A-Infos (en) France, UCL AL #361 - History - 1825: But why did the Haitian state agree to pay? (ca, de, fr, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]

It is understandable why French imperialism had an interest in demanding 
a crushing tribute from Haiti. It is less clear why the Haitian ruling 
class accepted it, when an enemy invasion was impossible. Several 
hypotheses can explain this: fear that the war would lead to a social 
revolution; misplaced pride; poor strategic calculation... Ultimately, 
it was the peasantry who paid for this capitulation. ---- On this 
January 1, 1825, all of Port-au-Prince gathered in Place Pétion. 
Independence, wrested from France with weapons in hand in 1804, was 
celebrated. Speeches, cheers, solemn cannon shots, a high mass, balls, 
and fireworks[1]. With the founding of Haiti, we also celebrate the 
abolition of slavery in August 1793. What is modestly ignored, however, 
is the triggering event of 1791: the insurrection of the enslaved 
proletariat[2]. This is because this uprising evoked a rural, African, 
Voodoo, and Kreyólophone imagery that was very little appreciated at the 
time in Haitian urban, Catholic, and Francophone upper-class society[3].

The entirety of Haiti in the 1820s and 1830s was structured by this 
dichotomy: on the one hand, a "military-landlord" oligarchy that owned 
vast estates; on the other, a mass of "semi-serf peasants" forced, by 
coercion, to hire out their labor[4].

The country was then administered by a Senate of twenty-four oligarchs, 
under the leadership of Jean-Pierre Boyer, a self-righteous and elitist 
general from the mulatto minority[5]. Under his presidency, the country 
was unified and stabilized. The island exported coffee, logwood, cotton, 
and cocoa; it imported manufactured goods, weapons, and clothing. 
British, American, and Spanish ships-and even French ones, flying false 
flags-thronged its ports. Despite this, for twenty years, no foreign 
state had wanted to anger Paris by recognizing Haiti's independence; the 
island officially remained a rebel French colony named Saint-Domingue.

To end this pariah state status, the French monarchy would have to 
ratify its independence. But how could it do so? It was under pressure 
from the lobby of former colonists, who were clamoring for a military 
expedition to reclaim its tropical properties.

Port-au-Prince Proposes Compensation
To compensate them and legally secure their expropriated estates, the 
Haitian bourgeoisie had proposed, since 1814, paying them compensation 
in exchange for a peace treaty with France. In Paris, this compromise 
solution was under scrutiny. It received support from the merchant 
lobby, eager to trade unhindered with Haiti and mocking the colonists' 
backward-looking attitude. The time had come for free trade, for 
heaven's sake[6]!

The compromise was also advocated by General Pamphile de Lacroix, a 
survivor of the disastrous expedition of 1802-1803, who wrote a lucid 
book about it. In it, he concluded that reconquest was impossible and 
the revolution irreversible. However, he made a cruel suggestion. 
According to him, it would be easy to strike Haiti by destroying its 
fleet, blockading its ports, bombing its coastal towns, and burning its 
crops... "We would destroy more in a day than they could restore in a 
year." This could convince the "current leaders that it would be better 
to cede some of the property they have usurped"[7]. Ultimately, it was 
this terrorist scenario, foreshadowing what would later be called 
"gunboat diplomacy," that would prevail.
Jean-Pierre Boyer (1776-1850) was the right-hand man of Alexandre 
Pétion, founder of the Haitian Republic, and succeeded him in 1818. Born 
into the mulatto minority, he was a typical representative of the 
military-landlord oligarchy that dominated Haiti at the time, and which 
attempted (in vain) to maintain the plantation economy by bringing the 
Black rural proletariat into line.
Lithograph by Alexandre Cheyère, Sainte Geneviève Library
Having ascended the throne of France in 1824, the reactionary Charles X 
was also determined to settle the Haitian affair through a settlement. 
But, imbued with his divine right, he wanted to unilaterally set the 
terms, with an overarching ambition of revenge for the past.

In April 1825, he passed a law requiring the French people to pay, in 33 
annual installments, an indemnity of 990 million francs to the former 
royalist émigrés deprived of their property during the Revolution - this 
would become the famous "émigrés' billion". The same month, he signed an 
ordinance demanding from Haiti, in five annual installments, a sum of 
150 million francs to compensate the expropriated settlers - in return 
for which, he would recognize the country's independence.
Why this figure? In France, people fantasize about the prosperity of the 
Haitian state. It is credited with an annual budget surplus of 18 to 30 
million francs, extrapolating from the magnificent figures of the 
1780s[8], a time when the colony exported mountains of sugar, coffee, 
indigo, and cotton, at the cost of a horrific exploitation of enslaved 
labor.

However, in 1825, the situation was radically different. The revolution 
had destroyed the plantation economy, and the Haitian state was 
struggling to balance its books. The sum of 150 million was out of all 
proportion to its capacity. This was all the more true since Charles X 
was demanding a halving of customs tariffs for French trade, which would 
cut the island's tax revenues by the same amount. But no matter. The 
king signed the ordinance with his august hand and sent it off, like an 
ultimatum.

The Head of Government Displays His Torches
On July 3, 1825, three ships flying the French flag landed in 
Port-au-Prince under Admiral Armand de Mackau. Having come to deliver 
the King of France's ultimatum to Haitian officials, he informed them 
that he was being closely followed by a squadron of 13 warships to 
blockade Haiti if they refused[9].

The Haitians' initial reaction was outrage. Coastal cities were placed 
on alert; the head of government, Inginac, went so far as to display his 
incendiary torches in Mackau, intended to reduce the capital to ashes in 
the event of an attack[10]. All coastal cities had been stockpiling them 
since the Constitution of 1805 proclaimed: "At the first blast of the 
alarm cannon, the cities disappear and the nation stands."» Six months 
earlier, for the national holiday, all Haitian leaders had reiterated 
the ritual oath to "die rather than cease to be free and independent."

Yet, quite the opposite would happen. For President Boyer wanted 
everyone to reflect. A meeting brought together ten senators, six senior 
officials, and four Boyerist senior officers[11]. Four days later, 
before the announced squadron had even been sighted, Boyer and the 
Haitian government accepted the ultimatum. Then, on July 11, the Senate 
voted to approve it.

During a private meeting, Admiral de Mackau promised the Haitian 
president that the 150 million franc indemnity would certainly be 
reduced later if he agreed to sign. And Boyer would have considered it 
honorable to trust the emissary of the King of France. It's hard to 
believe that Boyer, who had seen it all, could have acted with such 
naivety. The reason for his signature must be sought elsewhere.
Print. Lahure, Contemporary Popular History of France, Hachette, 1864
Three Hypotheses for a About-Face
How can this about-face be explained? Three hypotheses can be combined.

The first is the fear of the Haitian propertied class. Taking up the 
challenge, accepting war? This would have meant the end of their urban 
lifestyle, a retreat into the bush, and the submersion of the state by 
the armed people. But the people are those frightening "Africans" of the 
countryside, semi-barbarians, barely subjugated, whom the predominantly 
mulatto bourgeoisie of Port-au-Prince fears more than the French. By 
unleashing them, the war would open the door to a social revolution, as 
Inginac himself suggests[12].

The second hypothesis is based on the clumsiness of Haitian diplomacy, 
aggravated by Jean-Pierre Boyer's hubris. The autocrat, who has so far 
had success in everything, refuses to acknowledge his country's poverty 
and believes its prosperity is imminent[13]. In 1824, he had already 
proposed, of his own accord, an unrealistic indemnity of 100 million 
francs[14]. In his view, the "cost of peace" would be offset by reduced 
military spending and a boom in trade.

The third hypothesis is that of a calculation gone wrong: the indemnity 
of 150 million francs is certainly enormous, but if it can't be paid, 
well, it won't be paid. Or only a fraction, as a token of good faith. 
Then Paris will end up giving up on it. In the meantime, an irreversible 
goal will have been achieved: recognition of independence, international 
normalization. So, fear of war and social revolution? Misplaced pride? 
Miscalculation? In any case, the capitulation of 1825 was not President 
Boyer's alone to blame. He acted correctly, with the approval of the 
ruling circles in Port-au-Prince.

Popular anger against the "shameful tribute"
In July 1825, the Boyerist government presented Charles X's ordinance as 
a victory, and festivities were organized for three days in 
Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haïtien. It wasn't long, however, before this 
surrender sparked a wave of hostility, particularly in the north, where 
anti-French sentiment was stronger.Anger at the "shameful tribute" would 
spark two military conspiracies-nipped in the bud-and then grow popular 
and parliamentary opposition.

Admiral Mackau, for his part, could boast upon his return to Paris. His 
success, he believed, would transform Haiti into "a province of France 
bringing in a lot but costing nothing"[15]. As we can see, while the 
term neocolonialism did not yet exist, Mackau already had a firm grasp 
of the concept. The Haitian propertied class would at least have 
achieved its normalization: following in the footsteps of the former 
metropolis, Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark, and then Great Britain 
would recognize Haiti. In the United States, however, due to blockades 
by the pro-slavery lobby, it would take until 1862 and Lincoln.

Independence was thus recognized. But as for paying the compensation... 
President Boyer only managed to complete the first installment of 30 
million francs. And even then. By emptying the public treasury. By 
cutting spending. By borrowing from a French bank.

At the same time, his hopes for new revenue faded. A public loan was 
launched, but yielded very little. A project for a gold mining 
concession in the east of the island, deemed unviable, was abandoned. 
The Rural Code of 1826, which tightened coercion against workers to 
boost agricultural productivity, was a failure. To top it all off, the 
economic situation was poor, with coffee prices steadily falling.

Seeing nothing come of the first installment, the French state would, 
for years, claim what was owed. After the 1830 revolution ousted Charles 
X, the Haitian government hoped to see the debt erased by his more 
liberal successor, Louis-Philippe. Not at all!

In 1831, a diplomatic crisis erupted. In Port-au-Prince, where a wind of 
patriotic anger was blowing, people declared themselves ready to break 
with France; in Paris, they threatened a punitive naval expedition[16]. 
But finally, realizing that Haiti was insolvent and that it was better 
to "save Private Boyer," the French state resolved to revise the debt. A 
reduced tribute was better than no tribute at all.

In May 1838, once again under threat of an armed squadron, Boyer signed 
a treaty halving the remaining debt. The country would still have to pay 
60 million francs over thirty years. They would be paid, painfully, over 
fifty years. Discredited, worn down, and hated, Boyer was overthrown in 
1843. But subsequent governments would continue to pay... with the sweat 
of the Haitian people.

Guillaume Davranche (UCL Montreuil)

The Peasantry in Revolt Against the Neocolonial System
The payment of the Haitian debt was based on the overexploitation of the 
peasantry by a propertied class that had become vassals of French 
imperialism and, from 1914, of American imperialism.

In the second half of the 19th century, compensation for former white 
settlers was nothing more than a pretext for paying the 1825 debt. 
Haitian rent was used to fuel speculation by French banks with ties to 
increasingly corrupt Haitian leaders. These would burden the state with 
exorbitant loans, supposedly to repay the previous ones, at real 
interest rates of 15% to 30%[17]: 15 million in 1875, 50 million in 
1896, 65 million in 1910... A vicious spiral.

From pickets to cacos
Many popular struggles attempted to overthrow this neocolonial system. 
In the years 1844-1848, there was the peasant "picket" movement of 
Jean-Jacques Acaau in the South. In the years 1867-1870, the country 
experienced a crisis that ended in the massacre of revolutionaries. In 
1911-1915, the cacos, these rebellious peasants from the North, 
descended on the capital five times. From 1915 to 1922, a second 
generation of cacos led the guerrilla war against the US occupation[18].

Despite this, over seventy years, Haiti paid a total of 112 million 
francs - or 543 million euros in present value. If these funds had been 
invested in the country's economy, Haiti would likely have developed 
like its neighbors, instead of stagnating in poverty. But, to borrow a 
phrase from Benoît Joachim, due to this "castration of national 
capital," it was unable to generate anything...

According to a study published in 2021 by an international team of 
researchers, the shortfall for Haiti over two centuries would have been 
$115 billion[19]. It is on this basis that the Haitian people are now 
demanding reparations.

G.D. (UCL Montreuil)

Validate

[1]Le Télégraphe, Port-au-Prince, January 9, 1825.

[2]"Enslaved" is a neologism emphasizing that one is not a slave by 
nature. One is something else, but one is subject to this imposed 
status. Read on this subject: Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, Les Routes 
de l'esclavage (The Routes of Slavery), Albin Michel/Arte, 2018, p. 21.

[3]Gérard Barthélémy, "At the Origins of Haiti: 'Africans' and 
Peasants," Outre-mers No. 340-341, second half of 2003.

[4]Paul Moral, Le Paysan haïtien (The Haitian Peasant), Maisonneuve & 
Larose, 1961; Benoît Joachim, Les Racines du sous-développement en Haïti 
(The Roots of Underdevelopment in Haiti), Henri Deschamps, 1982.

[5]Mulatto was the pejorative term used in the colonial world, and later 
in former Haiti, to designate the "caste" of mixed-race people.

[6]Joachim, op. cit., pp. 58 and 74.

[7]Pamphile de Lacroix, Memoirs to Serve the History of the Revolution 
of Saint-Domingue, Pillet Aîné, 1819, volume 2, pp. 331-335.

[8]Le Borgne de Boigne (1817), commented by Lacroix, 1819, volume 2, pp. 
280-282.

[9]Jean-François Brière, Haiti and France 1804-1848: The Broken Dream, 
Karthala, 2008, p. 108.

[10]Beaubrun Ardouin, Studies on the History of Haiti, Dezobry & E. 
Magdeleine, volume 9, 1860, p. 341.

[11]Ardouin, ibid., pp. 349-351.

[12]Mémoires d'Inginac, J.R. de Cordova, 1843., p. 69.

[13]Brière, op. cit., p. 117.

[14]Ardouin, op. cit., p. 271.

[15]Brière, op. cit., p. 120.

[16]Brière, ibid., p. 219.

[17]Joachim, ibid., p. 184.

[18]Joachim, ibid., pp. 212, 231, 234.

[19]https://www.nytimes.com/fr/2022/05/20/world/haiti-france-dette-reparations.html.

https://www.unioncommunistelibertaire.org/?1825-Mais-pourquoi-l-Etat-haitien-a-t-il-accepte-de-payer
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