A-Infos (en) France, OCL CA #339 - Senegal: the neocolonial power of Macky Sall is at the end of its run but the political crisis is not over (ca, de, fr, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]

In Senegal, the head of state, after having had to renounce a third 
mandate, has since sought to prolong his time in power but he also seems 
to have lost all credit with the Senegalese, even within his own camp 
which appears divided and weakened. Whatever the outcome of this end of 
reign, Macky Sall's record will be that of unequaled repression in the 
political history of this country while the fundamental problems which 
keep the majority of Senegalese in poverty still remain. , obscured by 
the twists and turns of the electoral dispute.

Macky Sall's ultimately losing strategy since he had to give up his 
third term

To face the challenge to his regime, embodied in particular by Ousmane 
Sonko's PASTEF, Macky Sall had on May 31, convened a "national dialogue" 
on the subject of the political crisis situation initiated in 2021 with 
accusations of rape targeting the leader of PASTEF. The aim of this 
"dialogue" (which was not the first he organized) was in particular to 
divide the opposition grouped under his banner of Yonnu Askan Wi. Which 
was an objective partly achieved with the participation of one of the 
figures of this coalition, Khalifa Sall, the former socialist mayor of 
Dakar having created his own party, and who, after a conviction in 2017, 
had been imprisoned and prevented to be a candidate during the last 
presidential elections in 2019. However, at the end of this dialogue at 
the beginning of July, under pressure both from the population and from 
his mentors at the international level, Macky Sall had to give up run 
for a third term.
Thinking that it had isolated Sonko and his supporters, the regime then 
launched an operation to eliminate them: after having been illegally 
detained for weeks in his own home, without being able to communicate 
with his lawyers, the leader of the opposition was then arrested as well 
as hundreds of its supporters, in particular executives and local 
elected officials of the party which was itself dissolved. In September, 
he then designated his Prime Minister Amadou Ba as the candidate in the 
presidential election for the Benno Bokk Yakaar coalition, dominated by 
his party, the Alliance for the Republic, but this choice was quickly 
contested with the the emergence of dissident candidates within the APR 
itself as well as criticism targeting Amadou Ba, from figures in the 
presidential party.
Another event changed the situation. While the regime thought it had 
finished with Sonko, other opposition candidacies close to the latter 
were validated by the Constitutional Council on January 20, 2024, 
notably that of Bassirou Diomaye Faye, number 2 of PASTEF, also 
incarcerated but not yet definitively judged, which allowed him to be 
declared a candidate. On the other hand, another candidate that Macky 
Sall thought he could integrate into his game was invalidated by the 
Constitutional Council: Karim Wade, the son of former president 
Abdoulaye Wade. He was not able to obtain his decree of renunciation of 
French nationality until January 16, after submitting his application. 
He was therefore excluded on this basis. The PDS, unhappy with this 
decision, immediately launched accusations of corruption against two of 
the members of the Constitutional Council. Other failed candidates, 
declaring themselves as "spoiled candidates" also put pressure on their 
files to be re-examined. Incidentally, we can note that the 
establishment of a system of "citizen sponsorships", supposed to limit 
the number of candidates for the presidential seat, led to the opposite 
result: 20 candidates were selected, an unrivaled record!

An attempted constitutional coup that does not pass...
While a few days earlier, Macky Sall had received and listened to the 
grievances of the "failed-spoliated" by telling them that the decisions 
of the Constitutional Council could not be appealed, on February 3, he 
canceled the decree he had taken the end of November to convene the 
electoral body on the grounds that there would be an institutional 
crisis between the Assembly and the constitutional council targeted by 
accusations of corruption. In the process, the National Assembly met to 
vote on a derogatory law with a view to postponing the elections to 
December 15 and prolonging Macky Sall in power in the meantime. What had 
already announced this institutional coup, a few days later, was the 
vote in the Assembly for a commission of inquiry into accusations of 
corruption by the Constitutional Council. However, the corrupter 
implicated in the accusations launched by the PDS was none other than 
the Prime Minister and candidate of the ruling party, Amadou Ba!
This latest about-face by the head of state appeared as a new 
masquerade, failing to conceal his choice to block an electoral process 
in which his side was the loser. Faced with the reaction of the 
population, first on Sunday February 4, then especially on the following 
Friday, where demonstrations took place almost everywhere, not only in 
Dakar and its suburbs, but also in other cities in the country: Saint 
Louis, Thiès, Ziguinchor, Louga, Diourbel, up to Mbacké near Touba, the 
religious town of the Mourides. As in the past, the regime reacted by 
repressing demonstrations, cutting off mobile internet data and cutting 
the signal of the Walf television channel, known to be close to the 
opposition. Shortly after, the license for this channel was even 
"permanently" withdrawn. But by acting in this way, it is Macky Sall who 
has definitively discredited himself. Macky Sall's international 
sponsors had to let him go, more openly in the case of the United States 
than France, which fears more the hazards of an electoral alternation. 
By wanting to cling to power, while Senegal is supposed to be the 
democratic showcase of French neocolonialism, Macky Sall has become a 
burden. In terms of symbols, the images of opposition deputies evacuated 
from the hemicycle by the Senegalese GIGN look bad. On the economic 
level, from the perspective of the interests of international 
imperialism, the atmosphere of crisis for which it is mainly responsible 
is not good for business and moreover, on the internal level, the 
Senegalese employers have also distanced himself from the regime by 
demanding respect for the electoral calendar.
Faced with this, the Macky Sall regime, which only knows the balance of 
power, will go back (a little): it restarts the internet and reverses 
the closure of the Walf channel, it releases some of the political 
prisoners (between three and four hundred). On February 15, the 
Constitutional Council repealed the presidential decree of February 3, 
declared the law passed in the national assembly as unconstitutional and 
ordered the president to organize elections "as soon as possible."»
However, Macky Sall continued to vacillate, to procrastinate by 
announcing a new "dialogue" to agree on the date and modalities of an 
"inclusive election". This umpteenth "dialogue" took place on February 
26 and 27 but it was boycotted by 17 of the 19 candidates still in the 
running.
Unsurprisingly, the conclusions of these "dialogueists" went in the same 
direction: pushing back the date of the presidential elections to June 2 
and opening the list of selected candidates to a certain number of 
"spoiled" people who would see their files examined again. Once again, 
the Constitutional Council, requested by the other candidates, confirmed 
that the elections must be held within a short time, giving the date of 
March 31. For his part, Macky Sall published a decree calling elections 
for March 24, a date with which the Council ended up aligning.
The battle now seems lost for the supporters of the constitutional 
putsch but everything is perhaps not over. The official candidate of the 
government, Amadou Ba, is in a delicate position, so much so that we 
even wondered if the government was not going to completely abandon him 
in favor of someone else. Those who embody the putschist hard line are 
still in government, like the Minister of Tourism, Mame Mbaye Niang, at 
the origin of the defamation complaint which resulted in the 
invalidation of Sonko. They know that in the event of defeat, they risk 
a lot, being personally involved in repressive actions, including those 
carried out on the fringes of the action of the security forces with the 
establishment of militias (notably that with the evocative name of the 
"Maroons"). fire") that we have seen at work against demonstrators or 
opposition activists, not to mention all the cases of corruption for 
which they could be prosecuted as soon as the sword of justice has 
changed hands.
Another element of uncertainty which weighed on the launch of the 
campaign, the release of Ousmane Sonko and Bassirou Diomaye Faye, 
announced as imminent since mid-February, ended up materializing on the 
evening of March 14. We will also see if the National Audiovisual 
Regulatory Council will end up granting air time to Bassirou Diomaye 
Faye, which was initially refused to him on the grounds that this time 
would have been used by others who would speak in his name. name.

The heavy repressive record of Macky Sall's "republican" regime
During the last wave of spontaneous demonstrations against the 
postponement of the election, four young people were killed by the 
police (two students in Saint Louis, a high school student in Ziguinchor 
and a young street trader in Dakar). Over the entire period of the 
crisis since March 2021, the death toll, almost all of which are the 
result of live ammunition, amounts to more than sixty deaths. This is a 
sad record in contemporary Senegalese political life. Even in the period 
of Senghor's party-state during the years 1968 and following, where it 
was the subject of virulent protests from the youth then animated by a 
revolutionary spirit, we had never known such a level of repression. 
Likewise, the number of political prisoners during these years never 
exceeded a few dozen. With this crisis, Senegal has recorded at least a 
thousand political detainees. Freedom of information has also not been 
spared, with repeated internet shutdowns, violence recently carried out 
on journalists by the police, etc. This repressive outburst also 
targeting the latter can explain why during the release of political 
prisoners we could read in the press several testimonies about the 
ordeal of the latter: torture and ill-treatment on the part of gendarmes 
and police officers during arrests, often carried out at random; the 
incarceration decided in practice because the people in question had 
left likes on their cell phones on social networks in favor of Sonko or 
other PASTEF figures while no investigation was subsequently carried 
out; finally overcrowding, the lack of the most basic hygiene in 
Senegalese prisons, etc.
This assessment is not the result of chance. This is the result of a 
deliberate policy. Last year, Macky Sall was able to announce that in 
twelve years, the duration of his two mandates, the number of 
gendarmerie personnel reaching 35,000 men had tripled. The police also 
increased their numbers during 2023 with 4,000 new recruitments. When 
you drive around Dakar, you can't help but be struck by the youth of the 
robocops, supposed to maintain order, permanently deployed in strategic 
locations in the capital. We must also mention the collaboration with 
Western regimes, supposed to defend democratic values, in this rise in 
repressive power. We will not return to the delivery by France of 
repressive materials first used in Yellow Vest demonstrations, such as 
stun grenades. There was also the assistance of Israeli elements, 
identified among the police forces who came to "pick up" Sonko to bring 
him to the courthouse in February 2023. The latest development in the 
matter is the identification of units special intended for the fight 
against terrorism, on photos dating from the repression of 
demonstrations organized in the south of the country at the end of May 
of that same year. These special units, the GAR-SI, were financed by the 
European Union and set up thanks to "technical cooperation" from the 
Spanish Guardia Civil, which is also experienced in this area!

A self-serving amnesty
While Macky Sall was still repeating in January that there were no 
political prisoners in Senegal, he had the Assembly vote on March 6 for 
an amnesty law concerning "offenses or crimes linked to motivated or 
political demonstrations committed between February 1, 2021 and February 
25, 2024.» More than ten amnesty laws have been passed in Senegal since 
independence, but for the first time it will include acts which have not 
not the subject of a judgment, or even an investigation, which is the 
case for the dozens of people killed during the demonstrations. This is 
why this amnesty law appeared to be yet another deception, because to 
free the demonstrators or opposition supporters there is no need for 
amnesty in fact, as we have seen. when a few hundred of them were 
released, to reduce tension after the demonstrations against the 
postponement. In fact, it is a text which aims to exonerate from all 
prosecution the various people responsible for repression (political 
leaders, police officers, gendarmes, militiamen, etc.). That said, we 
must not forget that there is also a procedure initiated at the level of 
the International Criminal Court and it is not said, either, that this 
amnesty law is definitively acquired as a shield against any prosecution 
later even on an internal level.

The underlying problems that remain and the mirages of the "Senegalese 
democratic model"
Macky Sall's government has prided itself for years on having obtained 
high growth rates, of the order of 6 to 7%, and on having provided the 
country with infrastructure, but since 2018, the index of human 
development which takes into account criteria of health, education and 
standard of living is in decline. Conversely, logically, migratory flows 
are increasing. The economy remains underdeveloped, with on one side, an 
informal sector which occupies the vast majority of assets and on the 
other side, rent-seeking activities in the hands of multinationals 
(mining, telecommunications, and in the near future: oil and gas 
exploitation...) generating high profits, repatriated abroad. Fishing is 
a disaster sector due to overfishing resulting in particular from 
fishing agreements concluded with foreign countries. Likewise at the 
land level, the authorities are selling off land in favor of 
agribusiness to the detriment of village communities. Macky Sall had 
promised in 2019, 100,000 housing units for low-income households, not 
even 2,000 were delivered and still to families with incomes that are 
rather average than modest. To finance this infrastructure, the country 
went into debt at a record level. Growth has largely benefited a 
minority of speculators and dealers linked to those in power but not the 
mass of the population. In addition, this growth comes at the cost of 
environmental degradation, which already poses public health problems in 
the Cape Verde region where the capital is located, with air and soil 
pollution as well. .
If Sonko and PASTEF aroused unprecedented and unforeseen popular 
support, it is because people clearly perceived that Macky Sall's power 
was only there to satisfy the interests of a minority of upstarts and to 
keep his privileges, the ruling clan resorted more and more openly to 
the manipulation of different institutions and even to brutal force 
outside any legal framework.

A sham good governance pact
That said, the mobilization against such a project of monopolization of 
power was largely carried out on the basis of institutional demands, or 
sometimes in the name of an idealized conception of the Senegalese 
political system which would be a "model" of democracy to be preserved. 
This institutional protest perspective was born from the disappointments 
of the first alternation. In 2008, opponents of Abdoulaye Wade, who were 
largely former supporters of the latter when he came to power - notably 
those from the left who paradoxically had brought a "liberal" candidate 
to power in 2000 -, began to realize that he was setting up a system of 
personal power after having manipulated the appetites for power of 
everyone within the political class. This took the form of the National 
Conferences held in 2008, which made proposals to put in place 
mechanisms limiting presidential power. Macky Sall supported these 
meetings when it came to getting elected in 2012. But subsequently, when 
he came to power, he was careful not to implement what they recommended. 
For this 2024 election, we saw the resurgence of a Good Governance Pact 
initiative claiming this heritage from the National Conference, which 
was proposed for signature by the candidates. Obviously signing is one 
thing, applying it later once in power is another... Another question, 
even more political: will the opposition with Bassirou Diomaye Faye of 
PASTEF, if it wins the elections - or rather if we let him win these 
elections! - will be ready to assume a break with French neocolonialism. 
This candidate announced in his program the establishment of a national 
currency, but on this point, will there really be a break with the CFA 
franc, if by chance he is elected, that remains to be seen!

A mythical vision
The other illusion which permeates certain speeches is the reference to 
a political system which has embodied democracy for decades, even 
centuries, in Senegal. The name of the "civil society" coalition (Aar 
sunu election: Protect our election) created in reaction to the 
postponement of the presidential election, implicitly refers to this 
mythical vision of a Senegalese democratic electoral system which would 
contrast with the situation of neighboring countries. To celebrate this 
"democratic tradition", some sometimes go so far as to refer to the 
registers of grievances of the colony of Senegal during the meeting of 
the Estates General of 1789, forgetting that these were demands in favor 
of the interests of colonial commerce. , especially those of the 
slave-owning settlers! In the contemporary period since independence, it 
must be remembered that elections have been the occasion for crises and 
violence, as in 1963 with the Allées du Centenaire massacre where dozens 
of demonstrators were killed by bullets or later, the state of emergency 
after the 1988 elections, with the imprisonment of opposition leaders, 
including Abdoulaye Wade. More generally, the elections were either 
organized without opposition during the era of the de facto single 
party, or were the subject of massive fraud, with ballot stuffing as a 
result, whether in the early 1960s under Senghor, or later under Abdou 
Diouf in the 1980s.
Nowadays, it's a little more sophisticated but there are also different 
ways to rig or at least bias the results of the election. A recent work 
(F. Pigeaud & NS Sylla, De la Démocratie en Françafrique) highlighted a 
proven tactic that these authors called "electoral eugenics". In fact, 
it is a question of favoring geographical areas or categories of 
population where the party in power is in a position of strength. For 
example, between 2012 and 2019, the Fouta region which is the 
"stronghold" of the ruling party saw the number of voters increase by 
63,000, who voted overwhelmingly for Macky Sall. Conversely, over the 
same period the department of Dakar, where the ruling party is in the 
minority, saw its number of voters decrease by 19,000, which does not 
correspond to demographic reality. In terms of age, a similar phenomenon 
is happening: the youngest age groups are clearly under-represented in 
the electoral register because young people are those who vote the least 
for the party in power. This file is subject to periodic revisions but 
over very limited periods. Furthermore, it is the administration which 
has control over this file. Another recent study has raised an issue 
which deserves a closer look when we celebrate the democratic model in 
Senegal: by comparing different sources of the administration, we 
identify, among other things, the existence of "826 offices fictitious 
votes in which 469,291 voters are attached. ( 
https://www.seneplus.com/opinions/u...;»;)
At the time when these lines are written, it is difficult to predict 
what will happen after the first round of the election, on March 24. 
However, it cannot be ruled out that after a pre-electoral crisis which 
has developed for three years, Senegal will also experience a 
post-electoral crisis.

http://oclibertaire.lautre.net/spip.php?article4128
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