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(en) France, OCL CA #336 - Political crisis in Senegal: a temporary lull but no exit in sight. (ca, de, fr, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]
Date
Wed, 14 Feb 2024 07:20:11 +0200
In June 2023, in particular, Senegal was the scene of clashes between
supporters of the opposition leader, Ousmane Sonko and the forces
serving the head of state Macky Sall, namely the police, the
gendarmerie, and even "thugs" recruited as auxiliaries to deal with a
riot situation (see C.A. of last October). Since then, the situation has
experienced a certain calm, although one might have believed in a new
wave of violence after the imprisonment of Ousmane Sonko and a large
number of his supporters. However, with the electoral deadline next
February, the same crisis factors remain, both in terms of political
policy and on a social level.
A brief look back at the standoff between the government and the opposition
In March 2021, following Ousmane Sonko's summons to the Dakar court to
answer charges of rape and death threats, Senegal was on fire for
several days. This case attributed to an opponent occurred while two
previous challengers of Macky Sall were sentenced to prison terms making
them ineligible: in 2015, Karim Wade, the son of the previous president
and in 2018, Khalifa Sall, dissident member of the socialist party who
was then mayor of Dakar. A new wave of violence took place at the
beginning of June 2023: given the weakness of the case, the court had
given up prosecuting Sonko for rape and death threats, but had still
condemned him for "corruption of the youth" to two years in prison,
which was enough to disqualify him from the presidential race. In total,
around fifty people died in these events, due to the action of the
police (or militias acting as backup). To date, despite complaints filed
by the families of the victims, there have been no investigations
carried out to determine responsibility for these deaths.
The imprisonment of Sonko and the illegalization of the main opposition
party
After being placed under de facto house arrest for 55 days at his home,
the regime ended up incarcerating Sonko on July 30 on various grounds:
call for insurrection, criminal association, attack on state security,
conspiracy against the authority of the State, acts and maneuvers to
compromise public security, criminal association in connection with a
terrorist enterprise. In the process, his party, PASTEF, was dissolved.
Even before this period in the preceding months many activists,
including elected officials, were thrown in prison. After his arrest,
Sonko went on hunger strike until September 2. He then resumed this
strike to follow the movement started on October 10 by women detained at
the Penal Camp.
In the weeks that followed, arrests continued. A French woman, Coline
Fay, who participated in a rally in support of Sonko on November 17, was
even arrested and charged with "criminal association in connection with
a terrorist enterprise, an act likely to compromise the security of the
State, complicity in "action against the authority of the State".
Incarcerated in the women's prison (Penal Camp), she led a hunger strike
to protest her arrest and detention.
Beyond police and judicial repression, the strategy of reprisals desired
by the Macky regime
Beyond the direct repression which decimated the ranks of PASTEF and
which also targeted other targets (journalists, members of "civil
society" during the year 2023), it appears that the government is
engaging in a strategy of reprisals targeting groups or sectors of
society considered to have participated in protests against the regime.
Geographically, the city of Ziguinchor which elected Sonko as mayor has
found itself relatively cut off from the rest of the country since the
events: the airport is under construction while the boat trips which
linked Ziguinchor and Casamance to Dakar are suspended for "security
reasons". Another symptomatic example is the University of Dakar which
has been closed to students since June 1. Students are supposed to do
distance learning which doesn't actually work. The current regime
prefers to have a "white year" at the University of Dakar rather than
take the risk of it becoming a hotbed of protest in an electoral context
that it knows is high risk. This once again shows the level of cynicism
of those in power when it comes to weighing the future of the country
and its own perpetuation. Macky Sall prides himself on having put
Senegal on the path to "emergence" but he is ready to sacrifice the
economy of an entire region or the study opportunities of a new
generation of high school graduates.
After the urban guerrilla war, the squabble on the political-judicial field
Ousmane Sonko's strategy, which consisted of relying on popular
mobilization in his favor, particularly among young people, has also
shown its limits. Since the last crisis in June and the incarceration of
Sonko at the end of July, those in power seem to have managed to regain
control. This is undoubtedly because PASTEF, faced with the repression
that has taken place, probably does not have deep enough roots in the
country. It is also because the fight has moved to another area, that of
justice. The issue is that of Sonko's presence in the presidential
election. The General Directorate of Elections (DGE), following Sonko's
conviction to two years in prison for "corruption of youth", removed him
from the electoral register. However, on October 18, a judge in
Ziguinchor ordered that Sonko be reinstated in the file on the grounds
that this conviction had not been legally notified to him, which would
make him eligible again. The DGE nevertheless continued to refuse to
comply. Then, it was the Autonomous National Electoral Commission (CENA)
which also decided in favor of this reintegration. Immediately, the Head
of State dismissed the members of the CENA whose mandate had officially
ended several years ago. Later, the Supreme Court and the ECOWAS Court
of Justice had to rule, in a rather negative sense in relation to the
requests of Sonko's lawyers. But in the latest twist in this legal
drama, on December 15, a court in Dakar once again ordered the
reinstatement of Sonko in the file. But for their part, the government
lawyers will appeal, so that we get as close as possible to the final
date for submitting applications on December 26, which will make a Sonko
candidacy increasingly unlikely despite the court decisions which were
favorable to him. In fact, Macky Sall's government shows the little
regard it has for court decisions since they risk allowing Sonko to be
present in the February elections.
Attempts to block the vote by the ruling candidate...
To "kill the match" for the upcoming elections, the current regime seems
to have chosen to exploit a system supposed to filter candidates. This
is the sponsorship system: to be able to be a candidate, you must have
the signature of a certain number of members of the electorate (roughly
60,000 signatures or 0.6% of the electorate) or a a certain number of
signatures of deputies (13) or local elected officials (120). However,
the ruling party announces sponsorship collection figures at an
exorbitant level: the government newspaper, Le Soleil, wrote at the
beginning of December that the candidacy of Amadou Ba, the current prime
minister designated as Macky Sall's "dauphin", had recorded up to
3,700,000 sponsorships, or half of the electorate. Whether this figure
is inflated or not, this clearly indicates the government's strategy: to
ensure that the "pool" of sponsorships is dried up by the steamroller of
the presidential party, not to mention the "bogus" candidacies of
profiteers ready to withdraw for the candidacy of power in exchange for
hard cash and/or various advantages. Added to this are the obstacles
placed on other opposition candidates who are prevented from traveling
in certain regions when seeking sponsorship, under the pretext of risk
of disturbance to public order.
...and resistance from the opposition
On the side of PASTEF, the party which had the candidate having every
chance of being present in the second round and winning the elections,
there is another candidacy which is emerging, that of Bassirou Diomaye
Faye, the de facto number 2 of the party which is also imprisoned for
various offenses including contempt of court but which has not (yet?)
been removed from the electoral lists. But in any case, everything
indicates that the regime has chosen to rule out a priori any candidacy
emanating from this party which has become the bête noire of the regime.
Migrants leaving the country for the Canaries
The splitting of the presidential camp
But in the power camp, even if he seems to have succeeded in subduing
his opposition adversaries through repression, there is also
uncertainty. Firstly because Macky Sall has "used up" more and more
figures from his own camp who now find themselves in the opposition
(notably the former prime minister who led the presidential party's
campaign for the legislative elections in 2022 ) or who present
dissident candidacies against Amadou Ba (Aly Gouye Ndiaye former
Minister of the Interior and Bounne Abdallah former Prime Minister).
Then, because within the very presidential party that he is supposed to
embody, Amadou Ba is considered not very credible and has been the
target of criticism within the Alliance for the Republic (APR) which one
wonders if they are not are not remotely controlled by the head of state
himself. The prospect of a postponement of the elections is sometimes
mentioned, which would allow Macky Sall to remain in power, thus going
back on his promise made under the pressure of events, a few months ago,
to leave power and not to run again. for a third term. In the same
register, the question of the intervention of the army in this regime
crisis is not pure political fiction: during the International Forum on
Peace and Security which took place at the end of November, a Senegalese
general put forward the idea of subjecting politicians to "a single
mandate of seven or eight years" to avoid the electoral crises which
regularly shake African countries...
France's continued support for a regime which remains one of its last
points of support after the wave of coups in neighboring countries
However, the position of the French government remains totally in favor
of the current regime. Macky Sall's Senegal remains with Alassane
Ouattara's Ivory Coast, the main point of support for the strategy which
consists of maintaining against all odds a Françafrique which is
increasingly falling apart with the departure of the military from Mali
, Burkina Faso and Niger. On November 13, Macron took the liberty of
intervening in favor of Macky Sall to bombard him at the head of a
pro-imperialist Théodule committee: the Paris Pact for Peace and Climate
(4P) in case he was unemployed in leaving power. In December, Amadou Ba,
to consolidate his presidential image, was able to appear alongside
Elisabeth Borne during a Franco-Senegalese intergovernmental seminar. In
the event of an open crisis, the support of the French state would be
acquired by the regime, which knows that Macron is ready to do anything
not to lose face once again in an African country, especially when it
comes to the democratic showcase of Françafrique, even if numerous facts
symptomatic of the dictatorial drift of the regime are increasingly
tarnishing this brand image.
In any case, this electoral campaign, which focuses on legal issues
linked to the desire of those in power to exclude certain candidates a
priori, ignores social issues even more than if it had been a question
of an open and non-controversial election.
Conclusion: political impasse aggravates the social crisis
The Macky Sall regime's discourse is that of "emerging Senegal". It
boasts economic results of an unprecedented level in the history of the
country, with an economic growth rate of around 6 to 7%, which could
further increase with the start of gas and oil exploitation. from next
year. The justification for its power is based on the political
stability which would allow this growth, supported through public
investment in infrastructure (roads, highways, electricity and water
supply networks, etc.). But this growth remains limited to certain
sectors (in particular urban real estate or agro-business which allow
speculative gains) and ultimately only benefits a minority of
Senegalese, or even foreign businessmen like the famous Frank Timis who
after having hit the headlines for having obtained oil concessions
through Aliou Sall, the president's brother, returns to the news by
acquiring 20,000 hectares of land which will be devoted to the
cultivation of alfalfa intended for export...
Conversely, traditional sectors of the Senegalese economy, such as
peanuts and oil mills or even fishing, are devastated, in a context
where increased globalization and the sell-out of the country's
interests in favor of short-term calculations have prevented the
construction of economically and ecologically sustainable sectors.
The Zuiderdam, one of the largest cruise ships, welcomed at the port of
Dakar
In recent months, even before the electoral deadlines, many Senegalese
voted with their feet by leaving their country in canoes. Thousands have
managed to reach the Canaries where an obstacle course awaits them to
find a situation in Europe, without forgetting the hundreds who have
disappeared at sea. The fishing crisis which makes it more interesting
for the boss of Whether a canoe conveys migrants or casts its nets for
increasingly meager catches can explain the increase in these
departures, but it is above all the lack of prospects for an
impoverished population that explains this. The authorities, faced with
the phenomenon, continue to develop a discourse of blaming migrants
without mentioning outright repression: hundreds of fishermen accused of
ferrying migrants are currently incarcerated. At the same time, the
Dakar port authorities welcomed with great fanfare the Zuiderdam, one of
the largest cruise ships (and one of the most polluting!) which can
transport nearly two thousand tourists with more than eight hundred men
crew. Criminalizing the poor who try to find a future elsewhere than in
their own country and rolling out the red carpet to foreigners with deep
wallets sums up rather well the pro-imperialist line faithfully followed
by the current Senegalese state.
http://oclibertaire.lautre.net/spip.php?article4056
_________________________________________
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