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(en) Italy, FAI, Umanita Nova #21-25 - Suspicious vices. The ancient art of infiltrators (ca, de, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]

Date Tue, 19 Aug 2025 08:04:41 +0300


The Italian translation of the "Manual for unmasking an infiltrated policeman" has recently been made available online; the work edited and adapted by "progettometi.org" can be downloaded freely from their website. The original document was written following the discovery in Spain of the presence of a certain number of people infiltrated within some grassroots groups involved in social struggles. This has caused quite a stir within the Spanish movements also due to the similarities with similar precedents in the United Kingdom, some of which date back a long time. In Italy, at the end of May, "Potere al Popolo" publicly denounced the infiltration of a policeman into the Party that lasted 10 months and was discovered almost by chance.

You don't have to be an expert to remember that state apparatuses have always been accustomed to infiltrating parties, groups, collectives, movements both to acquire information on their functioning and their activities and to set up some provocation. The Italian history of the last 50-60 years contains a good number of examples and it is no coincidence that the law recently approved by Parliament provides for a series of changes to the regulations in force (art.31 "Provisions for the strengthening of the information activity for security", Decree 11 April 2025, n. 48) that specifically concern the activities in question. In practice, a certain number of crimes committed by infiltrated people are made non-punishable. It is superfluous to remember that there are no lists or statistics (public) regarding the number of infiltrated people (and where), so it is not possible to know whether these are tens or hundreds and any hypothesis made in this regard is certainly unfounded. However, it is certainly an activity that today is accompanied by that of the control carried out through spy software installed on cell phones, as clearly demonstrated recently by the discovery that the "Graphite" program (produced by the company "Paragon") was used to control some people whose communications are evidently considered interesting by the repressive apparatus.

Given that the problem of infiltration exists and that it is not the result of a banal conspiracy theory, at least three questions arise spontaneously: 1. is it possible to discover an infiltration? How? 2. if they are discovered is it appropriate to publicly report these cases? 3. is it possible to prevent an infiltration? How?

The "Manual" cited at the beginning tries to answer above all the first two questions but raises some doubts regarding the answer to the third question. Below we try to summarize the content of the document and refer the people most interested to the full text. The literal quotations, placed in quotation marks, will be followed by the page number (enclosed in square brackets) from which they come.

The first thing that is clarified is that the text was written by people who have directly suffered the infiltration activity and that the purposes of the document are: "Transmit the experience and knowledge"[3]acquired; "Increase the culture of protection in organizations and collectives."[4]and highlight the cracks in the infiltration system and the fact that the police and the State are not infallible. Ultimately, it is believed that it is "essential to make public all the information and elements obtained"[4]and that it is necessary for certain information to be shared because "it would be dangerous and discouraging to leave this possibility only to our discretion and arbitrariness, as this could produce hierarchies and imbalances of power."[5]. The decision to make certain information public is then motivated; it is probably the synthesis of a debate in which the pros and cons of this decision were evaluated.

The question is then answered: "Why is it important that there is a group that controls the process?"[8]which is followed by answers that concern "discretion", the need to avoid unnecessary alarmism but also that of preventing the infiltrated person from knowing that he is in the sights of an "initial investigation group."[9].

Throughout the text, reference will be made continuously to the activity of this "group" formed by a group of people who have strong bonds of trust among themselves, who have found themselves sharing some "suspicions" and who have decided to investigate them further. The aim is to provide "information, common models, guidelines and recommendations on the possible problems that can be encountered when starting an investigation, as well as on the possible security measures to prevent infiltrations."[10]

And the main part of the document is dedicated precisely to the "suspicions". According to the author, "Most suspicions can arise by observing clothing[sic!], political ideas, social networks, lack of roots, something that does not fit in a life story or simply the fact that there are people who do not fit in well with the context."[11]to these must be added "the sudden, unexpected and inexplicable distancing of the partner (infiltrator) from militancy"[12]a fact that has occurred in many cases and also in the context of infiltrations that occurred in the United Kingdom.

If the "suspicions" are only a starting point, it must always be kept in mind that these, by themselves, do not constitute proof and that, it will be repeated on several occasions, it is much better to be wrong than to follow some kind of prejudice. It is starting from these collective "suspicions" "that we can form an affinity group to carry on the investigation."[14]This must also include a person who is trusted but who has no ties to the suspected person, in order to have a point of view not directly involved in the problem that can serve to avoid errors of assessment and/or judgment and that can function as a sort of "psychological support".

In the "Manual" it is recommended to keep a written record of what comes to mind and the information collected from the beginning and to evaluate the suspected person according to a series of basic questions that will then be listed later in the text. At a certain point it may be necessary to acquire information by contacting other people and the document advises how to behave in such cases.

In the end, one way or another, the "investigations" will be closed.

In the best of cases, no evidence is found on the suspected person and this information must be shared with all the people who were aware of the "investigations" in order to avoid "rumours continuing to circulate."[21]In this case, the question arises as to whether the suspected person should be among those informed, a decision that is obviously quite delicate. No precise indication is given on this, while it is explicitly written that "Some groups have simply decided not to mention the investigation, which can have the disadvantage of never definitively closing the matter."[21]

In the case where, although there are "suspicions" and "evidence" these are not considered sufficient or incontrovertible, it is recommended to be cautious and "not to publish anything until definitive evidence is available."[23]

In the worst case, when there is no doubt about the infiltration, it is suggested that it is "almost always a good idea to make the news public"[23]taking care to warn in advance the people who have had the most contact with the infiltrated person and making sure to have "support tools available for those who will be most affected by the consequences."[25]

The "Manual" barely mentions the problem that could arise when an infiltrated person enters into a relationship with an activist, which complicates the whole matter considerably. The issue is taken up again, in part, in a documentary (on the same story) produced by a Catalan digital platform and visible here https://www.3cat.cat/3cat/infiltrats/video/6319194/

The "Manual" then lists the "lessons" learned by the people involved in nine cases of infiltration that have been made public; later in the text, links to the web pages where the stories of these individuals are published will be provided. The lessons do not only concern infiltration techniques but also the effects that discoveries of this kind have on the level of the people who are part of groups, collectives, movements. Effects that are above all negative and that could, if not well managed, lead to damage both the people and their relationships: "Be aware that any investigation, regardless of its outcome, can damage the networks of trust within the group."[26]Some pages of the "Manual" are dedicated to psychological and relational damage and it is recommended to choose adequate "safety protocols" that make people feel at ease.

The 17 "questions" are then listed on which the "investigations" should be based and which should constitute a sort of working grid useful for unmasking an infiltration. Each of these questions is accompanied by explanations and examples taken from real cases.
Here is the list: 1. Past history and lack of roots; 2. Are their political ideas almost non-existent or poorly developed?; 3. Has anyone met their family?; 4. Does their work or "personal" life lead them to be absent for long periods of time or for many short periods?; 5. Does their home seem little lived in?; 6. How did they become involved?; 7. Do they have extraordinary driving skills or do they have a driving license for almost all vehicle categories?; 8. What is their attitude or personality?; 9. Do they have money problems?; 10. Do relationships focus on key people or those around them?; 11. Oddities and contradictions; 12. Have there been strange court cases or little interest from the police?; 13. Have they suddenly disappeared and avoided any contact?; 14. Social; 15. Photos; 16. COVID; 17. Cell phones.[33-]

It would take too long to analyze in detail each of these that we could call "clues" and that should help to discover an infiltrated person. But even just scrolling through the list you can see that these are models and/or behavior patterns that have no specificity whatsoever and can therefore mean anything but also the opposite of everything. This applies, to a greater or lesser extent, to almost all the points listed, something that is also noted (fortunately!) in some of the notes written by the person who wrote the text.

Towards the end of the document it is written: "we must always be clear, however, that getting to know new people should be aimed at basic socialization and not so much (or not only) at security"[51-52]. Therefore, the person who wrote the text does not seem to exclude the need for "investigations" to be carried out on any new person who comes into contact with a group, a collective, a movement. This seems to be confirmed by the fact that the immediately following paragraph has this title: "Possible useful precautions (but not infallible) for integrating people into the group"[52]and is followed by a series of suggestions for obtaining some basic information on a person. However, it is not specified who should collect this "information" and by what "suspicions" the collection would be justified.

In the "Conclusions"[55]many of the warnings written on several occasions in the previous pages of the "Manual" are reiterated with the aim of avoiding "false positives" and negative side effects for the communities in struggle, unfortunately it ends up also writing: "The fact that someone does not fit into the schemes does not mean that every suspicion must be discarded."[57]

Overall, it can be considered that, apart from some unintentional naivety, the document addresses a theme that, as we mentioned at the beginning, is still current and not only in Spain. From a political point of view, the fact that groups, collectives, movements that act in broad daylight have been infiltrated says a lot about the fact that this type of practice certainly does not serve to combat international terrorism but rather the grassroots social struggle. What is evident, however, is that in many cases the infiltration was discovered by one or more errors, some truly gross, committed by the infiltrated person.

What is less convincing about the proposals made in the "Manual" is the need to create a secret structure that "investigates" "suspicious" people, an entity that - as presented in the text - is born on the basis of an "instinct" and that ultimately answers almost only to itself. This certainly does not mean that it would be preferable to have a sort of institutionalized internal police force but rather that the problem of security should be directly taken care of by all the people who are part of a group, collective, movement. If one of the goals that should be pursued is to throw out (rather than discover) unwelcome people, an open collective discussion on these topics would cause quite a few problems for an infiltrated person.

In addition, it would be good if human relationships within a fighting community were not based on the control - even for good purposes - that a group (more or less small) exercises over the entire community. The need to defend communities is certainly something important but this should be carefully balanced: even the person who wrote the "Manual" has underlined on several occasions the collateral damage caused by an "investigation", unfortunately one has the impression that these have not been adequately evaluated and certainly have not been compared with the damage that an infiltration could cause. And we are talking about damage that is produced whatever the final result of an "investigation". Obviously this is valid (especially) for groups, collectives, movements that operate in the light of day and for which illegality is not the main or only form of struggle.

Ultimately it is one thing to live with and manage a pinch of paranoia, especially on certain occasions, it is another to get carried away by mechanisms that could become commonly used practices. In most cases, it is probably enough to share even a minimum amount of attention to internal security issues to try to address the problem collectively rather than delegating it, moreover without even being aware of it, to a small group.

This system will probably not be the most efficient, from a security point of view, but it will certainly allow all people to participate in a certain type of problem and this will reduce the inevitable impact of the negative effects that are caused by an infiltration.

Pepsy

From https://pepsy.noblogs.org/

https://umanitanova.org/vizietti-sospetti-lantica-arte-degli-infiltrati/
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