A-Infos (en) Italy, UCADI, #198 - Ukrainian Diaspora and the European Right (ca, de, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]

Among the effects of the war in Ukraine, the diaspora of its population 
is undoubtedly the most underestimated and least analyzed in relation to 
the effects it has produced and will produce over time. Even before the 
outbreak of the war, Ukraine was a land of emigration to the West, as 
was happening to an even greater extent from all Eastern European 
countries. Those who left the country, migrating to the Mediterranean 
countries where welfare structures for the elderly are more lacking, 
were mainly women, while the male workforce was largely made up of 
seasonal migration almost across the border with Germany. This migration 
was mainly employed in agriculture in the East German states.
The war caused a massive exodus, more than a quarter of the country's 
entire population, which in a very short period of time expelled more 
than 2 million people towards Russia and around 10 million Ukrainians 
towards the West.
To manage this huge mass of population, EU countries have resorted to 
the application of Directive 2001/55/EC of the Council of Europe, issued 
after the Balkan wars, which establishes minimum standards for the 
granting of temporary protection. This is a measure of the EU Council, 
which grants exceptional temporary protection to displaced persons or 
victims of natural disasters, which in this case applies to Ukrainian 
citizens residing in Ukraine before 24 February 2022, the date of the 
beginning of the Russian invasion. This protection includes rights such 
as a residence permit, access to the labor market and housing, medical 
care and access to education for minors. The duration of this protection 
has been extended several times, initially for one year, then for a 
further year, currently until 4 March 2026. Residence permits for 
temporary protection can be renewed and converted into permits for work 
reasons.

The distribution of refugees

As was obvious, in a first phase the exodus of the Ukrainian population 
poured into the neighboring countries, so much so that both Romania and 
Poland, like Moldova, can be considered both transit countries and 
countries of second settlement, also due to their proximity to the 
border with the mother country. Many Ukrainians chose to settle in these 
countries to continue to have relations with the country of origin and 
develop trade and economic activities, shelter from war events. However, 
the majority of Ukrainians sought and found refuge well beyond the 
border countries, finding hospitality above all in Germany, while Poland 
can be considered both a transit country and a country of new 
significant settlement.
To better understand the characteristics and identity of the phenomenon, 
it is good to examine some data relating to the different countries, 
underlining the characteristics and nature of the provisions adopted in 
favor of refugees, also in relation to the possibilities of finding work 
and building a new stability. In fact, one of the characteristics of the 
exodus, also due to the persistent duration of the conflict, is that the 
new settlement increasingly takes on a permanent and permanent character.
Approximately 5.4 million Ukrainians have entered Romania since the 
beginning of the war, of whom over 86 thousand have remained in the 
country as refugees, mainly women and children. Others have continued 
their journey to other EU countries, such as Germany, France and Italy, 
Spain or going overseas, where they have benefited from temporary 
protection.
Poland has welcomed a large number of Ukrainian refugees, an estimated 
1.5 million, using EU funding, but the assistance program has gone much 
further thanks to allocations from the Polish state, so in reality the 
real number of the hosted population is unknown.
In the United Kingdom, Ukrainian refugees have been welcomed through the 
"Ukraine Family Scheme" and other support programs. The United Kingdom 
has also offered rent allowances and financial support to those who have 
hosted refugees.
There are currently over 254,000 Ukrainian refugees in the UK, and the 
government has extended their ability to stay for another 18 months. 
There is also a program that helps those who decide to host a family 
fleeing war; lately the demand has significantly exceeded the supply. It 
is important to note that the hospitality of Ukrainians occurs in 
derogation and in contrast to the rejections adopted against refugees 
from every other country in the world.
In Italy, over 175,000 Ukrainian refugees, mainly women and minors, have 
been welcomed with temporary protection status. Many of them, around 
86%, plan to stay in the medium or long term.
Integration is supported by projects such as PUOI, which offer 
orientation courses, job placements and internships. However, it is 
estimated that the number of Ukrainians present in Italy is at least 
double, since those who were previously present in Italy for work 
reasons in more or less official forms and who saw their position 
regularized after the outbreak of the war must be added to the refugees.
In Spain, there are over 170,000 Ukrainian refugees who are 
beneficiaries of temporary protection. Integration, however, is not 
easy: over half do not have an address, and the percentage of Ukrainians 
who have found work is 15%, much lower than the European average of 40%. 
Spain has also regularized Ukrainians who reside without documents, 
offering them temporary protection. Temporary protection permits can be 
renewed until March 2026 and converted into work permits. There are 
236,000 who have had their residence permits in the country extended 
because they were already present in Spain before the war.
A separate discussion must be made for Germany, where approximately 1.2 
million Ukrainian refugees currently live, 63% of whom are women. Around 
360,000 are children, who cannot work. Precisely because of their 
growing number, refugees will no longer receive the Bürgergeld (social 
benefit aimed at people able to work, who are in conditions of poverty, 
an instrument therefore in some ways comparable to the citizen's 
income), normally reserved for permanent residents in Germany. From the 
new Government they will instead receive the Asylleistungen (asylum 
subsidy) which guarantees less money. Based on the Bürgergeld, singles 
received 563 euros per month, while asylum seekers are entitled to 122 
euros less and receive 441 euros, via a payment card. Refugees receive 
less money if they share accommodation, even if the accommodation costs 
are still covered. The Bürgergeld is financed by taxes from the federal 
government, while asylum support comes from the Länder and the 
Municipalities. This change in legislation came about under the new 
government precisely because of the controversy that arose in relation 
to the policy of support for refugees that has sparked so many protests 
among voters, so much so that it is one of the main reasons behind the 
Ampel coalition's decision to grant refugees from Ukraine residency 
status, because in this way refugees can receive work permits more 
quickly and weigh less on the coffers of the state and the Länder.
However, it is currently unclear whether the classification of 
Ukrainians as asylum seekers will go further and have an impact on their 
right to work in Germany. According to the regulatory framework for 
asylum seekers, refugees cannot work for the first three months and, 
after that, they face further restrictions. The Ukrainian presence fuels 
consensus in Germany on the so-called re-immigration policy that 
provides for the rejection of migrants in their countries of origin.
On the other hand, only 13,000 Ukrainian refugees have applied for 
international protection in France. The same order of magnitude is 
supported by much smaller countries such as the Netherlands, Denmark, 
the Baltic countries, Portugal: the exodus towards Canada, the United 
States and Australia is also of some consistency.

Temporary protection and the principle of equality

The institution of temporary protection, born from the bad conscience of 
the West, aware of having produced with its devastating interventions in 
the life of peoples unresolved problems of coexistence - it is no 
coincidence that the EU directive was issued following the Balkan crises 
- has not failed to raise serious problems in relation to the violation 
of the principle of equality, introducing disparities in treatment 
within the populations of European countries, especially since it has 
intersected and interacted with the parallel phenomenon of migration 
towards the continent of populations from all parts of the world.
Support measures for populations in particular conditions of hardship 
appear understandable and bearable where there are support institutions 
for the entire population in favor of that most disadvantaged part that 
feels the economic and social problems with greater discomfort, but they 
can be extremely discriminatory where
the support is provided in a situation in which a most disadvantaged 
part of the native population remains without any form of support.
It so happens that in Italy the application of the European Community 
directive in favor of Ukrainian refugees coincided with the almost 
contemporary and contemporary suppression of the citizen's income. This 
gives rise to an understandable reaction of social envy for a category 
of people who appear to be particularly and unjustifiably protected, 
especially if one considers that at the same time policies of rejection 
are being adopted against clandestine and irregular emigration of people 
who reach the country, following what is known as the Balkan route, 
coming from the Middle East and the South of the world, or among those 
who arrive in Italy by crossing the sea.
In other words, the Ukrainian diaspora fuels and further complicates the 
migration problem, not only in Italy but with particular relevance in 
Romania and Germany, where it has contributed to the shift of the 
electorate to the right, in favor of those parties that oppose the war 
in Ukraine, its financing and therefore promise to put an end to the 
provision of resources to this segment of the population.
It is thought-provoking that European governments are increasingly 
adopting policies to contain emigration from the global south, invoking 
cultural diversity and the skin color of migrants as an element of 
differentiation, while leaving the doors open to the deployment of 
solidarity and acceptance towards Ukrainian populations. The suspicion 
arises that migration from Ukraine is viewed more favorably, since it is 
a population coming from another European country, of a culture and 
religion that is supposedly similar and, above all, characterized by a 
skin pigmentation that allows for easier integration and a lack of 
immediate recognition in terms of different origins. The profound racism 
that characterizes European society and also permeates legislation and 
translates into different standards that in fact create the legal bases 
for discrimination is essentially evident in political and collective 
behavior. The war in Ukraine thus becomes one of the ways in which 
European states are replenishing their populations, recruiting those 
portions of citizens who are missing due to the demographic decline of 
European states, afflicted by an almost exponential decline in the birth 
rate, through the introduction of a racial drift. The exodus induced by 
the war has caused a part of the Ukrainian people to take a path of no 
return that leads to the dilution of their identity.
However, this choice is raising growing resistance, so much so that the 
news of these days is that the EU has decided not to extend the customs 
exemption on the import of Ukrainian agricultural products, which in 
fact entails the introduction of customs duties starting from June 6: 
this was announced by the representative of the European Commission for 
Agriculture Balazs Uvari.

The suicidal politics of the left-wing parties and the war in Ukraine

The parties of the reformist left. uncritically assuming the defense of 
Ukraine as an attacked country, they have been victims of a hasty and 
superficial analysis of the causes of the conflict that instead should 
be sought in the need to maintain a geostrategic balance between the 
different areas of influence but also keeping in mind the founding 
values on which the European Union itself was built.
Looking deeper into this aspect of the problem, we note that one of the 
key principles of the togetherness of the European peoples who have 
joined the Union is the acceptance of the principle of 
self-determination of the peoples who have agreed to be part of it. This 
principle has universal value and has been invoked when the Union itself 
has deemed it suitable and consistent with its own interests, that is, 
in the case of the Balkan crisis and the dissolution of the former 
Yugoslavia, recognizing the right to self-determination of the Balkan 
peoples and their request to recognize their future in the common 
destiny of the European peoples. However, the request for 
self-determination of the eastern provinces of Ukraine, of Donbass in 
particular, has not received the same attention; indeed, their 
aspiration to self-determination and autonomy was considered a serious 
violation of law and an illegitimate uprising against the central State 
and its integrity. It is worth remembering that the European Union did 
not hesitate to intervene in the Balkan crisis by promoting the process 
of self-determination of the peoples of the Balkans, while in this case 
it did the opposite. Similarly, rather than supporting the centralist 
policies of the Ukrainian nationalist government, the parties of the 
left should have, consistently with their political positions, supported 
the principle of self-determination of peoples, recognizing that similar 
conflicts are resolved with the recognition of the autonomy of the 
territories. We cannot ask peoples to adopt double standards and to 
recognize the principle of autonomy in response to the requests of the 
Balkan populations, while denying it to the populations that inhabit the 
territories east of the Dnipro and in Crimea.

The virtuous case of Trentino Alto Adige

Our country has also had to face the problem of a part of the national 
territory in which separatist tendencies predominated, fueled by a 
difference in language and traditions. We are referring to Trentino Alto 
Adige, but also to the Aosta Valley, regions for which the Italian legal 
system, compatible with the European one, has provided and provides for 
broad autonomies, which allow these communities to live in harmony 
within the national State and within a broader community of States. A 
similar solution could have been found for the eastern provinces of Ukraine.
Once the problem of the autonomy of the territories and populations was 
correctly set, the other complex issues that the conflict brings with it 
should and could have been addressed from a different perspective, 
taking into account the interests of the parties in conflict, among 
other things avoiding the successful completion of operations of 
scavenging by subjects, third parties such as the United States and 
Great Britain, who had every interest in destabilizing the relationship 
of exchange and collaboration between manufacturing and energy on which 
the partnership between European industry and the Russian economy was 
based. It should also be remembered that a non-marginal aspect of the 
Ukrainian crisis is closely connected to the conflict entirely internal 
to Orthodoxy that opposes the Patriarchate of Constantinople to the 
Patriarchate of Moscow, which compete for hegemony over the Orthodox 
ecumene. This conflict that led to the establishment of a schismatic 
Orthodox Church in Ukraine and to religious persecution appears, if 
possible, to be of greater complexity in identifying possible solutions 
due to the geopolitical implications that it brings with it. The 
inability to grasp the set of problems connected to the crisis depends 
on the lack of ideal and scientific guidelines in the left-wing parties 
and on the abandonment of historical materialist analysis capable of 
providing a rational and coherent reading of reality taking into account 
the class interest and the struggle of proletarian internationalism, in 
the interest of the people, social justice and equality. Using the 
categories of the class struggle would have avoided falling into the 
trap designed by the international right, avoiding providing the reasons 
to allow a shift to the right of the electorate of which we all pay the 
consequences.

Gianni Cimbalo

https://www.ucadi.org/2025/06/22/diaspora-ucraina-e-destra-europea/
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