A-Infos (en) France, OCL: A "Caledonian State" within a "United States of France" - And New Caledonia as an example for Corsica? (ca, de, fr, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]

Let's get back down to earth: the text signed on July 12 is in fact only 
a draft agreement. It still needs to be accepted by the archipelago's 
political parties and population; some of its wording remains very 
vague, and its implementation depends largely on the Caledonian 
Congress. This text speaks of a "State of New Caledonia" within the 
national entity, which would be enshrined in the Constitution of the 
French Republic." The question of independence is thus sidelined for the 
time being: there is no mention of either a "Kanaky" or a "Kanaky-New 
Caledonia." It is only written that it will be possible to change the 
name of the Congress and the identifying symbols of New Caledonia...

On July 2, 2025, at Macron's initiative, new negotiations opened between 
the six Caledonian delegations and representatives of the French 
government (the previous ones, led by Valls in the archipelago, had 
failed a few months earlier). These six delegations represented the 
pro-independence FLNKS-UC and UNI-Palika, the anti-independence 
Loyalists, the centrists of Oceanian Awakening and Caledonia Together, 
and Les Républicains.
The two Caledonian MPs were present: Emmanuel Tjibaou, president of the 
Caledonian Union, for the pro-independence camp (Christian Tein, 
president of the FLNKS, was released but his presence was refused by the 
Élysée); Nicolas Metzdorf, leader of the Loyalists party, for the 
anti-independence camp.
At the opening of these negotiations, Macron had raised the possibility 
of an "associated state" within fifteen to twenty years-Tjibaou retained 
the phrase "associated state," which had outraged Metzdorf.

Everything, in fact, seems to depend on the assessment of the Caledonian 
Congress. For example, the sovereign powers that New Caledonia could 
obtain depend on it: it is the Congress itself that can decide to 
request them from the French state; then a "working committee" including 
representatives of the French state will work on the matter, and then 
the opinion of the Caledonian population will be sought.
The anti-independence camp no doubt believes that it has gained serious 
leverage against independence: their camp will work to ensure that the 
Caledonian Congress does not make decisions of this kind. The same goes 
for the upcoming "fundamental law of New Caledonia" on identity symbols 
and other symbols (so far, no agreement has been reached between the 
various political parties regarding the archipelago's flag). The 
pro-independence camp recently lost both presidencies of the Caledonian 
institutions (the Congress and the government), and the 
anti-independence camp will ensure that it does not regain them.
Furthermore, a "special organic law" will change the composition of the 
provincial assemblies. However, a large proportion of their members make 
up the Caledonian Congress, and the number of members representing the 
three provinces (the pro-independence North and Islands, the 
anti-independence South) in the Congress has previously favored the 
pro-independence camp, much to the dismay of the Loyalists. The text of 
the agreement mentions "taking into account demographic realities and 
the objective of rebalancing"...

The anti-independence movement also secured the right for the provinces 
to have their own resources (notably through taxes) and their own police 
force, and we can count on the leaders of "their" wealthy Southern 
Province not to forget this. The text of the agreement does indeed state 
that the "special organic law" will guarantee the "maintenance of a 
financial solidarity mechanism between the various institutions and 
communities of New Caledonia," but we'll see what that actually means, 
given that the Southern Province wanted to secede. (The same goes for 
the transfer of powers from New Caledonia to its provinces, which this 
"special organic law" is supposed to establish.)

The independence movement has made some concessions on the issue of the 
electorate: ten years of presence in the territory will be sufficient to 
obtain Caledonian nationality and to participate in the February 2026 
vote on the signed agreement; Fifteen years will be required to 
participate in the June 2026 provincial elections.
It was very likely that the Kanak delegation (led by Tjibaou, but not 
far behind) would sign the draft agreement, clinging to the promise of 
an "associated state" (even within the "fifteen or twenty years" 
announced by Macron at the start of the negotiations, but which are not 
mentioned in the text).

It is also not so surprising that the Loyalist delegation also ended up 
signing the draft agreement, because these "ultras" do not represent the 
Caledonian employers, and the latter could not allow the economic 
situation to deteriorate any longer. The right, or Les Républicains, is 
represented in the French government by Retailleau, who recently 
appointed Alcide Ponga (a Kanak mining entrepreneur) as one of his 
advisors. He leads the Rassemblement-LR party in the archipelago and is 
currently head of the New Caledonian government. The proposed agreement 
is thus supported by Macron's supporters and the right.

France, for its part, will be spending a significant amount of money 
because the underlying idea is to revive the New Caledonian economy:

It promises the pro-independence movement to boost the nickel 
industry-particularly the processing of this ore in New Caledonian 
factories (if conditions permit, it is nevertheless specified: 
otherwise, "it will be exported"). There is also a promise to support 
the factory in the Northern Province. The government therefore seems to 
be backtracking on the nickel issue (it wanted to stop its processing on 
site). It remains to be seen whether it will follow through on this 
commitment (among other things because the Court of Auditors has a say 
in the matter).
- It promises to transform some of its loans into grants (at the 
insistent request of various New Caledonian delegations)... under 
certain conditions, to reduce the enormous debt of New Caledonian 
institutions. It remains to be seen what it will agree to do on this issue.
But the French state will retain control in many New Caledonian sectors: 
nickel, foreign trade, international and defense issues, "security and 
public order" (notably through the "creation of a High Caledonian 
Security Council" which will include various New Caledonian 
authorities-including traditional authorities).
In short, France is keeping the archipelago within its fold: it remains 
"in close contact" with it to "preserve the New Caledonian 'terrestrial 
and marine environment'"; It is under its "protection" at the 
international level and under its economic supervision, particularly 
with regard to nickel.
The services of the High Commission will also be strengthened...

The role of the Customary Senate is also being strengthened, at least on 
paper (as are the powers of the communes and customary areas). 
Previously, the Customary Senate was primarily a consultative body. Now, 
it is expected to become involved in "crime prevention," and a 
"customary police force" will be created.
It is easy to see, in these types of measures, the State's desire to 
"involve" the separatists in maintaining order: they are responsible for 
better controlling "their" youth. But in reality, a strengthening of 
repressive forces at all levels is planned-and the creation of a new 
prison to "relieve" the one in Camp-Est.

Youth, designated as "the strength of New Caledonia," has been declared 
a priority: policies concerning health, education, training, employment, 
culture, as well as "the fight against alcohol and drug addiction" and 
"civic engagement" will be dedicated to them by the French government; 
they will be offered voluntary military service and other military 
attractions...

We will see, if the agreement is accepted, how the "desire to build a 
people" it affirms will materialize.

In any case, without falling into conspiracy theories, it can be said 
that the French government has done everything in recent years to 
"break" the pro-independence movement (particularly Kanak youth) by its 
decision to hold the third referendum during the Covid pandemic, and 
then to "unfreeze" the electoral body. The third referendum would 
undoubtedly have led to independence if it had been held at a different 
time. The riots of May 2024, by ruining the archipelago's economy, had 
the perverse effect of allowing the French state to tighten its grip 
(economic and military) over the archipelago. Not only are New 
Caledonian employers now calling on the state for help, and a large 
portion of the New Caledonian population (largely Kanak) finds itself in 
extreme precariousness or outright poverty (the "special riots" 
unemployment benefit, which had been extended, saw its pay drop, then 
ended; a new scheme is expected to replace it, but at what cost?), but 
New Caledonian leaders of all stripes (elected politicians and business 
leaders) are at the mercy of the French state, whether to revive the 
economy or to ensure the payment of pensions and other social benefits.

The French state is therefore, of course, working towards a "return to 
stability and the opening of new perspectives", for "the essential 
cleaning up of local public finances and the recovery of social 
accounts" (including through a tax reform that anti-independence 
activists do not want). Alongside dual nationality, Caledonians will 
retain their European citizenship. The Caledonian currency will be 
retained, but the French government will allow New Caledonia to put 
whatever it wants on its banknotes-a small symbolic gift to the 
pro-independence movement, although it's uncertain whether the 
"anti-independence" supporters will let them do so, again. Caledonian 
civil and military supervision will also be strengthened-including for 
the Kanaks, through the existing "Cadres Avenir" program. The Rural 
Development and Land Use Planning Agency (ADRAF) will be able to assist 
in the development of economic activities or allow for the expansion of 
customary lands. Etc.

There are many unknowns in the draft agreement, as its implementation 
largely depends on several upcoming elections: in the fall, the 
parliamentary vote on the inclusion of a change in status for New 
Caledonia in the French Constitution; in February 2026, the vote in the 
archipelago on the signed draft agreement; In March-April 2026, the 
adoption of the "special organic law" on New Caledonia; in June 2026, 
the provincial elections, which have been postponed twice. (And there 
will also be municipal elections in France and the archipelago in March 
2026.)
In the meantime, the FLNKS and Loyalist delegations seem-according to 
the press-to be quite apprehensive about the reception they will receive 
upon their return to the archipelago for having signed this text.

Vanina

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http://oclibertaire.lautre.net/spip.php?article4488
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