT able to intercept a single SCUD. Many years have passed and 
technology has improved, but on both sides, and it seems that the 
interception capability is only 5%, despite what the little green ogre 
in Kiev has consistently asserted and which is uncritically supported by 
the Western media. All this without taking into account that interceptor 
missiles are expensive and take a long time to assemble. Indeed, 
contrary to what the Americans claim about the obliteration of Iranian 
missiles, it is the Americans who are starting to run into trouble. How 
else can we explain the fact that they have forced South Korea to divest 
itself of its THAAD systems, the installation of which caused a crisis 
with China years ago, which, in retaliation, reduced trade?
Added to all this, the Iranian missiles are underground, most of them 
located in eastern Iran, which has not been affected by the bombing. 
Some missiles are in hidden silos that don't open like in James Bond 
films, but are covered by a light layer of earth that the missile itself 
breaks during launch: all of this is undetectable before launch. The 
other missiles are loaded onto special trucks at the last minute to be 
launched at ever-changing locations, making them difficult to identify.
Finally, many say that so far the Iranians have launched missiles that 
are 10-20 years old: it doesn't matter if they are less sophisticated: 
the Israelis and Americans are still forced to empty their arsenals. On 
the other hand, some of the new hypersonic missiles (especially 
undetectable) have warheads that are divided into 80 warheads, each 
containing 20 kg of explosives. 20 kg isn't enough to cause significant 
damage, but 80 of them, covering an area of 10-15 km2, are still capable 
of alarming a population that lived under the illusion of total 
protection thanks to the Iron Dome.
As for drones, however, as is well known from the war in Ukraine, the 
Iranians had already developed this technology some time ago: in the 
early days of the Ukrainian war, it was the Iranians who supplied the 
first drones to Russia (which then learned to develop them 
independently, contrary to the belief of the EU's senior leadership, who 
welcomed the start of the war in Iran because they believed the Russians 
were losing Iranian support). The fact is that Iran has mastered the 
technology to produce drones.
There are many types of drones: a little-publicized type uses the 
Iridium satellite network, consisting of around seventy satellites 
positioned at a medium altitude in the atmosphere (higher than Starlink 
satellites), used primarily by satellite phones. Their bandwidth is not 
wide enough to allow for the real-time transfer of high-resolution 
images, but a drone that needs to reach a target doesn't require high 
definition. In practice, once launched, the drone is able to send visual 
information on its position and receive input on its movement. 
Essentially, they are long-range FPV drones.
In relation to naval operations, the Iranians have equipped themselves 
with underwater drones, and here we are faced with an irony of fate. The 
Ukrainians, with the help of the UK and the Americans, have developed 
effective underwater drones. The Russians, having captured some intact, 
were able to reconstruct their functioning and appear to have 
transferred this know-how to the Iranians.
Perhaps the most important aspect of this war is that Iran is pursuing a 
strategy. As publicly stated, their initial focus was not so much on 
damaging Israel as on striking American bases in the Gulf, to undermine 
America's defensive and offensive capabilities. Indeed, Iran has blinded 
at least five sophisticated radars used for early missile detection; 
these systems cost between $500 million and $1 billion each and are 
time-consuming to rebuild. This blinding has reduced the time available 
in Israel to escape to shelters from 15 to 2 minutes.
Added to this is the destruction of the Fifth Fleet naval base in 
Bahrain. In practice, many American bases in the Gulf are not 
operational: their personnel are often forced to hide in shelters.
Another strategic aspect concerns aviation. Iran recognized this sector 
as inevitably weak on their part, but here we also discover a potential 
American weakness: the F-35s launch from distant bases and require 
in-flight refueling. Upon departure, the fuel is insufficient to 
complete the required operation and return to base. To accomplish this 
task, tanker aircraft are needed. Recent news reports indicate that one 
or two tanker aircraft have been shot down by the Iranians, and another 
five have been hit while stationed at bases (mainly in Saudi Arabia).
It's unclear how much this has weakened the Americans, but it's clear 
that the Iranians aren't acting haphazardly.
The central element of the Iranian strategy, however, is the closure of 
the Strait of Hormuz, which would jeopardize the global economic system. 
Not only 20% of the world's oil passes through that strait, but also 30% 
of its fertilizers: global agriculture will be severely impacted, even 
though the problem will only be apparent in months (the fertilizers must 
be used and the crops must ripen).
American statements make it clear they weren't expecting this move. The 
orange thug's proposal to escort the tankers is grotesque: the ships 
would be easily attacked from land with short-range missiles, and it 
remains to be seen which insurance companies would accept the associated 
risks. And the request for help from its vassal allies is even more 
paradoxical: the tiger is asking the cat for help.
Furthermore, Iran had announced it would adopt an eye-for-eye strategy, 
that is, attacking the same types of civilian facilities and structures 
that the aggressors had decided to target in Iran. So it's no surprise 
that after Israel's bombing of the South Pars gas field, the Iranians 
struck the corresponding Qatari infrastructure. It's worth noting that 
any further destruction of infrastructure means it would take years for 
oil and gas production to return to previous levels after the reopening 
of the Strait of Hormuz. However, the attackers love playing with fire: 
the Americans have bombed Kharg Island (Iran's main oil terminal). For 
now, they've limited themselves to hitting military targets, but the 
Orange villain has the nerve to declare (referring to Kharg Island): " 
We may hit it a few more times just for fun ." We want Caligula back.
Other highly vulnerable and possibly even more critical facilities are 
the desalination plants: the attackers were foolish enough to bomb an 
Iranian plant without realizing that life in all Gulf countries (Israel 
included) depends enormously on access to clean water.
While Iran is pursuing a precise plan, the US is clearly in trouble if 
it is forced to lift (even temporarily) sanctions on Russia. This is 
partly due to theater, given that China and even India had continued to 
buy Russian oil, but it speaks volumes about the state of affairs, 
especially the need for the orange criminal to avoid inflation that 
would undermine its domestic support.
Add to this the fact that the US is offering $10 million to anyone who 
can provide information on the whereabouts of Iranian leaders. 
Incidentally, the Iranians have discovered a mole who was providing 
timely information to the criminals. This is none other than the head of 
counter-espionage, General Esmail Qaani, successor to General Soleimani, 
assassinated by the Israelis in 2020, and a trusted advisor to Khamenei. 
The subsequent assassination of Larijani clearly shows that there are 
other flaws in the internal IT system, but it should also be remembered 
that the Iranian organizational chart is such that for every position, 
the names of replacements and replacements for replacements are ready.
Meanwhile, the attackers are forced to invent moves to achieve a victory 
that is increasingly in their minds and increasingly less in reality.
Boots on the ground: the invasion of Iraq was preceded by six months of 
troop recruitment and training; Iran is almost four times larger and has 
a much more complicated topography, with mountains and forests.
Special forces to seize enriched uranium? American special forces are 
certainly the best trained in the world, but they would have to quickly 
reach the depot(s), located deep underground, and then return safely, 
and it's not even certain that blackmailing ally Netanyahu would be 
willing to acknowledge a possible positive outcome as conclusive.
Recruiting Kurdish troops? They've tried and are trying, but the Iranian 
Kurds are relatively well integrated into Iran (unlike the Syrian, 
Iraqi, and especially the Turkish Kurds). Furthermore, at least as far 
as the Syrian Kurds are concerned, they are well aware of the US 
betrayal. After using them to fight Bashar al-Assad, they threw them 
under the bus, to be attacked by Israel and the Turks. At the end of the 
day, it seems they can recruit a couple of thousand soldiers at most: 
nothing compared to an Iranian army with a million soldiers.
Al Qaeda and its entourageA few months before Operation Epstein Fury, 
strange movements occurred in Syrian Kurdistan, where the Americans 
freed several thousand prisoners (ISIS militants) to take them to a 
supposedly decommissioned American base in northern Iraq and train them 
for destabilization operations in Central Asia (including Xinjiang, 
China). It's not hard to imagine an Iranian reconfiguration of this 
workforce .
Making the scenario even darker for the orange villain are Iran's 
allies. First and foremost, Hezbollah, which had been considered 
definitively defeated, actually possesses short-range missiles that are 
heavily hitting northern Israel. They won't defeat the Zionist 
terrorists, but they will reduce the quality of life in Israel and 
reignite the flow of people leaving (fleeing) the country. A sign of 
this is the Israeli government's restrictions on the number of 
passengers allowed on each plane departing from Ben Gurion Airport, 
which can reach approximately 50% of the plane's capacity. Officially, 
the measure is justified on security grounds; however, it appears to be 
a way to reduce the flow of passengers out of the country.
There is also a variable that hasn't yet come into play, but which 
proved highly effective a year ago: the Houthis, who were able to block 
maritime traffic in the Red Sea and, if necessary, could very 
effectively blockade Saudi Arabia's Red Sea ports and further exacerbate 
the oil crisis. We don't know if and when the Houthis will take action, 
but they can certainly play a significant role.
Meanwhile, an interesting article appeared in the South China Morning 
Post (published in Hong Kong) stating that the current American reserves 
of rare earth elements available to the military department only last 
two months. It's unclear how the Chinese have precise information on US 
stockpiles, though they likely can track rare earth sales. The key 
message is that China may be restricting its rare earth sales (as it 
temporarily did in 2025) and may be starting to do so again.
It's therefore logical to ask: why did the Americans embark on this 
venture? Iran has been a potential target for more than twenty years, 
when it was included on a long list of Middle Eastern countries to be 
subjugated.
We can even go back to 1996, when Richard Perle, US assistant secretary 
of defense and architect of the Iraq operation, informed a young 
Netanyahu, newly appointed prime minister of Israel, that the two-state 
perspective had to be abandoned and replaced by Israel's transformation 
into a regional power. Over the years, the perspective hasn't changed, 
but the window of opportunity is closing: Iran's substantial alliance 
with Russia and China is making the country increasingly less vulnerable 
to attack, making it now or never. Added to this, the true
global enemy, China, is surpassing the US in every conceivable metric, 
and even then, any attempts at containment are becoming increasingly 
less feasible (if they aren't already): hence the attack on Venezuela 
and Iran, two countries that supply China with oil.
The move remains a last resort, and not all members of the US 
administration agree. Vice President J.D. Vance has been silenced, as 
has National Security Advisor Elbridge Colby, who wants to disengage the 
US from both Europe and the Middle East (which would be better called 
Western Asia)
to focus exclusively on China. This war, which instead forces Asian 
vassals to expropriate their defense systems, as well as emptying 
American arsenals, ends up being a help to China.
The most worrying aspect is the short- to medium-term outlook. In the 
very likely event that Iran refuses to accept temporary solutions (given 
the near certainty that the criminals will attack the country again), 
what exit strategy can be envisioned? How can the US and Israel save 
face after what they've started? I hope I'm wrong when I write that I 
see no viable option left, with only the nuclear option, especially for 
a nation that possesses more than a hundred weapons without any 
recognition or acceptance of international rules.
And then we must also remember Iran's geographic location, at the 
latitude of the jet stream, which is optimal for the circulation of 
radioactive particles across the globe. But perhaps the miraculous 
discombobulator used by Trump to capture Maduro will be put back into 
operation and everything will return to normal.

Antonio Politi

https://www.ucadi.org/2026/03/28/il-malvivente-arancione/
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