A-Infos (en) South Africa, Zabalaza* #6 - ZIMBABWE: TIME FOR AN END TO THE ELECTORAL ROAD

The April 2004 elections pose tough questions for the MDC, ZCTU. The
choices made now will have massive consequences. We suggest a way
UP FROM UNDER --------- In 1999, the class struggle in Zimbabwe
------------------------ was at an all-time high. An ongoing series
of general strikes in the private and State
sectors had shaken the State apparatus
headed by Robert Mugabe and the ZANU-
PF machine. The union movement, cen-
tred on the ZCTU, was numbered among
the ten fastest growing worldwide. Riots in
urban townships, a farm workers strike of
unprecedented scale and success, a mili-
tant student union, ZINASU, and protests
by war veterans crippled the neo-liberal
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP)
that had been in place since 1991. The
SAP - championed by a ZANU-PF in office
since 1980 - was quietly abandoned by the
end of 1997.
     These events, reported in Zabalaza,
and its predecessor, Workers Solidarity,
were immensely inspiring, and were part of
a broader upsurge of class struggle in
South Africa, Swaziland, and Zambia. The
possibility of a post-neo-liberal and post-
nationalist Zimbabwe seemed very real.
ZANU-PF was widely reviled, corruption
scandals well known. The party's hold on
power seemed shaky. What was, in prac-
tice, a one-party State, seemed doomed:
throughout southern Africa, popular move-
ments were toppling postcolonial rulers,
and Zimbabwe seemed next in line. In
1999, the ZCTU, ZINASU, the National
Constitutional Assembly, NGO, and others,
began a process that led to the formation of
a very popular "Movement for Democratic
Change" (MDC). Then, in early 2000,
ZANU-PF lost a popular referendum on
changing the constitution.

HOW THE REST WAS LOST
     The game seemed up, yet over the next
five years, ZANU-PF has made itself more
unassailable than ever. Several factors
have led to this outcome, but foremost
must be counted the ruthlessness and cyn-
icism of the regime, coupled with the hope-
less politics of Zimbabwe opposition. In
1997, the regime co-opted the war veter-
ans' groups with a massive "pensions" pay-
off totalling US$350 million. In 2000, after
the referendum and just before the mid-
year elections in which the MDC made its
first appearance, the regime launched its
invasion of 1,600 White-owned commercial
farms. Orchestrated through the police,
army,       and      Central      Intelligence
Organization (CIO), the actual seizures
were led by a motley coalition of self-
described "war veterans," ZANU-PF offi-
cials, and CIO men. The operations were
simple: a group of unemployed people
would be bussed onto a farm; farm workers
and landowners were driven off; actual
ownership of the land passed to the lead-
ers; and small plots and some food were
given to the loyal elements of the "reset-
tled" unemployed.
    This brilliant gamble achieved many
things. It broke the back of the farm work-
ers union, the largest ZCTU affiliate and
the MDC's main rural outpost. It trans-
ferred vast resources to the bankrupt State,
which could be used to discipline and
reward followers: in a very real sense,
quasi-feudal chieftaincies of the "commu-
nal" lands were replicated throughout what
was once the heart of the capitalist econo-
my. By attacking an unpopular and promi-
nent minority, Zimbabwe's whites - many of
whom were sympathetic to the MDC - the
regime was able to appeal to popular
racism, while making sure its land reform
left the African bourgeoisie of ZANU-PF
larger and wealthier. Many on the left have
consistently ignored the overtly racist ele-
ments of the land invasions, yet these
proved its strongest appeal.
    Despite the myth - current amongst
South African activists - that peasant pro-
ductivity is higher than that of capitalist
farmers, Zimbabwe's new rural relations
were quite unable to replicate the perform-
ance of the high productivity, capital-inten-
sive, commercial farms. This led to mas-
sive shortfalls in food output and exports,
destroying a sector previously responsible
for one quarter of all jobs and 35 percent of
exports. The spectre of
starvation led innumer-
able international chari-
ties to send in food aid,
but this was captured
by ZANU-PF (inde-
pendent      distribution
was not permitted), and
became one more tool
of power: food was
exchanged for ZANU-
PF loyalty.
SELECTIONS AT ELECTIONS
    The rural counter-
revolution was coupled
to a massive crack-
down on the MDC and its affiliates.
Morgan Tsvangirai, former ZCTU head,
and now MDC leader, was subject to two
treason       trials,   ZINASU's     Tinashe
Chimedza was beaten unconscious, media
was suppressed, and ZCTU and MDC
meetings attacked - either by the police
and army, or by "war veterans," - by now a
quasi-official militia, the "green bombers."
For those who have illusions in ZANU-PF's
professed radicalism, the continuity with
the 1980s must be noted: the Matabeleland
Massacre left between 5,000 and 15,000
dead, and resulted in the dissolution of the
rival ZAPU party.
     Even so, the MDC won 57 about of the
120 elected seats in the 2000 general elec-
tions - a further 30 seats are appointed by
the president - and performed well in the
2002 presidential elections. It captured the
main urban working-class constituencies,
but was unable to break into the rural
areas, where the bulk of the population
lives. The traditional chiefs, and the "new
chiefs" on the seized farms, used every
means necessary to ensure ZANU-PF car-
ried the day.
     By 2005, however, the long-term effects
of repression, hunger, patronage politics,
vote-rigging and unremitting tyranny had
helped break the MDC. ZANU-PF ended
up with 78 seats, the MDC only 41, with
voter turnout it's lowest in years. Huddled
urban crowds greeted the results in silence
and resignation. While the South African
government, and its regional allies in
SADC continued to make fools of them-
selves, proclaiming the elections "free and
fair," social movements in South Africa, and
COSATU and the SA Communist Party,
agree with Tsvangirai: the results reflect
"disgusting, massive fraud."
WHERE TO NEXT?
     How far Zimbabwe has come from the
glory days of 1999! Repression played its
role in the change, but other movements, in
far more desperate circumstances, have
achieved far more in far less time than the
   DC and the ZCTU. Furthermore, the
2005 elections have been characterized by
substantially less repression than the previ-
ous elections, yet the MDC has done even
worse.
     At the heart of the problem is the
absolutely pitiful politics of the MDC. While
it grew from the hard-fought struggles of
the popular classes, the new party never
offered much. Built by unions and students
and township fighters, the MDC soon
became a moderate party. Direct action,
which had turned the tide against Mugabe,
was now on the backburner: all efforts were
to be concentrated on elections. Despite
the obvious fact that ZANU-PF has manip-
ulated the electoral process since first com-
ing into office, elections are the be-all and
end-all of the MDC leaders. Strikes and
demonstrations in Zimbabwe have been
replaced by international fund-raising, pro-
viding obvious ammunition for ZANU-PF's
"big lie" that the MDC is the tool of Tony
Blair.
     The struggle against neo-liberalism,
which had driven the popular movements,
was replaced by an MDC commitment to
privatisation and cost recovery policies: in
power, the MDC-led Bulawayo town coun-
cil soon began to implement hated cut-offs
of basic services. The shift to neo-liberal-
ism reflected the most basic structural
problem of the MDC: it was not under the
control of the popular movements, and was
soon hijacked by moderates who hated
criticism and tried to purge the small
Trotskyist ISOZ group. As a party that
called itself a "united front of
Zimbabweans," the MDC was unable to
develop a resolutely working class and
peasant programme that went beyond sim-
ply criticizing repression to champion col-
lectivisation of resources, self-manage-
ment, equality and internationalism.
     The confused leaders of the MDC are
quite unable to tackle the hard-nosed
Mugabe and ZANU-PF. They dealt with
electoral abuses in 2000 and 2002 by
appealing to the courts: even though the
judiciary is routinely manipulated by ZANU-
PF.
     They backed off from an earlier deci-
sion to boycott the 2005 elections, allowing
another Mugabe gamble: a temporary
decrease in repression to win international
legitimacy and, more importantly, renewed
foreign aid. After the elections, Tsvangirai -
obviously scared of another treason trial -
made vague comments about renewed
popular protest, but the tradition of ongoing
protest has lain dormant for years, and the
MDC has no real plans to re-awaken it.
This political posing is simply irresponsible:
it was followed by a military occupation of
the Bulawayo townships.

WAY FORWARD

    As anarchists, we have, of course, no
faith in elections. While we consistently
supported free elections in Zimbabwe as a
step forward, we stressed that only ongo-
ing protest could achieve such a goal, and
strongly opposed any participation of the
popular movements in such elections. An
open parliamentary system is preferable to
a tyranny, but only because it is associated
with an extension of rights that facilitates
further struggles - not because the parlia-
ment itself is a road to revolution.
    We have always taken a flexible posi-
tion on the forms of struggle in Zimbabwe.
In 1999, we supported the need to unite the
popular movements, and also the forma-
tion of a political organisation in Zimbabwe.
However, we advocated a revolutionary
and anti-parliamentary body, rejecting the
emerging MDC policies. In 2001, we
argued that the potential for the MDC to
become a "radical grassroots organisation
to shake the foundations of the
Zimbabwean capitalist state" had been
lost. Even so, we argued the MDC must be
defended against repression. In 2003, our
view was that the focus had shifted to elec-
tions, and we therefore stressed the need
to focus on overthrowing Mugabe. This
implied that an MDC government would be
better, but actually left the question of the
future quite vague.
    It is now clear, however, that the MDC's
electoral road is at a dead-end. What
future struggles take place, must take a
new path if they are to achieve anything.
The wave of struggle built up in the 1990s
is almost exhausted, with a tangible mood
of despondency has set in the popular
classes. Everything points to another turn-
ing point, like that of 1999. At
present, the MDC is on the eve
of accepting Cabinet posts,
which would be an absolute
disaster. Either the MDC is
reinvented, or it must be aban-
doned. There are signs of dis-
sent in the ranks - ZINASU is
opposed to electoral participa-
tion, the moderate Women of
Zimbabwe Arise expressed its
unhappiness with Tsvangirai's
fumbling, and the underground
Zvakwana group seems keen
on protests - but these must
come to something.

picture: Zimbabwe 1997 - cops clash with workers

BUILDING TOMORROW
    It is time for reflection and reassess-
ment, a period that must give rise to a new
direction, or accept another 20 years of
misery. Our opinion is that elections must
be abandoned. It is necessary to go back
to the streets in protest, both against
repression and against poverty. The pre-
cise form of protests cannot be decided in
advance, but the use of the general strike
must be seriously considered. The protest
movement must reject the political party
model of organising, and centre, instead,
on self-organisation, mandates and dele-
gates, and self-activity and self-education.
Only such a movement will have the
resilience to tackle ZANU-PF, survive its
inevitable retaliation, and create new and
better relations between the people.
    It is necessary, also, to have a pro-
gramme that can inspire the masses. It
must offer something more than an
exchange of Mugabe's iron fist for
Tsvangirai's bumbling hands. It must
champion important demands - abolition of
the chieftaincy, job security, social welfare,
political freedoms, reindustrialisation - and
foster a project of creating a post-capitalist,
self-managed society, based on horizontal
control of the communities and workplaces
by those who live and work in them in place
of just changing the faces at the top. It
must link the fight against neo-liberalism
and tyranny in Zimbabwe to similar fights in
neighbouring countries. That is the basis
for a united front of the oppressed classes,
the water of struggle that will nourish the
tree of freedom.
   Note: We are looking for Zimbabwe
   correspondents - please contact us
  through the addresses at the back of
               this magazine.


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