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(en) Brazil, UNIPA: Press Release #83 - Only the People Can Save the Planet: COP 30 and the Three Disputed Lines for the Climate Future (ca, de, fr, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]

Date Sun, 14 Dec 2025 08:22:08 +0200


They are relying on the arsonist to put out the fire: COP 30 between climate statism and green capitalism ---- COP 30 is the 30th UN climate conference, held in Belém (PA), in November 2025, bringing together countries to negotiate actions against the climate crisis. It seeks to accelerate the implementation of the Paris Agreement and maintain the 1.5°C target, discussing national emission reduction targets, climate finance, and the transition away from fossil fuels. For Brazil, hosting the event brings diplomatic prominence to the federal government, but also highlights contradictions such as deforestation and socio-environmental conflicts, while the Lula government tries to present itself as a climate leader, proposing initiatives such as a Climate Coalition and a US$125 billion fund for tropical forests.

From the perspective of social class analysis, COP 30 represents the confluence of different national technocracies and international capitalist factions, along with a minority of social movements integrated into the capitalist-statist order, to discuss our climate future within the framework of this same order. In this sense, they ignore the class and political aspects of the climate emergency, part of the broader ecological crisis promoted by capitalism, focusing discussions on illusorily technical and financial measures. The solutions proposed by these agents of climate statism and green capitalism range from palliatives that a more or less regulatory state and a financial capital duly greened for the climate problem can provide.

On the other hand, indigenous peoples and traditional communities have in fact contributed to mitigating the climate crisis because their territories, when recognized and protected, concentrate disproportionate carbon stocks and systematically exhibit lower deforestation rates than other areas, a direct result of their own forms of territorial organization and management. In other words, the fact that these territories remain forested is, in itself, a global climate "service" of enormous scale (Tropical forest carbon in indigenous territories: a global analysis, UNFCCC COP21, 2015).

Since the beginning of COP30 in Belém, indigenous peoples have already staged at least three direct actions against the official climate theater: one led to the occupation of the event's main pavilion, and another blocked the entrance to the so-called "blue zone," where the planet's destinies are negotiated behind closed doors. The immediate response from the UN Convention bureaucracy was to demand increased security and perimeter control, attempting to contain what the press calls "incidents" but which, in practice, is the eruption of real struggle within the sanitized space of green diplomacy. On Saturday (November 15th), hundreds of indigenous people marched with social movements through the center of Belém in protest, while the Brazilian government, in a calculated move, avoided open criticism of the mobilizations. When the Munduruku people blocked the entrance to the pavilion on Friday (November 14th), the conference president, André Corrêa do Lago, and ministers Marina Silva and Sônia Guajajara rushed to negotiate with the leaders and end the blockade-a clear example of how the State seeks to manage and neutralize the indigenous offensive, preserving the "normality" of negotiations that keep intact the structures responsible for the climate crisis itself. COP 30 in Belém reproduces on a micro scale the contradictions of the statist-capitalist order we live in, where the arsonists responsible for the climate crisis are called upon to put out the fire, while those who have built a sophisticated system of socio-ecological relations with nature and who are currently preventing the worsening of the climate situation are repressed and expelled.

Towards a proletarian climate policy

We understand that the climate issue permeates the issue of territorial disputes over mineral and energy resources, central elements in dispute in this Second Cold War that we have already addressed in previous statements. The struggle for land for the extraction of minerals necessary for the "energy transition"

Thinking about climate policy from the perspective of the working class and oppressed peoples means inverting the starting point: it is not "how to save the climate without hindering growth," as the agents of climate statism and green capitalism reason, but how to organize the class struggle on a warming planet. Therefore, climate policy is not a separate "environmental" issue, but a central field of contemporary class struggle, as it concerns the dispute over who has the power to decide what to produce, for whom, under what conditions, and at what human/ecological/territorial costs.

Three-line struggle in climate policy

The working class, oppressed peoples, and anarchist revolutionaries need to correctly discern the different lines at play when it comes to climate policy. The 1) liberal and 2) social-democratic lines enjoy greater visibility in public debate, while a 3) proletarian line only sketches its existence and outlines its minimal and revolutionary programs. The first two lines lead to the reproduction of the interstate and capitalist system as we know it, not to its overcoming in political, economic, and ecological terms. In this sense, they are auxiliary lines of the current order, prolonging the climate problem instead of solving it. The solution to the ecological crisis, of which the "climate emergency" is only one of its constitutive aspects, necessarily involves the end of capitalism and the state as forms of organizing social life on local and global scales.

A line centered on the working class places climate directly on the terrain of class struggle. The difference between this and the other two approaches is not merely one of "degree of state intervention," but also of starting point, political subject, tools, and historical horizon.

The liberal perspective starts from the idea that global warming is essentially a market failure: carbon does not have an adequate price, and economic agents do not incorporate "environmental costs" into their decisions. Climate policy, in this context, is conceived as a set of mechanisms to "correct" this failure through prices, incentives, and technological innovation. The main actors are national governments and multilateral organizations in dialogue with capitalist companies and investors. The stated objective is to reduce emissions "at the lowest possible cost," without undermining economic growth and maintaining the structure of private ownership of the means of production: the energy source is changed, processes are improved, a carbon market is created, but the pattern of accumulation and reproduction of capital is not questioned. The state appears as a neutral mediator, guaranteeing a good "business environment," and the market is treated as the privileged space for the solution. In this context, class struggle tends to disappear, replaced by problems of "governance" and investment.

The social-democratic line recognizes the same crisis, but formulates it as a public problem that cannot be simply handed over to the market. Here, climate policy combines environmental regulation, carbon taxes, subsidies for so-called "clean" technologies, and compensatory social policies. The political subject expands: the welfare state, progressive parties, institutionalized unions, NGOs, and multilateral organizations enter the picture. The idea of a "just transition" becomes central: reducing emissions, yes, but with compensation for losing sectors and regions, negotiated productive reconversion, and job protection through a social pact between the state, companies, and unions. The market remains important, but "tamed" by regulation; the state, in turn, is the actor that coordinates and redistributes. Class struggle is acknowledged, but channeled into forms of institutional negotiation and gradual compromises between capital and labor: the horizon of rupture is replaced by a regulated capitalism, with a "cleaner" energy matrix and some reinforcement of the welfare state.

However, the perspective from the working class shifts the axis of the debate. Here, the climate crisis is not seen as a market failure, nor merely as a problem of public management, but as a historical result of class exploitation, colonialism, imperialism, and patriarchy under capitalism. Climate politics is seen as a central field of contemporary class struggle because it concerns who decides what to produce, for whom, under what conditions, and with what impacts on territories and peoples. The political subject is no longer the "well-intentioned State" nor the abstract "civil society," but the working class in its broadest sense: rural and urban workers, formal and informal workers, indigenous peoples, peasants, quilombola communities, residents of the peripheries, women and precarious youth, organized in grassroots movements, combative unions, assemblies, and territorial councils.

If in the other two lines, the "lines of order," the central criterion is "reducing emissions" in an economically efficient or socially sustainable way, here the criterion becomes more incisive: reducing emissions and ecological destruction while expanding the power and autonomy of the working class and oppressed peoples. This implies shifting the question "how much does it cost?" to "who pays and who decides?" Instead of financing the transition with regressive taxes and tariffs that fall on workers, from the point of view of a minimum program, it is proposed to tax fortunes, extraordinary profits, and fossil and agrarian-export income, as well as the expropriation of explicitly destructive assets. Instead of a transition designed by state technocracies negotiating with corporations, the focus is on ecological-democratic planning, with social control of key sectors such as energy, transport, sanitation, and food through workers' and community councils, with real veto and decision-making power.

This "breaking point" also alters the role of territory in climate policy. In liberal and social-democratic frameworks, territories appear primarily as spaces where projects are implemented - wind farms, hydroelectric dams, "low-carbon" agribusiness, regional development programs. From a class perspective, territory becomes a front of conflict between the state and capital on one side, and rural and urban communities on the other. Climate policy necessarily involves the active defense of indigenous peoples, peasants, extractivists, quilombola communities, favelas, and peripheries against extractivism and megaprojects. Instead of viewing forests, savannahs, or coastlines as "carbon assets" to be integrated into global markets, an ecological agrarian reform and a radical urban reform are proposed that recognize traditional territories and peripheries as subjects of climate policy, and not as mere spaces for compensation and top-down directed development.

Another important shift is in the reproduction of life. The liberal approach tends to make domestic and care work invisible, focusing on the "resilient" and entrepreneurial individual. The social-democratic approach introduces social adaptation programs, insurance, and shelters, but still within a sectoral policy framework. From the perspective of the working class, the focus becomes: who takes care when everything collapses? Extreme events increase the burden of domestic work, almost always borne by women, and put pressure on public services. Thus, a class-based climate policy places public and community-based care networks at the center, valuing invisible labor (waste pickers, health workers, educators, informal rural workers) as key actors in the proletarian climate response, and forms of income and protection linked to the maintenance of life, not to market productivity.

Finally, the dispute between the two "lines of order" and the "line of rupture" is evident in the forms of organization and struggle. Liberalism relies on controlled consultations, business forums, and global governance; while social democracy expands councils, conferences, and institutional spaces for participation, without breaking with the structural asymmetry between capital and labor. Climate policy from the working class demands grassroots democracy and direct action: popular assemblies, company and neighborhood committees, rural-urban alliances, climate strikes, blockades of destructive infrastructure, and productive boycotts for ecological reasons. Climate policy is no longer just a specialized "environmental issue" but returns to the classic vocabulary of class struggle, updated by the fact that today the dispute over labor, land, and territory is, at the same time, a dispute over the material conditions of possibility for social life itself.

The climate future between the forces of order and rupture

Ultimately, what is at stake are three distinct historical horizons: a financialized, green capitalism that transforms the ecological crisis into a new round of accumulation for capitalists; a regulated, green capitalism with a reinforced welfare state and a supposedly "clean" energy matrix; and a horizon of social ecology, based on the socialist self-government of the people, on the self-management of production geared towards collectively defined needs, and on an ecological mutualism between nature and society, in balance with ecological limits, articulating the overcoming of class exploitation with a critique of colonial, patriarchal, and racial domination. It is within this context that climate policy, conceived from the perspective of the working class, is situated: not as just another "thematic agenda," but as a strategic field in the struggle for a socialist and self-governed society.

The three lines of climate policy today - liberal, social-democratic, and proletarian - are three ways of imagining the planet's climate future. The liberal and social-democratic lines, despite differences in instruments and language, remain within the established order: they accept the statist-capitalist system as given and attempt to "decarbonize" or regulate capitalism without addressing the logic of accumulation, the private ownership of the means of production, and the centralized command of the State. Thus, they may mitigate impacts and partially redistribute costs, but they continue to reproduce the same historical form that produces global warming and ecological destruction: intensive extraction of energy and matter, territories transformed into sacrifice zones, and the State acting as manager of this dynamic.

The perspective from the working class emerges as a breaking point because it places climate directly within the context of class struggle, colonialism, imperialism, and patriarchy. Instead of simply asking "how to reduce emissions?", it asks "who decides, who pays, who benefits?", proposing a radical democratization of decisions regarding energy, land, transportation, and food; the dismantling of structurally destructive activities; and the reorganization of production and life based on collective needs and ecological limits. This materializes in climate strikes, blockades of megaprojects, the defense of territories, and experiences of ecological self-management led by workers, indigenous peoples, peasants, and urban peripheries. If statism-capitalism is the historical form that produces the crisis, then there is no sustainable climate future within it: both lines of order manage the disaster; only the proletarian breaking point opens the possibility of a minimally habitable post-capitalist and post-state world for the majority and for other forms of life.

https://uniaoanarquista.wordpress.com/2025/11/19/so-o-povo-salva-o-planeta-a-cop-30-e-as-tres-linhas-em-disputa-pelo-futuro-climatico/
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